Ormuz and LNG. Who really gains from tensions in the Middle East?

The armed conflict in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Ormuz again remind us of the importance of the world's energy trade as a narrow throat. It is estimated that around 20% of global LNG trade passes through the Ormuz Strait.

LNG Geography – why Asia pays the most for gas

Much has been written about the importance of the Strait of Ormuz. Every tension in the region immediately raises the question of security of energy supply. In the shadow of these concerns, however, there is a question which is much less frequently raised – who can actually be paid.

We most often hear that destabilization in the Gulf region threatens to break energy supply. And indeed – it was enough for several incidents in the strait to make the movement of ships rapidly die and world markets immediately react to the rise in prices.

Qatar remains a key element of this puzzle. It was from the LNG terminals there that over the years huge quantities of liquefied gas flowed primarily to Asia. Japan, South Korea, and China built their energy security largely on supplies from the region.

Qatar is one of the largest LNG producers in the world today. According to Energy Institute, annual production exceeds 100 billion cubic metres of liquefied gas, which puts the state at the forefront of global exporters alongside the United States and Australia. The Ras Laffan complex, the world's largest LNG processing and export centre, plays a key role.

Importantly, about 80% of Qatari gas goes to Asian markets. That is why any information about the disruption of production or transport through the Strait of Ormuz immediately triggers a nervous reaction of the markets. For importers in Japan, South Korea or India, this represents a risk of a reduction in supply and a sharp increase in raw material prices for the market.

From an economic perspective, the mechanism is quite simple. Where gas demand is greatest, the highest prices also appear. Interestingly, the Asian LNG market has been among the most expensive in the world for years. According to a 2025 analysis, the average price of liquefied gas in northeastern Asia – calculated by spot contracts – oscillated between $12–13 per million BTU.

By comparison, the American benchmark Henry Hub at the same time remained at around $3–4 per MMBtu, or more than three times lower. This difference is not accidental. It is mainly due to the geography of supply and the way in which global gas trade operates.

So, although every crisis in the Middle East raises legitimate importers' concerns, for some players in the energy market it can mean something completely different – new opportunities.

LNG marine routes – Panama, Suez or Pacific?

LNG transport is largely a maritime geography issue. Gas turbines must overcome thousands of nautical miles before reaching reception terminals.

In the case of Qatar everything starts with one narrow throat – the Strait of Ormuz. She's the one that's got to get the gas ships going further into the Indian Ocean.

The situation in the United States is different. American LNG can reach Asia on several different routes. One of them leads through the Panama Canal, which shortens the way from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific. Another leads across the Atlantic and the Suez Canal.

However, there is another direction that has attracted increasing attention in recent years – the northern Pacific. That is why the LNG export project from Alaska is so interested. Any ship from this terminal could then head directly to the ports of Japan or South Korea, bypassing the most sensitive points of world shipping.

Middle of the puzzle – American interest

This is where the theme appears, which is often overlooked in public discussions. We are talking about the world's energy security, the threat to shipping in the Ormuz Strait and the risk of rising gas prices. Less often, however, we ask ourselves who can benefit from this destabilisation.

It is not a secret that in recent years the United States has become increasingly involved in the conflict with Iran. American aviation and Polish Navy conducted attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan in 2025, directly involving the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East.

Of course, I'm not saying someone in Washington is planning conflicts to increase gas sales. I'm not a Pentagon strategist or an advisor to Donald Trump. However, looking coldly at the history of this empire's activities in recent decades – from Iraq to Syria – it is difficult not to notice a mechanism.

Any major crisis in the Gulf region means an increase in uncertainty for energy transport through the Ormuz Strait. And the greater uncertainty in the energy market, the higher gas and oil prices.

From an economic point of view, this situation changes the arrangement of forces on the global LNG market. The more expensive gas in the world makes export projects in other parts of the globe – especially in United States – they become much more profitable.

So this kind of analysis leads me to make a hypothesis. I'm not saying this is Washington's official strategy. However, it is hard not to notice that destabilisation in the Gulf region can indirectly strengthen the position of US LNG exporters.

As energy transport from the Middle East becomes uncertain, importers in Asia and Europe start looking for more stable suppliers – especially in the United States.

Point

In fact, the tensions around the Strait of Ormuz are not just a regional conflict. At this point, one of the greatest economic interests of the modern world is the energy trade, the safety of maritime routes and the competition for markets.

The war and destabilisation of the region, of course, represent a huge risk to energy importers. At the same time, however, they change the arrangement of forces on the global LNG market. As deliveries from the Gulf become less secure, the importance of other fast-capable producers grows increase exports.

From an economic perspective, this means one thing – every crisis in the Ormuz area increases the importance of alternative sources of supply. This arrangement is particularly advantageous for the United States, which, thanks to the growing production of gas and the expansion of export infrastructure, are increasingly trying to take over part of the market that has previously belonged to the producers in the region.

Therefore, the conflict in the Middle East is much wider than military. In the background, there is a competition for control over one of the world's most important raw materials markets. This is probably just one of many possible scenarios for the development of this situation, although from an economic perspective it seems extremely likely.