Silent Baltic War over cables and wind farms

The safe Baltic is just a password without any cover. A network of fiber optics, offshore wind farms and offshore energy mains become the target of incidents that have too regular rhythm to be considered a coincidence.

In the article

When the marine critical infrastructure becomes a test field and Poland is still waiting for ships, the question is not: not "will" but "when" someone will turn off the light in our homes.

Critical infrastructure in the Baltic: new threats to Undersea cable

At first glance – these are only thin lines on the map. In fact: the blood circulation of the 21st century. More than 1.3 million kilometers of fiber optic cables cover the bottom of seas and oceans, carrying 95 percent of global Internet traffic and trillions of dollars a day in financial transactions. Next to them – energy buses that supply islands, platforms and offshore wind farms.

These lines have become the new front. In January 2025 NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced the launch of the operation Baltic Sentry – frigates, marine aviation and autonomous submarine systems are to patrol the Baltic in search of civilian units that behave too "untypically". The decision was not a gesture to show – it was a response to a series of incidents: cut fiber optics, broken power cables, always near NATO countries.

Baltic Hybrid War: incidents around Marine Critical Infrastructure

There are points on the threat map. Since the explosion on Nord Stream pipelines in 2022, by almost simultaneous damage to two key telecommunications cables in November 2024 – BCS East-West Interlink between Lithuania and Sweden and C-Lion1 connecting Finland and Germany – until the cable cut between Latvia and Sweden in January 2025. The Wilson Center has collected these events into one directory of incidents that – considered individually – may look like a coincidence. But together they form a clear pattern: actions to test the resilience of NATO infrastructure without formally violating the Washington Treaty.

A new front line. Poland, Baltic and War Without Fire / Shipyard Portal — Photo Shutterstock

In the investigations conducted after the incidents of November 2024, particular attention was paid to the activity of commercial units, which were moving an unusual track in the area of damaged cables. Among them were freighters registered in Chinese registers. Although this does not prejudge their deliberate action, it highlights the increasing complexity of the operational environment, in which critical infrastructure can be both an accidental victim and an element of the planned test of resilience of NATO states.

On 25 December 2024, the power cable failed Estlink 2 between Estonia and Finland. At the same time, four telecommunications lines were damaged. Finnish law enforcement authorities indicated Russian tanker Eagle S, part of the so-called "shadow floats", as a potential perpetrator dragging an anchor cable through the seabed.

Last winter, in January 2025, another cable cut between Latvia and Sweden was detected. Swedish authorities have stopped the ship Vezhen under suspicion of sabotage; the shot was completed when the hypothesis of unintentional damage was established — Although the precedent for these cases raised reasonable doubts. Eventually, on February 3, 2025, the Finnish prosecution qualified the incident as an accident.

Some of these incidents can still be explained by weather, crew error, or equipment failure. But when it comes to the repetitiveness of such events, the specific locations and presence of units from the "shadow float" or ships registered in Chinese registers – it is difficult to speak of the case. It is becoming clearer that someone is testing how far he can go before Article 5 is launched, and that the Baltic has become a laboratory for the scenarios of "war without war".

Baltic Sentry and a billion euros: wound patch or real shield?

The European Union no longer wants to remain a spectator in the game under the Baltic. In February 2025, the European Commission announced the allocation of EUR 1 billion for the initiative to protect critical offshore infrastructure. Support is intended to cover, among others, a network of fixed sensors, satellite surveillance systems, submarines and submarines and a fleet of specialized vessels ready for emergency repairs of fiber optic and energy cables.

On paper, this sounds like a pillar of the new maritime safety strategy. In practice, Europe is suffering from its shortcomings. The market lacks specialized cablemen, capable of precise repair work under hybrid war conditions. The procedures are also unclear the use of force against civilian units active in the "grey area" of the law of the sea – where there are no clear rules for armed confrontation, but the rate is as high as in the classical conflict.

In the Polish context, we described this problem in detail on our portal, analyzing the draft "Safe Baltic" Act. It identifies three key barriers to the effectiveness of the Polish Navy: the lack of a clear legal framework for intervention outside the zone adjacent to the territorial sea, the indeterminate division of competences between MW and Border Guard and the procedural uncertainty in situations requiring rapid response and the need to use the measures set out in Rules of Engagement (ROE). As Mr. Oskar Draus pointed out well – today we have a good diagnosis, but we do not have the ability to act. Details We wrote in the text by link.

In Brussels there is a need for a "technical coalition" – an alliance of countries that will not only build a threat detection system but will also be able to defend it. For now, however, "Baltic Sentry" is more of a political framework than a real shield – and opponents have already learned to operate between its slots – in the space of a hybrid battlefield that escapes traditional definitions.

Marine wind energy under geopolitics pressure

offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea were to become energy transformation symbol And independence from Russian gas. Today, however, they increasingly become an incendiary point – not due to weather whims, but through political decisions and geopolitical tensions. The debate is at the heart of the lack of common safety standards that regulate the admission of non-NATO producers to projects considered strategic.

The problem is also regulatory chaos. The EU CER Directive (2022/2557), which was to deal with the physical protection of critical maritime infrastructure, has not yet been fully implemented. The deadline for implementation into national law was 17 October 2024, but, as the European Commission acknowledged, by July 2025 only 10 of the 27 Member States met this commitment. Among the "prompts" were Poland and Sweden. Although the Commission has already initiated infringement procedures until the relevant legislation enters into force, it is impossible to clearly identify who is responsible for the financing of patrols, radar systems and sonar "flakes" protecting offshore wind farms in the Baltic.

The lack of common safety guidelines for components used in offshore wind energy raises not only legal but also political problems. An example are Chinese companies such as Ming Yang. Although they offer competitive technologies, some countries – headed by Sweden – are cautious about them, pointing to possible technical and political risks. This is not about accusations of sabotage, but about the growing awareness that offshore infrastructure elements can also have strategic significance – regardless of the intention of the supplier.

In Germany there is a discussion about the project Watercant 270 MW in which 16 turbines were to be supplied by Ming Yang. The Ministry of Defence there warned that the manufacturer would gain remote access to infrastructure – including radars, communication and farm control systems. This. potential tool pressures that could be used in a situation of political or military crisis. Although investors defend the contract, pressure from public opinion and safety-related environments is increasing.

The new standard of the Federal Shipping and Hydrography Office of 2 April 2025 requires each farm to install radar and transmit raw data to the Navy – the cost (up to several million euro) lies solely on the operator's side, which the industry calls the "hidden security fee".

Stockholm went much further. In November 2024, the Swedish government cancelled thirteen wind farm projects in the Baltic with a total capacity of 32 GW. Official reason? The risk of deterioration of defence capabilities – both by possible radiolocation system disruptions and by shortening the response time of detection and guidance systems from about two minutes to one. This is at least what the Swedish Ministry of Defence (Försvarsdepartementet) lists. In practice, this means that a large part of the Eastern Baltic has become an informal zone excluded from new offshore investments. Only single locations on the west side of the country were allowed – away from naval operational routes and surveillance technical zones.

The industry is not concerned. The lack of common safety criteria for offshore components leads to regulatory chaos and discourages investors. In a decision-making vacuum, without clear rules of admissibility, equipment from non-NATO producers is still entering strategic installations – although it often involves technological and political risks.

BALTOPS 25: Second Plan of Drama

On the surface – demonstration of allied unity. In practice – intensive training of defence of the marine critical infrastructure. This year's BALTOPS 25 exercise They brought together 40 ships, 9,000 soldiers and aircraft and unmanned components from 19 countries. The scenarios simulated attacks on gas pipelines, fiber-optic cables intersections and diversionary activities of "unknown perpetrators". In the shadow of standard naval operations, the ability to integrate the swarm of drones and the first landing of the Mi-17 helicopter in the colours of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland aboard the U.S. Navy was also tested – symbolic but important in terms of the ability to act together. The Baltic becomes not only an arena of exercise, but a real area of response to hybrid threats – with cables and buses in the role of silent characters of conflict.

Maritime security Poland: equipment gap and waiting for Swordfishand

Warsaw boasts the program of the Sword and the construction of three multipurpose frigates: ORP Wind, ORP Storm and ORP Hurricane. The work schedule is now in line with the planned plan – the launch of the first unit is scheduled for the summer of 2026. At the same time, it is worth remembering that the way from launching to achieving full combat readiness takes two years in this case – it is time to carry out sea trials, integration of systems and crew association.

Until then, Polish waters of the Baltic will continue patrolling used frigates of the OHP type – individuals remembering the times of the Cold War, whose real combat value is very limited today. Unless the Italians, holding their FREMM fregates on the Baltic, decide to cover our flank for longer. However, if Russia or "unknown perpetrators" decide to take another test Marine critical infrastructure, Polish Navy The Polish Republic may be forced to count on allies who may have different priorities at a crucial moment. That's why the "you can count, you can count on yourself" principle has not lost its status.

At the same time, the programme has not yet been resolved Eagle – key to ensuring Poland's ability to carry out secret underwater operations. If frigates Miecznik programme strengthen the water component, the lack of modern submarines means a gap that the opponent can use to conduct exploratory and diversional activities near the Polish economic zone. Further delay in implementation Eagles puts into question the consistency of the Polish deterrent system at sea.

What next – questions no one wants to answer

Does Europe know how much a minute of silence costs underwater? It is estimated that the interruption of one 5 Tb/s fibre cable is at least EUR 24 million per day (RAND analysis, 2025). In extreme cases, this could be even a few hundred million euros. The question is: who pays for it – operators, insurers, or maybe ultimately taxpayers? More and more countries demand that turbines – like 5G equipment – be subject to mandatory safety certification.

Only that Brussels still did not decide who would set up "blue helmets" to protect infrastructure: NATO, the EU or an ad hoc formed coalition of willing? Meanwhile, in Warsaw, the question arises whether in the next stages of the construction of wind farms in the Baltic Poland will risk the embargo on Chinese components. And finally: when the ORP is incarnate in service Wind – and will the Baltic remain a "green" construction site by then, or will it be a "red" ground?

Why is that controversial?

Because it flunks the mantra, according to which "green energy = safety" and shows that the turbine can be as strategic as a rocket. Because he asks questions that nobody wants to ask out loud: about NATO's readiness to physically defend critical maritime infrastructure and about Poland's real capabilities in terms of protecting its own cables, future offshore wind farms and buses.

Because the truth is, the Baltic War is already on. There are no shots, no rockets, no alarm messages – but there are cables, there are interference and there are tests. Every day.

Disturbing GPS signal, energy flow anomalies, cable damage. That doesn't sound like the introduction to conflict. — Just like his everyday life. And in this everyday life Polish Navy The Republic of Poland is still based on used frigates of type OHP, supported by ad hoc allies. We, as a coastal state, still hope to make it before someone turns off the light. Future frigates – ORP Wind, ORP Storm, ORP Hurricane – and the rescue ship, the construction of which is about to begin, are still in the implementation phase. And time plays in favor of the enemy. It does not favour those who are in the process.

We realize – it is not easy. Three decades of negligence cannot be done overnight. But the coastal state, which has a long coastline and depends on the supply by sea of energy resources which it wants to be taken seriously, needs battleships here and now – at a time when threats are real and not hypothetical. Not in a few years. We need a shield, not a view board.

Meanwhile, politicians are flexing their muscles and predict that they will "step on Putin's ground", although real responses to hybrid attacks under the sea surface remain dramatically limited. Where are the planners in all this? What are the answers if the threats are here and now, not on the slides of 2035?

Jeśli Bałtyk ma pozostać „zielonym morzem”, trzeba jak najszybciej przejść od konferencji, przemówień i deklaracji do decyzji, które realnie coś zmienią. W przeciwnym razie kolejne incydenty udowodnią, że jedna celowo rzucona kotwica może sparaliżować kontynent szybciej niż batalion czołgów.

A wtedy pytanie nie będzie brzmiało „czy zareagowaliśmy za późno”, tylko – dlaczego pozwoliliśmy zgasnąć światłu w każdym polskim domu.

To tylko kilka scenariuszy – hipotetycznych, ale coraz bardziej prawdopodobnych. Tekst ten nie miał na celu kogokolwiek obrażać ani podważać wysiłku żołnierzy i planistów, którzy – często w ciszy i bez prawa do publicznej odpowiedzi – stoją na straży bezpieczeństwa. Jeśli w naszej analizie pojawiły się słowa zbyt ostre, prosimy traktować je jako wyraz troski. Ten artykuł nie jest aktem oskarżenia, lecz głosem zatroskanego obywatela, który – jak wielu – chciałby czuć, że państwo potrafi odpowiedzieć na zagrożenia w obliczu dzisiejszych wyzwań. To głos, który zrodził się z rozmów: z kolegami, z przypadkowymi pasażerami w pociągu, z ludźmi, którzy nie śledzą debat dotyczących bezpieczeństwa naszego kraju, ale czują, że coś wisi w powietrzu.

Bo my, jako społeczeństwo, nie prosimy o cud. Prosimy tylko o pewność, że światło nie zgaśnie, zanim zdążymy się obudzić.

Autor: kmdr por. rez. Adam Woźnicki/Mariusz Dasiewicz