Defenseless Polish Critical Infrastructure at Sea

The functioning of the Polish economy increasingly depends on one gas pipeline, one gasport and two liquid fuel handling bases. In the coming years, the floating LPG regasification terminal FSRU (Floating Storage Resolution Unit) and a large family of offshore wind farms will join this set. As can be seen from the above list, do we depend on the Baltic Sea as a national energy gate only can we protect and defend this gate?

The importance of the Baltic Sea to the energy security of Poland

Over the next few years, the existing infrastructure set will be joined by a floating LPG regasification terminal FSRU and a large family of offshore wind farms. In this way, Poland will benefit from energy independence and will be able to prevent possible supply interruptions more effectively.

As it is easy to see, Poland is dependent on the Baltic Sea as a source of energy. However, are we able to protect and defend this "national energy gate"? Many threats threaten the Polish critical infrastructure at sea, such as lack of fuel or interruption of electricity supply. In the face of such risks, it is important that we have the right plans and remedies that will allow us to effectively address threats. What action should we take to ensure that our maritime infrastructure is protected and secure?

Marine oil and gas supply route – key economic artery

In 2022, Gdańsk Naftoport overcharged 24.5 million tonnes of oil and petroleum products, which meant a jump in volume by 37% y/y. In addition, there is a modest 2 million tonnes of fuel reloaded at Gdynia Port. To understand the importance of oil imports by sea, it is worth knowing that last year Polish refineries processed (according to the data of the Polish Organisation of Industry and Petroleum Trade) almost 25 million tonnes. Even more significant are the data for the 1st quarter of 2023, which already clearly show that oil transhipments, in Polish ports, fully reflect its conversion in Polish refineries, which means that almost all fuels that supply the Polish economy came by sea.

Another element of the Polish energy puzzle is the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline which through Denmark connected Polish and Norwegian mining platforms located in the North Sea with the Polish gas system.

The gas pipeline has already reached full capacity, which is up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year, which corresponds to more than half of the annual gas demand in Poland.

The sea section of the pipeline running across the Baltic Sea between the coast of Denmark and Poland is 275 km (with 900 km of total length).

The Truism is to remind that the supply of liquefied gas to the gas pipeline in Świnoujście is also carried out by sea. The current gas capacity is 6 billion cubic metres, and it will soon rise to 7.5 billion.

In total, by sea, it will reach Poland up to 17 billion cubic meters of gas, equivalent to 80% of annual consumption. The launch of the floating FSRU terminal in the Gulf of Gdańsk will further increase these proportions in the Polish Marine Infrastructure.

Marine wind energy – a new pillar of the Polish energy mix

At the same time, advanced preparatory work is underway to begin construction of offshore wind farms in the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone. The so-called first stage of development is implemented on the basis of decisions of the President of the Energy Regulatory Office, which were issued until June 2021.

Overall, it will consist of nine wind farms run by five investors. The total installed capacity for the first stage is nearly 6 GW. If we count the capacity installed for the projects planned to be implemented in the second stage, we are to achieve a total capacity of 11 GW from offshore wind power in the Baltic by 2040.

For comparison, the largest Polish coal power plant in Bełchatów has 5.4 GW installed capacity, while the installed capacity of the first block of Polish nuclear power plant located on the seashore in Choczewo Municipality is expected to be 1.5 GW. Ultimately, when all reactors are activated, the total power shall be up to 9 GW.

As can be seen from the above data, the installed capacity of offshore wind turbines will already be at the level of the most important coal power plant in the first stage, and will be overall comparable to the nuclear power plant.

Polish offshore energy – national interest or ignored necessity?

In total, at sea and at sea we are to create at least 20 GW of power. At the end of 2022, the total installed power plant capacity in Poland was 60GW.

In summary, in the near future almost 100% of oil demand, 90% of gas demand and one fifth of the energy needed will be obtained by sea, sea and seashore.

Looking at the above data, it is impossible to treat the opinions of some people with ambition to give a tone to the strategic debate in Poland, the lack of interest at sea and the lack of meaning of the naval forces differently as harmful ignorance.

Over a year ago, both strands of the Nord Stream pipeline connecting Russia and Germany were blown up. Every now and then, the question of the saboteur is revived, but the final evidence is not there. However, since then there has been a significant increase in the suspicious activity of the Russian Federation in the waters surrounding European countries.

Russian reconnaissance operations around maritime critical infrastructure – threat of getting closer to Poland

Norway and the United Kingdom have repeatedly reported on the aggressive actions of Russian vessels in the areas of oil and gas extraction from the bottom of the North Sea combined with the crossing of the security zones of mining and transmission infrastructure. Under cover of fishing and commercial shipping units, activities are carried out to identify the course of oil and gas pipelines and fibre optic cables.

Similar signals come from Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, where Russian vessels have been mapping offshore wind farms trying to identify the course of power cables and fiber optic networks.

Polish marine areas have not been free from suspicious activities of the Russian Federation for the past year either. Several times, just outside the territorial waters, Russian vessels suddenly experienced a fitness failure and anchored for several days. What they were doing at the time, you don't know.

Maritime interests require naval strength – necessity, not choice

As early as the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, "the father of the founder of maritime operational art", Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan stated that a state with maritime interests must also be able to secure these at sea.

Since the energy interests of Poland, and thus the ability of the Polish economy to function, are closely linked to the sea, the ability of the State to guarantee its interests at sea by means of adequate maritime forces is not an invention, but an indisputable necessity.

After years of "dividence of peace" and political belief that this condition was given to us once and for all, a brutal awakening came to us, and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure and routes of the acquisition of energy resources became a necessity to which the Polish state is completely unprepared.

Pipelines, gas pipelines, fiber optic networks, offshore energy export cables, shipping routes are elements that cannot be fenced and perimetric protection cannot be arranged. Except for the mining platform, it is also impossible to maintain permanent personnel on them.

Process thinking instead of object – a new perspective on maritime infrastructure protection

Meanwhile, the Polish model of protection of critical infrastructure completely fails to cope with something that is not on land, cannot be guarded and not yet seen from the shore. We have the dominance of "objective thinking" instead of "processual thinking".

The gas supply process is a series of activities from the moment of the acquisition of a Polish or foreign company on the Norwegian shelf, through the transport of pipeline systems (including Baltic Pipe), to the insertion of gas into the distribution system on the Polish bank.

So if we look at the task of obtaining gas through process, we get a completely different prospect of protecting critical infrastructure, because it is not enough to protect the gas transmission station on land, but also to ensure the safety of the Baltic Pipe pipeline. To this end, it is important to be an active participant in the combined protection system for mining platforms in the North Sea and the pipeline system at its bottom.

From an identical process perspective, the process of extracting liquefied gas and oil by sea transport should be considered From the moment the product was loaded onto the ship to discharge at the Polish oil or gas terminal.

And it is not about shipping ships across Atlanta, but at least about ensuring that the seabed in the Baltic approaches to gas or kerosene is safe.

In a similar process, energy generation from offshore wind farms should be considered, from energy processing from wind farms to its introduction into the national distribution system.

In this case, as a critical infrastructure, we will not consider single windmills only the key elements of offshore power stations collecting and processing electricity from the entire farm, underwater fiber optic networks and underwater export cables to bring the generated energy to land.

The scale of the threat – what really requires protection in the Baltic?

Let us therefore summarise, in a very simplistic way, the minimum marine critical infrastructure in the Baltic basin, which requires and will require direct protection:

• 3 mining platforms;
• 280 km of Baltic Pipe pipeline;
• approximately 60 km of access tracks to the ports of Gdańsk, Gdynia and Świnoujście;
• 7 offshore power stations (only in the first stage of the development of Marine Wind Energy);
• about 300 km of underwater export cables (in stage I only);
• Several hundred kilometres of underwater fiber optic network

This should include several hundred kilometres of shipping routes along the border of our territorial waters, which should be subject to periodic control and protection.

Lack of strength, lack of system – and time works against

At this point, I would like to return to the talk about protecting critical infrastructure a few months ago, which took place at the guest thresholds of the Naval Academy.

At the time, I stressed that the vast majority of the Navy's tasks were about a period of peace and crisis, and that the conduct of war was last on the list of duties. The current situation verified the validity of those words. Neither is the lack of state readiness to protect critical infrastructure.

It is impossible to maintain the permanent presence of ships over the entire length of the Baltic Pipe pipeline, the approach tracks to Polish ports or key shipping routes, because no one has such extensive shippower. Therefore, the most desirable solution would be to conduct a comprehensive seabed scan along all of these critical underwater objects, to create a digital bottom map based on the data obtained, and then to periodically repeat the scan and compare it with the original image. In the near future, Artificial Intelligence technology can be used for comparative analysis of images and capture of disturbances or changes.

There's only one minor problem. We still do not have enough specialized forces and resources in Poland to carry out such a comprehensive task. The ideal units for such a mission are the Kormoran II type mine destroyers.

Both their underwater surveillance and mine hazard recognition systems and crew experience make these units particularly predestined for maritime critical infrastructure protection tasks. Only how to scan, with a repetitive frequency, about a thousand kilometers of seabed by three ships? Even after the construction and entry into service of the next three units, it will still not be enough.

And here again I would like to return to my conversation at AMW, where I have pointed out the need to achieve "excess" in the number of ships owned, on Kormoran II, autonomous submarine recognition systems. My attention was then met with criticism, which I think was due to my misunderstanding of my argument. Meanwhile, the security situation in the Baltic Sea and the increasing role of maritime critical infrastructure call for the acquisition of further autonomous submarine recognition systems, otherwise the protection of maritime critical infrastructure will be very limited due to the limited efficiency of existing systems.

Our joy from the "inner sea of NATO" may prove to be a great illusion on the day when our homes suddenly run out of gas or electricity, and we find empty distributors at gas stations. Only because the protection of maritime critical infrastructure was considered to be a minor undertaking or implemented by our favorite "input-free method".

Author: kmdr dir. Mirosław Ogrodniczuk