Unmanned War on the Baltic – is Poland ready for this? [Part 2]

Is Poland ready for a new dimension of the maritime war? In the first part we looked at Russian unmanned marine systems and their potential impact on the Baltic situation. Now it's time for the key questions: Polish Navy The Polish Republic has effective measures to address these threats? Have we reached a global level? In which areas must we act faster and more decisively?
In the article
Russian sea drones on the Baltic – real threat or propaganda bubble?
The first use of unmanned submarines in the Black Sea quickly showed how effective such systems can be in asymmetric activities. Ukrainian sea drones, relatively simple but well coordinated with NATO intelligence data, have led to major losses in the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The destruction and damage of several large units, including landing and support ships, has proved that the era of unmanned at sea has become a fact.
There is no doubt that Russia has drawn conclusions and started its own programs for the development of sea drones. The Kremlin, known for its propaganda "pumping" of any new solution, presents its designs as superior to Western counterparts. The question is – do they really have technology that can tip the balance in the Baltic?
Russian strategy: technology or abundance?
The effectiveness of marine drones depends not only on their parameters, but above all on the system in which they operate. Even the most advanced unmanned will not achieve its full potential without adequate support – in the form of command, artificial intelligence, navigation, fire, intelligence and communication systems.
Here's the key question: Is Russia able to create an operating ecosystem at NATO level? I don't think so.
The North Atlantic Alliance is based on highly developed ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) systems providing precise data for combat management. NATO has advanced architecture for the processing and exchange of information – from satellites to reconnaissance drones to real-time communications networks. Russia, despite progress, is still struggling with the quality and consistency of operational data, and its development in this area limits technological sanctions.
This is why Moscow can try to cover technological shortages with quantity – as it does in other areas of the military. However, in the context of sea drones massiness does not always mean effectiveness, especially when the opponent has an advantage in terms of situational awareness and punch precision.
Russians are known for their excellent knowledge of aero- and hydrodynamics. Many times they proved that they were able to compensate for deficiencies in drives or materials with the perfection of hull shape. Moreover, they have achieved pioneering success in using cavitation phenomena to reduce friction, which allows for high march speeds in both the water and underwater environments.
Currently, research on so-called supercavitation is also conducted in Poland. This theme includes extensive analyses of the intermediate state between full immersion swimming and motion based on a pillow with imploding cavitation bubbles. For those familiar with marine mathematics and physics, this is not a novelty, but the potential for this phenomenon in future marine solutions is enormous.
There is no doubt that the technical capabilities of Russian engineers, who, often working under shortage conditions, can develop innovative solutions, should be appreciated. Their achievements hydrodynamics are important, but will they be enough to offset the Western technological advantage?
Technical limitations on Russian drones
Russian constructions, if they are units of classical construction, may have significant weather, maneuvering and delay in sensory and system areas.
At the current stage of the development of sea drones, I do not consider it appropriate to describe the disadvantages and advantages of various Russian structures.
However, this does not mean that the threat can be underestimated. In sufficient numbers and with sufficient support, Russian drones can pose a real challenge to security in the Baltic.
Poland already has a global level – time for the sea
The Polish ship and drone thought is mature enough to introduce such a highly advanced design that the risk of encountering something equivalent at sea is minimal. The recognition of advantages goes far beyond the mere scientific or systemic properties – this is an example of a comprehensive approach to the modern concept of sea domain droning.
Polish Navy Poland is quickly making up for its capabilities, because in other defence sectors Poland has already reached a global level.
Anti-aircraft defense: Poland has developed a unique layered air defence – from Pilica+ system, through Narew with CAMM missiles, to Vistula with Patriots. These are modern solutions that build real deterrence.
Air drones: Systems such as FlyEye, FT-5 Moose or BSP Atrax are used by both the Polish Army and foreign customers. The WB Group has become a recognizable player in the market for reconnaissance and impact drones, and the developed ammunition circulating Warmate and Gladius prove that we have potential in this field.
Precise weapons: HIMARS missile artillery systems, K239 Chunmoo and our own lobster-A fall into global trends of far-reaching destruction. APR precision ammunition is also developed for crabs and mortars cancer, which gives us real capabilities for precise damage over a distance of several to several hundred kilometres.
What about the sea drones?
Poland has the potential to enter this segment, but there is no clear strategy and investment. We already have navigation, recognition and precise destruction technologies that can be transferred to water and underwater platforms.
If Poland is able to build modern air drones and develop rocket artillery, there is no reason why we could not produce submarines and submarines. This is a logical direction of development that should be taken as soon as possible – within the framework of national competences, without waiting for foreign solutions.
Polish Response: Crypt Divisions. B — drones versus drones
It is not enough to observe the threat – you have to have a ready answer. Polish Navy The Polish Republic should actively develop its own unmanned systems. We need crypt squadrons. B, whose task would be to control the marine area permanently.
How could this work?
- Some units accompany Navy ships, acting as mobile sensors behind the horizon line and the drone shield.
- Another part patrols critical infrastructure, protecting ports, LNG terminals and underwater telecommunications cables.
- The Impact Section carries out patrol and intervention activities.
For example:
- Object Detection: Air or water drones recognize an unidentified object coming from the east. Parameters: 5 m long, speed 16 knots, course on Gdansk, ETA (time of arrival) in 9 hours.
- Decision-making: The patrol section is ordered to intercept.
- Risk elimination: Strike drones get combat coordinates, go to contact, and after an hour instead of an enemy drone, only a video remains on the network, documenting its destruction.
Such a system would allow for a minimum cost and without endangering manned units to eliminate threats in long-term approaches to Polish territorial waters. It is obvious that the tactics described above are not an advanced scenario – the capabilities of the Polish industry allow for a much more spectacular scenario and in this respect these systems will be developed.
Time to make quick decisions
The development of modern military systems in Poland often encounters a time barrier. The implementation of new technologies takes years, while threats evolve here and now.
If we do not change our approach – if we wait for "perfect solutions" instead of implementing them and perfecting them in operation – then in a few years we will again be forced to buy other technologies under conditions dictated by Western armed companies. And not alone. Expenditure will be the biggest problem, but strategic loss of technological and industrial potential.
Without our own systems, we will lose our ability to cooperate equally with global drone leaders. Nor will we be able to introduce innovative solutions not only to our war fleet but also to trade. It is important to assume that in a few years' time, the DWT and TEU records achieved by autonomous units will fall on the seas. We should be involved.
Turkey and Sweden have shown otherwise. They do not wait, they do not seek excuses – they produce, test, bring into service. We, too, have the potential to use it effectively. And those who doubt it will convince progress itself – its direction is unquestionably obvious.
Returning to the question in the title of the article, I reply: Yes. Poland may enter a new era of maritime war, but we will suffer enormous economic and defence losses if we do not act, using our industrial potential and outstanding capabilities of Polish engineers.










