Army of the New Pattern [Polemika part 2]

On October 2, 2021, on the Shipyard Portal, I published a short text entitled "New Pattern Army – means how the White Elephant tripped over his own legs [Polemika]" which was a reaction to the concept presented by the Strategy&Future team of the so-called New Pattern Army.

On 18 December 2021, the same team presented an almost 11-hour broadcast of the presentation of the overall concept of the New Pattern Army, including an hourly part devoted to conducting operations in the Baltic Sea. The following text makes my comment on this recent event.

The Baltic is not suitable for maritime activities,

it has no military significance, NATO ships will not come with help,

Therefore, dear Poles do not build their own naval forces

Because it's a waste of time and money.

In such a malicious way, you could summarize the presentation of the Army of the New Pattern, in the section on activities at sea.

In every second sentence, the American strategic thought prevails, with which S&F, in the person of Dr. Bartosiak, does not even hide, but on the contrary, empathizes with "Americanity" to put potential critics in the shoes of an uneducated provincial.

And it is a pity, because it only shows the S&F's independent analytical size in this area, which brings the issue of defence of the state in maritime areas to a mere slurring rather than a serious strategic analysis, weighing all pros and cons. Unfortunately, the belief that it is enough to replicate Big Brother's conclusions on the Baltic soil is a way to nowhere, or at least a way to go astray.

To make it easier to move in the thicket of presentation, I adopted a simple convention of polemics. In the first place, there is a presentation time and a phrase spoken by Dr. Bartosiak or quoted text from the slide, and below my position.

Read more:https://portalstoczowy.pl/my-marine-felieton/

Let's start with two statements on which I agree with Dr. Bartosiak in full.

(7.08.42) "There is no developed strategic culture of the maritime state".

In my texts or speeches I have repeatedly pointed out that Poland was (or tried to be) a maritime state only twice in history. For the first time in the days of Władysław IV, and for the second time in the 20th interwar anniversary.

After II. WŚ, the chief strategist took over the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was created, and Polish naval forces served exclusively as a service to the Baltic Fleet of the USSR.

Staff of officers educated at the Naval Academy in Leningrad provided both command ranks on the fleet and academic staff at the Naval Higher School in Gdynia. Poland, the naval operating art was a copy of this Soviet.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Partnership for Peace came to a stage and then NATO membership. And just as we've previously drawn all the knowledge from the East, so now we've reached for the hiding place of wisdom from the West.

And since, unlike the land troops, we had no historical experience of conducting wars at sea, we obviously did not gain our own maritime operating doctrine.

Only that the absence of this doctrine should not lead to the elimination of naval forces only to the development of an autonomous doctrine adapted to the needs and conditions of the Baltic Sea.

And such a conclusion should appear in the presentation of the Army of the New Pattern.

(7.11.08) "Operations in the Baltic represent only a flank for the land direction"Absolutely, and it's not a matter of any kind of polemic, but...

The maritime direction is the weakest link in the state's defence system and is an incentive for Russia to benefit from it.

Many times I have pointed out that the weakness of defence of the Polish coast creates conditions for Russia to perform almost impunity-free combined, aero-missile-like impact on the territory of Poland brought out from the Gulf of Finland. Instead of crossing further air defense systems over land, most distances over international waters can be unpunished.

Due to the trajectory of the flight and the initial climb phase, in order to mask the moment of launch, this direction will also be preferred to impact with hypersonic missiles.

Without ship-based observations deployed at sea, attacks of this type will be virtually unnoticed by terrestrial observation systems.

And in this case, the S&F team fails intellectually again. Instead of proposing how to resist such a threat, which tools (not necessarily marine) to defend the area of Poland from the sea direction, we received the phrase ‘frigates are unnecessary'.

Read also:https://portalstoczowy.pl/polska-infrastructure-maritime-in-the-prize/

Issues that I strongly object to.

(7.13.45) "People of the Sea (Anglossas) do not like the Baltic"

If so, why is Dr. Bartosiak offering only Anglo-Saxon doctrine? Why was the assessment of the maritime domain based solely on the experience of a country that never carried out war activities on waters with conditions similar to the Baltic? Why wasn't our neighbors' experience reached out?

Why do such reservations not appear in the case of the Black Sea, which is only 17% bigger than the Baltic Sea, and the Russian Federation's access to the shoreline in the Black Sea is much more advantageous than in the Baltic Sea?

I was hoping that the S&F team would reach for example the experiences of the naval forces of the FR from the times of the Crimea-Ukraine war, as well as the Russian experiences of the last 10 years from the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet. Especially as the Russians are trying to obtain a balanced naval combat group, where there is room for both large strike ships and small rocket ships.

(7.16.46) „I recommend going to Naval War College”

(7.17.25) slide "In order to understand well the arguments necessary for professional discussion or debate on the modern maritime war, we recommend that you learn about the nature of modern war in waters such as the Baltic, especially those from the most important centre in the world dealing with preparations for the naval war, which is American Naval War College."

The sound of this message is usually arrogant. Polish sailors, you're stupid because you want ships like the Americans, but we in S&F are smart because our New Pattern Army concept at sea is based on American experience and analysis.

I never wanted to use that argument, but Dr. Bartosiak spreads it on his own, and he's doing it from the position of the sea's master of secret knowledge, so this time I'll make an exception.

I studied at this university in 1994 and Professor Milan Vigo was my lecturer at the time.

Several dozen officers, including the current Naval Inspector, Commander of the Marine Operations Centre, Commander of 9.FOW, or Commander of the Marine Rocket Unit, are all Naval War College graduates, Newport RI. Several of them were also students at Andrew Micht's.

These people have studied there for a year, accompanied by officers of the American naval forces, and not a few days (maybe weeks) like people from S&F, so it would be reasonable to ask who has more knowledge in this field?

It would be nice to find out who in the S&F team is responsible for the analysis of naval forces and the concept of war at sea.

The real problem is that, in fact, the American knowledge of conducting activities in waters such as the Baltic is even less than Polish. We have no combat experience, but we have experience in maintaining the so-called operating regime. We know much better than our "oceanic allies", hydrological and hydrometeorological characteristics of this water. It was our sailors who "were throwing up their bile" in the Baltic Sea, not the American ones, so let's not spread the argument "because Uncle Sam knows better".

The experience of the Soviet/Russian fleet, the German fleet than the US Navy, is more credible in the Baltic War.

What we really should focus on is not how to bring the Navy to zero just to develop our own unique maritime operational art specific to the Baltic area.

Read also:https://portalstoczowy.pl/Romania-buys-submarine-a-polska/

I think it's time for the biggest inconsistency in the whole naval war presentation.

(7.26.01) "There will be no maritime transport lines of the Baltic States during the war"

(7.35.45) slide of the Continental Sea "The presence of numerous always in the Baltic merchant ships not engaged in combat (especially at the start of the war), also makes the identification of targets much more complicated than in the open ocean"

So how are the S&F gentlemen going to be these lines of communication or not? Is there a commercial movement in the Baltic or not?

Why should commercial movement only work in the interests of the Russians, because it will be difficult to detect their units in the noise of civil shipping, while completely ignoring the ability to mask their own ships in this environment?

The ability to generate false AIS signals by its military versions is also unknown in S&F?

Moreover, when hundreds of wind turbines will appear in the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone in the Baltic, at the same time, a new tool for masking own forces will appear. And it's not us, but the enemy will have trouble catching the right characteristics. Especially if the turbines are equipped with false signal generators (passive and active).

Not only will the detection and identification be greatly hampered, but the probability of a hit will also decrease, and this means that the Russians will have to fire a much larger number of missiles for the same purpose than they calculated earlier.

(7.27.08) slide "Continual Sea" Big ships won't be able to swim fast on the Baltic.

The S&F team uncritically based on the following study:Milan Vego, Naval War College Review: On Littoral Warfare, Vol. 68, 2014, p. 9Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015V E G O 3 9. But that's how you don't have basic knowledge of the subject and quote directly, without knowing the context.

Milan Vego writes: "The shallow waters limit or even exclude the use of large vessels. The speed of large submarines must be significantly reduced when passing on very shallow waters (10 to 40 ft (3-12m) deep. In shaded waters, such as canals, the ship's speed can be reduced by up to 60%. The impact of the water depth is quite significant in relation to submarines moving at speeds higher than 25 knots. For example, at a speed of thirty knots and a depth of 80 feet (25m), the water resistance is nearly three times greater than in water of 115 feet (35m) and five times greater than in deep waters (over 1200 feet (370m)".

Sounds dangerous. Three times the water resistance, five times the water resistance.

Meanwhile, these are the bases of hydrodynamics, and every MW officer knows that you don't swim in port or shipping channels at 20 knots, because the unit is affected by both resistance and attraction forces, just as you don't swim at this speed when you have only a meter of free water under the kelem.

Unfortunately, based on this passage of Milan Vego's publication, the S&F team came to the categorical conclusion that large submarines would not swim in the Baltic, because they would normally run out of water under the keel.

Meanwhile, it doesn't matter what Milan Vego wrote, and where he got the information and how he used it. For this reason, I refer to footnotes 38 and 39 quoted in Milan Vego.

Note 38 is a publication by Leo Lazauskas, The Hydrodynamic Resistance, Wave Wakes and Bottom Pressure Signatures of a 5,900 Tons Displacement Air Warfare Destroyer (Adelaide, South Australia: Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Adelaide, 31 July 2007).

The publication is unfortunately not available on the network, but it is enough to do a small research by the author to check that it deals with mathematical models to optimize hull shapes. Most of his research is about the hulls of regatta yachts.

However, the publication quoted in footnotes 39 is available. When Does Shallow Water Become a Problem? Hydrocomp Technical Report 124 (Menlo Park, Calif: Hydrocomp, 2003).

This is a report from model studies on water resistance characteristics and brings very interesting data. I took the liberty of digging through the measurement table.

And so, for a speed of 20 knots, there is no speed loss if the water depth is greater than 220 feet (70m). In order for the loss of 4% of speed to occur, it is necessary to influence the shallow waters more than 55 feet (17 m). It is only at a speed of 20w that a ship's speed declines at a depth of less than 10m.

Take another look at the Baltic depth distribution map attached below. As it is easy to see, the smallest depths dominate the waters in the western, most remote part of the Kaliningrad Oblast. On the other hand, the most problematic remains the area of the Åland Islands, which are not really in the sphere of our operational interest.

So much geography and hydrology of the Baltic Sea. A few more words on the operational theme.

The ship's "speed cult" has no meaning these days. The average maximum speed of modern frigate-class submarines and upwards is 26-28w. And the economic speed, providing the largest swimming range is 15-17w.

The speed of the ship was relevant when the range of the means of destruction was less than or close to the range of technical observation. The speed was important in the time of type 205 (OSA) rockets when the range of water-water rockets, type P-15, was 40 km and little exceeded the range of horizontal radio-location visibility.

The execution of the missile impact on the enemy's naval forces required entry into its range of observation, at the same time this "intrusion" was so small that the tactics of "tacking from the enemy" at full speed, immediately after the launch of the rockets, allowed the exit from the range of observation, and thus prevented effective counterattack.

Today, when hundreds of kilometers of damage are reached, the speed of the ship is no longer essential.

A few days ago, an MS Cape Akritas ship arrived at a port in Gdynia with a cargo of containers. His dive is 15 m and the march speed is 21 in. After leaving Gdynia, the ship went to Klaipeda.

For comparison, the cruiser type Ticonderoga has dive 10 m, frigate type FREMM has dive 6 m.

(7.28.55) another slide from the Continental Sea cycle

"The shallow water of the Baltic significantly impedes the use of modern torpedoes"– S&F has probably not been heard of light MU-90 LWT torpedoes that have been specially designed for shallow waters and are equipped, among others, with our naval forces.

(7.29.51) "Baltijsk is near and can be mined", "To the capacity of mine warfare we do not need large submarines, frigates and so on".

(7.54.15) slide "Applications for Naval Activities"

"The Navy's ability to wage mine warfare should be enhanced..."

Sounds great. Easy, easy. Just mine.

Unfortunately, the S&F team, so comprehensively spreading images and information war issues, did not read what international law says about marine mini-gates.

"In a period of peace, the state may deploy seamines in its own territorial waters, internal waters and archipelagos.

If a coastal State deploys armed seamines in its internal waters and fails to comply with the obligation to warn or inform ships of another State exercising the right of free movement, it shall breach its international obligations.

During the period of peace, the State is not allowed to place mines of any type in the territorial, internal or archipelagos of another State. Doing so will constitute a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the country concerned and treated as an act of aggression."

Most countries also agree in principle that international law prohibits the deployment of maritime mines in international waters".

Unfortunately, when it comes to conducting the mine war, Poland is trapped. Violation of international law and the establishment of defensive minesteads, during peace, in its own waters, without informing other countries about their positions, will put Poland in the position of a bandit country and will be absolutely used by Russian propaganda.

The example cited by the S&F of setting mines in the Persian Gulf is extremely inappropriate for international law. Those responsible for these decisions then faced American courts and were sentenced to many years of prison sentences.

Even worse is the issue of setting up hard-hit mines in Russian waters. This kind of homestead can only be built after the war has started.

And the question is, what are the means to do that?

If a frigate, with modern weapons systems, is a White Elephant, easy to destroy by Russian systems, how are the mines of Transport-Miné ships to supply in the Baltic region?

S&F's idea of putting mines from airplanes can be inserted between fairy tales, for the simple reason that such an operation requires specially adapted transport aircraft, and in order to carry it out it is necessary to control in the air.

Even the Americans are just roaring on the subject, because the last sea mines from the air were performed during World War II.

And this is my next enormous disappointment with what the S&F team presented on the issue of the naval war. I was hoping that the authors would propose technologies similar to circulating ammunition capable of operating in water tone or swarm technology in the form of micromines, managed with SI algorithms, capable of joining larger groups after the target was detected. Unfortunately, despite many words, the subject was treated stepmotherly.

(730.30) slide "Electromagnetic disturbances part 1"

Calling to the Falkland Islands War, which took place 40 years ago, as a reliable source of assessment of the efficiency of ship's radio-location systems, is just as curiosity as an assessment of the usefulness of combat infantry wagons on a modern battlefield based on the use of BWP-1 in the war in Afghanistan.

Over these 40 years, there has been a huge technological leap, wavewaters have disappeared, 3D radars, AESA radars have appeared, and digital beam formation and signal processing take place in the antenna block.

(7.47.10) slide "Propositions for Action"

"Buy on our anti-access capabilities displayed by the Marine Rocket Unit, which should be expanded by further systems".

Yeah, but...

Marine Rocket Unit, in itself, is just AD. What is the biggest problem of the armed forces is the lack of A2.

In the absence of terrestrial systems that will provide air and rocket shielding MJR, their role should be taken over by these depreciated "White Elephants". In such a tandem, the Marine Rocket Unit will "remove" from the water frigates of the opponent's platforms, while the frigate will carry out area air defence for the MJR and itself.

The multiplication of MJR components, without the simultaneous provision of organic air defense measures, not only will not increase its operational capacity, but will bring to the position of easy prey for the opponent.

(7.54.15) slide "Applications for Naval Activities"

‘......... It is extremely important to agree on plans for a war in the Baltic, with the Baltic and Nordic states."

This is one of the few rational conclusions contained in the entire presentation on the concept of the maritime war, only that treated very quickly.

Somewhere there was a shy offer of cooperation with Sweden, but it should be our strategic partner in the Baltic.

We should strive to sign a far-reaching intergovernmental defence agreement. From the concept of "shore sharing" to the division of the coast, where naval forces can operate freely in the territorial and internal waters of the second state, solely on the basis of a notification to the on-call operating service, to the possibility of supplying with combat measures or the emergency deployment of weapon systems in pre-established areas.

A similar agreement should be subject to an agreement between Poland and the Baltic States.

Some time ago, I wrote that the maritime forces of Poland and the Baltic States should have common command following the model of Dutch-Belgian "Admiral Benelux". Defence plans are not enough to agree, they should be linked. It would be advisable for the countries concerned to also pursue a common and agreed policy on the modernisation of maritime forces.

In the presentation of the Army of the New Pattern I lacked an analytical reference to unmanned combat systems at sea. On one of the slides passed the memory of robotics, but it was over.

True, we have mentioned unmanned aerial instruments for observation and reconnaissance, but that is far too little. The problem of floating drones has been completely ignored. Those on the surface of the sea and those in its depths.

In order to carry out the tasks of mine warfare or the fight against submarines, autonomous unmanned apparatus capable of carrying out tasks without the ship's platform should be used to the maximum extent.

For most of the presentation, we heard how the ocean fleet would feel uncomfortable in the Baltic. That we shouldn't actually expect her to be here.

And in fact, these are very legitimate concerns only why, in the second sentence, we hear that if they do not come, this area of action is meaningless and we are to give up building the naval forces.

Yes, the statement that the direction of the sea will be an auxiliary direction is not just an operationally justified heresy but it does not give any right to depreciate it, as was the case during the presentation of the naval part of the Army of the New Pattern.

Author: kmdr dir. Mirosław Ogrodniczuk