Will the Marine Wind Farms become a runoff of the Polish surveillance and reconnaissance system in the Baltic?

Faced with the growing importance of offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea, Poland faces the challenge of integrating new structures into its observation and safety system. There was a unique and unique opportunity to create a modern multi-domain surveillance system in the Baltic. Will the Polish Armed Forces use this emerging opportunity to strengthen their defence and exploratory capabilities?

When, more than a decade ago, the Ministry of Infrastructure began issuing decisions launching a process allowing to place offshore wind farms in the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone (as part of the so-called Phase I) few people, apart from investors, drew attention to this event. 10 years later, we are on the verge of beginning the process of building marine wind farms and nothing is the same as it was in the beginning.

First, the appetite of investors increased. The allocation of concessions to offshore wind farms within Phase II has just been decided, and the market is already coming to Phase III and waiting for another. Secondly, the safety environment has undergone drastic transformation. The biggest security problem of the Marine Wind Farm (IMF) was the unauthorised entry of the fishing unit, and today the phrase "security of the critical marine infrastructure" is changed by all cases, because the times of the end of history are ancient history.

Two years of Russian aggression have shown emphatically that critical infrastructure is the same target for a potential aggressor as a group of troops, and in the event of a war on destruction infrastructure becomes a top priority.

Third, according to the provisions of the Maritime Safety Act, Article 113c.:

To meet the requirements referred to in Article 113a requirements for the construction and operation of the offshore wind farm in paragraph 2(4), Manufacturer within the meaning of point (12) of Article 3 of the Act of 17 December 2020 on the promotion of electricity generation in offshore wind farms, draw up technical expertise on the assessment of the impact of the offshore wind farm and the assembly of equipment on state defence systems, including the radio-location imaging system, technical observation, maritime radio communications and the control system of air traffic services of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.
To meet the requirements referred to in Article 113a the requirements for the construction and operation of the offshore wind farm in paragraph 2(4), as regards the national border protection system at sea, Manufacturer within the meaning of point (12) of Article 3 of the Law of 17 December 2020 on the promotion of electricity generation in offshore wind farms draw up technical expertise on the assessment of the impact of the offshore wind farm and the equipment assembly on the radiolocation, technical observation and radio communication system of the Border Guard.

we have already made all the analyses and simulations necessary for the preparation of the experts concerned, and the experts themselves in the overwhelming majority have already been approved by the relevant institutions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The problem is that when we analyze and compare with each other the decisions on the Marine Wind Farms issued by the Ministry of Infrastructure more than a decade ago with the results of the technical expertise developed this year, it turns out that nothing agrees with each other, or even can be opposed. In the then Decisions, in a rather random way, both in terms of location and quantity, the IMF investors were given the location of radar and surveillance cameras installation.

This includes the results of technical analyses aimed at checking whether and to what extent built in the Baltic (in the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone) The IMF will have a negative impact on state defence systems, including shore observation systems, communication systems, etc.

In the event of a negative impact on systems used by the Polish Armed Forces and the Border Guard, the IMF investor should introduce suggested countermeasures. They may consist of installing additional radio stations, radio antennas, retranslators or radars at designated locations.

At first glance, this appears to be a reasonable and uncomplicated solution. Unfortunately, the reality snorts and shimmers. Under the laws and regulations, investors have prepared the required expertise by law, but the results for the individual IMF do not add up unequivocally when we consider all the farms built.

For example, the technical expertise for the IMF "X" indicates the need to install additional radar in its area. And that is the right assumption for this single, isolated IMF. But when we consider the cumulative effect, both our IMF "X" and the IMF in its neighbourhood, it suddenly turns out that this additional radar should no longer be installed on the IMF "X" only on the neighbouring IMF "Y", and not one and two radars.

The current situation is that Investors do not know how to approach the problem, as they have residual knowledge, concerning only areas of the IMF that will build themselves. Comprehensive knowledge is at the Ministry of Defence, and specifically at the General Staff of the HR, which was the main institution of opinion and acceptance of the results of technical expertise.

In 2000, on the Stoczniowy portal.pl, my article on relations between offshore wind farm operators and the Ministry of National Defence, titled Wind-driven tactics.

I wrote at the time that what is pleasing to investors and the economy may and should give a headache to the Armed Forces of Poland, and above all, the Navy, which will collide with a factor that will have to be included in its operational plans, and which has never had to be taken into account before.

I have put in this text (written from the perspective of a former soldier dealing with operational matters over the years) the following questions:

how to plan relations (rights and obligations) Armed forces – investor/operator, ensuring the security interests of the state?
How will we prevent the installation of other countries' recognition systems (sensors) on wind farm components, and how will we ensure that the Polish Armed Forces can use wind farm components to install their own sensors and detection systems?
Do the localization decisions of wind farms affect defense plans and areas for the development of operational naval forces?
how to use wind farms to increase their own situational awareness?

I regret to say that many of the problems I raised in my article three years ago remain unresolved, and many of the questions raised at the time have still not been answered.

Even if the IMF investors themselves took action to install the equipment indicated in the decisions and in the reports, we are still facing hardware, logistics and integration chaos. Moreover, it may turn out that, in the end, instead of compensating for the IMF's negative impact on defence systems, it will be further increased by an excessive number and inadequate location of compensation devices.

All these concerns, concerns and expectations about MON were confirmed during panel discussions of the Offshore Wind Poland Conference, organized by the Polish Wind Energy Association on 21/22 November 2023.

Since the cumulative knowledge, on the impact of the Marine Wind Farms on the defence systems of the state, as well as the need to observe and identify the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland is located in the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, seems to be the most appropriate for the Investors, through their representative body (perhaps the Polish Wind Energy Association), to ask the Ministry of Defence (SGWP) to urgently develop the concept (plan) of the state's wind farm water observation system.

A plan that will show where, how many and what devices to install. Which harmonises hardware requirements, indicates the owners of the devices responsible for maintenance and maintenance, and identifies the owners of the information obtained.

It is highly desirable that the Ministry of National Defence, along with its subordinate institutions, lean over the problem and give its position in this area as quickly as possible. The matter is urgent, that project work is coming to an end and investors will apply for construction permits. Nobody wants to suffer losses and risk multi-billion-dollar investment schedules due to the lack of key data on MON expectations.

The quick solution to the problem is in the interests of not only investors who are at business risk, but also in the interests of the Armed Forces of Poland who have a unique opportunity to acquire new operational capabilities. Let's hope this special opportunity doesn't get wasted.

Author: kmdr dir. Mirosław Ogrodniczuk, Offshore Wind Security Advisor