ARMIA NEW SZOR – So like the White Elephant tripped over his own legs [Polemika part 1]

On 22 September 2021 a presentation of the New Pattern Army (ANW) concept was held, which was prepared by the Strategy&Future team. Unquestionably innovative, ambitious and hopefully opening the door to major changes in the state security system. And like any "turning table" concept, it creates extreme emotions. Both positive and negative.

A careful reading of the New Model Army concept, and especially the accompanying presentation of Dr. Jack Bartosiak's speech leads to the conclusion that the authors of the concept, despite its modernist/nowatorial/characterist character, in several places, are pushing the Old Type Army. This applies especially to the kind of armed forces close to my heart, the Navy.

The fact is that the Navy was not devoted, during the presentation of the concept, much time, almost not at all, but as it was dedicated to it, to depreciate it particularly. And actually, it's hard to find a rational explanation for why.

I do not suspect the authors of the ANW concept, and especially Dr. Bartosiak about personal aversion or dislike of the MW, therefore the only possible explanation can be merely the lack of knowledge of what the maritime forces are doing and how they should be used and, consequently, the perception of them solely through the prism of defence, with the exception of the widely understood domain of state security.

This can be confirmed by the fact that the authors of the ANW Concept, in relation to the naval forces, are inconsistent in their opinions, and in some cases make contradictory thesis.

We can never be sure in advance at what point,whether full and whether Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will be launched at all.

ANW concept – slide 17

The appearance of a ship in a specific place, for centuries, is nothing but one of the levels of the escalation ladder. The State thus signals its readiness (presence of the ship) to specific activities or to defend essential interests. On the other hand, the absence of such presence is a sign of lack of interest or resignation.

It is worth mentioning at this point that the so-called "Right to Free Movement" is being tested by the naval forces in the area of Crimea or in the Taiwan Strait in order to convey a political signal.

Instead of depreciating the sense of implementation of the program We should strive for together with the frigates Poland to acquire the capabilities of TLAM (Tactical Land Attack Missile) or Tomahawk missiles.

Poland's willingness to acquire Tomahawk missiles and react to such a request would be a test of the credibility of the United States in supporting Poland as a front state of NATO and at the same time an excellent test of the reaction of other allied countries.

But most importantly, the acquisition of missiles capable of carrying nuclear charges would allow for the opening of serious talks regarding Poland's entry into the nuclear sharing program. And the "strategic window" can soon open when a Green government is formed in Germany and the debate on nuclear weapons begins in our western neighbour.

I would be very grateful if Dr. Bartosiak would shed more light on the statement of "US General" who stated that such a ship would last 15 minutes at most. I'm curious about his expertise in shippower and naval operating art.

I'll remind you that we already had authorities that claimed that the frigate would last 40 seconds, and then it turned out that they had no basic knowledge of carrying out activities at sea.

New Model Army aims to secure strategic flowsand protection against the effects of manipulating strategic flows.

ANW concept – slide 39

Despite many years of Chinese efforts to build the Belt and the Trail, the volume of rail and road transport between China and Europe is still a promotion of the volume of maritime transport, and there is no forecast that this will change significantly over the next two or three decades. Moreover, there are more and more problems on the Belt and the Road, and one of the key issues is the debt of the countries involved in this project, whose cumulative value is approaching USD 400 billion.

What is crucial to Poland's security is that Russia's disrupting or halting of strategic flows by land will not have a tangible impact on our economy, and therefore it will not be a leveraging tool for our safety.

It looks completely different in the sea direction. Energy sovereignty of Poland leads only through the sea, regardless of whether it is LNG or delivery via Baltic Pipe.

And here's another paradox associated with the ANW concept.

Despite the change by all cases of concepts such as the "new generation war" or "actions below the Art.5 threshold", the "strategic flows" of the Concept authors completely overlook the possibility of a threat coming from the sea direction. And the likely scenario is very simple, especially as the Russian leader has a great appetite for risk knowing that there is no unanimity in both NATO and the EU.

The Polish economy, dependent on the supply of energy raw materials by sea, may face a maritime blockade organised by Russia. Under an ulterior pretext Polish Navy The Russian Federation will start conducting blockade activities on the approach to the Danish Straits. All ships going to Polish ports with energy supplies will be detained. At the same time, freedom of navigation for ships going to other ports in the Baltic will be maintained. A strange measure of the accident will be the underwater section of Baltic Pipe.

Russia will not have to carry out any activities on land, and Poland will be alone, with an economy moving towards the abyss.

The blockade will not affect economically any of the allied countries. All the more reason to launch Article 5. No one will be interested in participating in this conflict.

And here the question should be asked how will the Polish State react? What tools of response outside the White Elephants will he have?

The answer is one. None.

The white elephant is an idiom for valuable but burdensome possession, which the owner cannot get rid of and whose cost is disproportionate to its usefulness or value.

In the historical context, Dr. Bartosiak referred to the experiences of the MW in September 1939. In the modern context, however, he estimated that losing frigate would cause shock and loss of morale among the fighting troops. I will skip the historical context, because I am convinced that the next conflict will be as never before and any reference to the past is missed. Let us therefore focus on the contemporary context.

I remind you that one Patriot system battery with a fire unit and logistics package will cost the Polish taxpayer $4.4 billion.

The ship from the Swordfish program, assuming a cost-effectively pessimistic option, will cost around EUR 1.1 billion along with the logistics package. By adding the most "favoured" configuration of the fire unit, we will reach EUR 1.5-1.7 billion.

As a result, for 40% of the price of Patriot batteries, we'll get a ship that has multiple operational capabilities. Plus, we don't have to wait for the radar to be sighted, because they've been on ships for decades.

The introduction to the line of ships from the Sword Program, capable of conducting zoned air and missile defense, including equipped with TLAM capabilities, will dramatically change the situation of Polish security in the Baltic and coastal areas throughout the threat spectrum, from crisis management to full-scale conflict.

Yes, ships are not indestructible. But at the same time, remember that a potential opponent does not have an infinite number of means of destruction. There is something like the economics of combat activities and the value of goals. And most importantly, in the event of a clash with Russia, without these "White Elephants" the ship's forces will not perform any combat task due to lack of cover.

Written by Mirosław Ogrodniczuk