Will China be forced to reduce naval development plans? [ANALYSIS]

The development of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in recent years has been impressive and has led to its position as the second largest naval force in the world. With regard to the number of large and medium-sized battleships and auxiliary units, the PLAN surpasses even the US Navy, having more battleships and more auxiliary units. Of course, Chinese ships are still giving up in terms of combat capabilities to the newest American units, but comparing new Chinese escort units with the most force-making U.S. units not dating back in the last few years does not have to look so bad for more "Chinese". The new quality of Chinese production equipment is expressed in increasingly frequent export transactions, where they often leave Western structures in the beaten field. The expansion to the arms markets is the result of reduced costs for serially produced ships and standardization of equipment and arms components. At this point it is worth recalling that in the last 10 years China has introduced to the line among others:

approximately 10 nuclear-powered submarines (SSBN and SSN);
approximately 15 conventional submarines (AIP-independent parts);
carrier (2 under construction);
6 large docking aircraft;
6 large landing vessels (LST);
16 large destroyers (7 further under construction);
29 frigates;
42 corvettes;
Ten large fleet supplies.

In 2014-18, the Chinese fleet was powered by vessels with a total displacement of 678,000 tonnes. Despite such a great effort, the Chinese fleet, due to the lack of large and numerous airport groups, much weaker on-board and base aviation, lower quality submarines, unsatisfactory number of large ocean support units, and the lack of adequate overseas bases, is unable to catch up with the US Navy and take the place of the world's first naval force. The obstacles to the creation of a strong ocean fleet are rising costs, increasingly modern ships of the latest generation. This price is due in a way to the desire to catch up with American models in the field of used technologies, and the latest technologies cost... China is also unable to shift, like the Americans, some of the cost of creating the latest weapons to resourceful allies, due to their real lack. Chinese products go to customers who want to benefit from a low series price, not co-finance the development of modern technologies. China itself is also partly dependent on the transfer of selected technologies from Russia or other countries of the former Soviet Union, e.g. aircraft engines, rocket technologies, weapons carriers. In Chinese products there is a clear influence of technical thought of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, but also of France or Israel. You can also see the effects of "non-licensive lending" from American solutions, just as the American inspirations of the Chinese concepts of new class ships are obvious. But it can be assumed that the way to imitate the solutions that have already been invented is cheaper than sweat

An additional cost to the development of the Chinese Navy is the attempt to establish naval bases in friendly countries or on islands, reefs and rocks often found in the disputed areas of Asia. The construction of a naval base in Djibouti, a deep-water port in the Pakistani Gwadar, the expansion of bases and stations on the disputed waters of the South China Sea (a base on Woody Island and stations on the Duncan, Tree, Lincoln, Money and Triton reefs in the Paracelese Archipelago, a base on the Fiera Cross, Subi, Mischief and Gaven reefs, Johnson, Cuarteron, Hughes in the Spratly Islands, the seizure of the Philippine-based Scarborough Shoal reefs, reported objections to the underwater Macclesfield Bank), the demands for the return of the Japanese islands of Senkaku, and the still unfinished process of establishing the boundaries of economic exclusivity zones with most countries of the region, make it necessary to maintain numerous forces and frequent demonstrations of presence in the vast region. They also cause increased tensions and widespread accusations of "Chinese imperialism" which results in worsening of many political and commercial relations.

In the above situation, the official Chinese position on the little influence of the U.S. trade war on the development of the armed forces may not be entirely correct. It is unofficially known that the Chinese fleet is expected to reduce its development costs. Current estimates of the cost of construction of the aircraft carrier and its aviation group at 50 billion renminbi (CN)¥ – yuan), i.e. about US$7.2 billion, force China's stated plans to maintain 4 aircraft combat groups in the future (including 3 operational ones). Also because, for example, the cost of the most important of the new ocean escorts, the 055/Renhai destroyers are twice as high as the price of the preceding type 052D and are approximately 6 billion CN¥ i.e. about $900 million. Moreover, the operating costs of an aircraft combat group, consisting of several escorts and submarines and supply units, are gigantic and incomparable with the Chinese fleet's current expenditure. There is also a small cost of repairs, repairs, shipbuilding and base infrastructure. In addition, the "mirror development" practice — in relation to the US Navy — of the fleet assumes developed own equivalents of LHAs capable of using vertical take-off and landing aircraft. The development of Chinese LHA Type 075, and the development of analogues for F-35B will entail further gigantic spending. This includes the cost of developing a new aircraft for using on-board catapults, currently built 002 aircraft. The Chinese are aware

Another challenge facing China is the organisation of a strong Marine Corps. The plans concern the formation of 6 new infantry brigades which is expected to result in 8 such tactical unions with a population of approximately 40000 soldiers. So far, 4 of the planned brigades have been formed. Interestingly, the process of creating them was based on the transformation of landing units of land forces and this allowed them to be formed relatively quickly. This practice is in line with the government's declared reduction in the army's numbers and increasing the responsibility of the fleet for defending the coast (but also for carrying out offensive landing activities). It is also possible that sea-going operations of this kind should be carried out by forces of one formation (as is known from the Pacific War performed by Japan and the US), especially since the fleet now has relatively strong and modern landing equipment (e.g. type 071).

These objectives, requiring considerable financial resources. The saturation of the fleet with relatively modern ships, and the increasing share of operating costs, more than ever, combined with the need to transfer rivalry to the quality of their forces, should in the coming years lead to a halt to the avalanche of introduction of new escort ships. This will probably include the development and implementation of units specialised in air operations, landing operations and support, and increased withdrawal.

Signature: Tomasz Witkiewicz