The Baltic is not too small. It is difficult – and that is what matters

The Baltic is a difficult water. Plated in many places, saturated with commercial vessels and means of destruction, with a complex bottom structure and a demanding acoustic environment. It's a fact. The problem begins when this complexity comes down to one word: "too big for the Baltic."

This text is not a reaction to the very entrance of the carrier to the Baltic Sea. The motive behind his rise was the discussion after publication of material about FS Charles de Gaulle, in which instead of talking about real operating conditions appeared well-known chorus about "too big for the Baltic". So it is important to put the facts straight.

The comments discussed primarily with the title. And the title triggered an old pattern of thinking. The problem is that the slogan "too big for the Baltic" sounds like an echo of the old era today. Not because the Baltic has grown. Because the nature of the threats has changed and the way NATO treats this water – as a high-risk area, critical infrastructure and the constant presence of naval forces.

Baltic – a demanding environment but not too shallow

The Baltic Sea was portrayed a few years ago as a water too shallow for larger warships, including frigates. Contrary to today's suggestions, this is not an argument from two decades ago. Just reach to a publication from that period to see how often he appeared in public debate.

The problem is that it is a thought shorthand that simplifies reality to one parameter – the number of meters under the keel – ignoring the rest.

To accurately assess the operational limitations of the Baltic, you need to go beyond the password and look at the data. The average depth of this basin is about 52–55 m. In the southern part, these values most often range from 20 to 80 m. However, the Baltic is not a uniform "plate bath".

The depth distribution map clearly shows that the smallest values dominate the western part of the watershed – the most remote part of the Kaliningrad Oblast. At the same time, areas with the greatest batimetric diversity are concentrated in the Åland Islands.

As Mr Mirosław Ogrodniczuk pointed out, this is the diversity of sectors – not the same average depth – should be the starting point for the assessment of operational constraints.

It is also crucial that the bottom, often muddy and irregular, and the specificity of the propagation of sound in conditions of limited depth and variable salinity, are of key importance. It is these factors that have the greatest impact on maritime activities, especially in combating submarines.

Baltic restrictions are real. However, they are due to his physics and hydrology, not to the very size of the ship.

Debate on the Head

I returned to the argument a few years ago not because the dispute continued continuously. However, it shows the way of thinking, which for a long time dominated the discussion about the Baltic Sea.

The problem is that the debate has been set on the wrong axis. It is not whether the Baltic is too small for larger ships. It is about what tasks they are to perform in a complex operational environment of the Baltic Sea.

After 2022 the Baltic stopped being seen as a peripheral training water. It has become an area of high strategic importance – with a dense network of critical maritime infrastructure, intense maritime movement and the constant presence of allied forces.

A good example of this change is Operation Baltic Sentry. This is not a symbolic demonstration of presence, but a real response to threats to underwater infrastructure. Ships of SNMG-1 and SNMCMG-1 teams, supported by patrol aviation and unmanned marine systems, were directed to the region.

Their task is surveillance, monitoring and rapid response to regional destabilising incidents.

Under such conditions, not the size of the ship itself, but its operational capabilities – sensors, communication, autonomy of operation and the ability to command in a high-saturation environment.

National activity is similar. Last year Polish Navy The RP conducted exercises "Baltic Guardian-25", whose scenario was to intercept a unit with an AIS system that was approaching critical infrastructure.

This was not a show of force, but a practical check of procedures for responding to real threats – from diversion to attempts to disrupt the operation of energy and telecommunications installations.

The movement of vessels and the myth of the Baltic

One of the most frequently repeated arguments in the comments was the Baltic's "ciasnot". If the water is limited spatially and intensively used by civil shipping, then, as the critics say, large ships have no operational sense here.

However, just look at the AIS map to see the Baltic from a different perspective. It's not "empty, shallow puddle." From a bird’s eye, it resembles a dense network of sea highways.

Tankers, container ships, ferries, gas tankers, offshore units and port traffic intersect in relatively limited space.

And that's where the myth of "tissues" comes in. Under conditions of high saturation of civil traffic, the importance of situational awareness grows. This in turn depends on the quality of sensors, radar range, communication systems and command capability.

"Ciasnot" is not an argument against large individuals. It is an argument behind platforms equipped with advanced observation systems, capable of integrating data from multiple sources and having On-board helicopters capable of being identified beyond the radar horizon.

In an environment where civil traffic mixes with potentially hostile activity, a larger ship with an extensive combat system is not exaggeration. It's a tool for cleaning up chaos.

Marine critical infrastructure – Baltic as a combined vessel system

The Baltic has ceased to be just a space of navigation and maneuvering. It has become a dense energy network and telecommunications "arteries" that connect the countries of the region into a single system.

Just mention some examples: SwePol Link between Poland and Sweden, NordBalt connecting Lithuania to Sweden or EstLink linking Estonia to Finland. These are not abstract lines on the map, but real connections with hundreds of megawatts of power, affecting energy prices and security of supply.

There are other investments. The development of offshore wind energy means new export and internal cables in the Polish and Baltic exclusive economic zone.

The bottom of the Baltic Sea is filled with infrastructure whose damage can have economic and political consequences going far beyond the region.

It does not take a lecture on HVDC technology to understand one thing: The Baltic has become a strategic basin not only because of the warships of various fleets operating on it, but mainly because of the critical maritime infrastructure.

The more underwater installations of this kind, the greater the need for constant presence, supervision and responsiveness.

It's only the first part.

In the following texts, we will look at the Baltic without publicist abbreviations.

First – ranges of rockets and saturation of means of destruction in the region. Further – the acoustic environment and why the Baltic is difficult primarily for the activities of the ZOP, not for the very buoyancy of individuals.

At the end – construction trends in the region and real, not declarative NATO presence.

There will be data, maps and parameters. Because the Baltic is not simple. That is why it is worth talking about him seriously.

Mariusz Dasiewicz – publisher of the Shipyard Portal. He deals with the issues of the Polish Navy and shipbuilding industry. In his texts he focuses on modernisation programs of the navy and issues related to the development of the maritime security of Poland. It focuses on a factual analysis and transparency of the decision-making process.