Will terrorists threaten Polish wind farms in the Baltic?

In the coming years Poland will gain – thanks to the construction of offshore wind farms – further energy capacity. This new element of critical infrastructure will also be exposed to sabotage or terrorist attacks. The risk of such attacks is even greater than many facilities on land. Tomasz Chła from the Łukasiewicz Energy Policy Institute analyses possible risks and indicates ways of protecting against them.

Last year there was a diversion in the Baltic affecting the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. In 2019, oil offshore installations in Saudi Arabia were attacked. These two examples show that maritime energy infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to diversion and terrorist attacks. The consequences of such attacks may be severe financially for the owner, but also jeopardise the stability of the entire energy system of the country or group of countries.

After the outbreaks of Nord Stream, the Polish government introduced the 2nd Bravo alert stage to the Polish energy infrastructure located outside the borders of the Republic of Poland. Let us remind that examples of such infrastructure are the Baltic Sea gas pipeline Baltic Pipe or high voltage cable SwePol Link.

Marine critical infrastructure is extremely difficult to protect and protect against possible attacks.

Therefore, the work on ensuring the safety of wind turbines in the Baltic must be started just now, a few years before the first turnover of shovels in the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone. And let us remind you that offshore manufacturing infrastructure could be responsible in 2035 for a generation of up to 40 Twh. According to the Energy Forum estimates, this could represent 17-21 percent of national electricity demand.

Tomasz Chła, Łukasiewicz Institute of Energy Policy expert

The expert emphasizes that the entire offshore industry must be aware that these investments can become after they are integrated into the energy network of the Polish Republic, for the purpose of terrorist acts.

Marine wind farms are formed at a distance of more than 12 nautical miles from the nearest ports (i.e. more than 22 km), often outside the line of the radio-location or optical horizon, which in itself prolongs the response time of state security services. In this situation, the transfer of an explosive charge to the wind turbine area or undersea cables is an increasingly likely scenario.

Such an attack may be carried out by a large range drone and a lift or a drone starting from a scooter, a yacht or a motorboat. Remotely controlled underwater vehicles (ROV or ROUV) can also be threatened by turbines

Defense against drones is obviously possible. I am referring to activities such as monitoring the area inside the wind farm and its equipment. This is served by systems consisting of detection devices and devices that destroy or disrupt flight.

Tomasz Chła, Łukasiewicz Institute of Energy Policy expert

The detection devices are typically radars, noise recording microphone sets emitted by an unmanned vehicle, cameras operating in a visible and/or infrared range of electromagnetic radiation, designed to observe airspace above the object and capable of being identified by an artificial flying object other than a bird. The flying unmanned craft can also be detected by an analysis of the communication signal between the control device in the hand of the pilot and the aircraft.

Especially difficult to detect will be an attack from the sea side, driven using a drone starting from a vessel.

Not the best condition of the Polish Navy should be the reason for the beginning of work on unmanned patrol vessels with little buoyancy, but equipped with radar systems and drone control systems. Such ships could defend offshore installations. In addition, the formation of offshore wind farms should be an impulse to build a listening system that protects the farm from threats that can be caused by underwater drones.

Tomasz Chła, Łukasiewicz Institute of Energy Policy expert

A significant distance of planned investments from the Polish coast makes the technical means available to the Naval Observation Points (the Bridgemaster radar and the modified radar NUR-21) and the Border Guard Station (Radar Terma Scanter 2001) impossible to conduct radio-location surveillance on wind farms closest to the coast.

Other forms of monitoring of the farm planting area at present can be carried out to a very limited extent due to the equipment of the Navy and Border Guard. For example, the Gdynia Naval Aviation Brigade only has M28B 1R, M28B 1RM/BIS and An-28 environmental surveillance aircraft with limited capabilities for such missions. With railway Border Guards units of limited suitability for such tasks.

The owners of wind turbines located in the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone will become operators of critical infrastructure. A Crisis Management Act (26 April 2007) requires the operator of such infrastructure to draw up a minimum security plan. Of course, the ministers responsible for state assets, energy or the economy of mineral deposits will also have their tasks to do, as well as, of course, interior and national defence ministers.

It is therefore necessary to develop a multisensor security system that would allow proper response to threats from divers, ships and submarines, submarines and drones. This is what the energy security of Poland requires.

Tomasz Chła, Łukasiewicz Institute of Energy Policy expert

Source: Ignacy Łukasiewicz Energy Policy Institute in Rzeszów