The days of the Navy's demise...

When on 28 November 1918, the Chief of State Józef Piłsudski signed the Order of the formation of the Polish Navy, he did not imagine that after more than 100 years later his legacy would be turned to dust.

In reference to our latest publications on the Navy, with the permission of the editorial board of the Journal of Armed Forces, we recall the text that was published on 07.08.2018. Will the words of the Navy Day prove prophetic...?

PO CO POLISH NAVY?

"The Founding Fathers of the Second Republic", in addition to the vision of the creation of the Central Industrial District, have also realized a vision of the construction of the Polish seaport, and accompanying this project, the idea of the reconstruction of the Navy. The implementation of all three projects took two decades, and the relative combat capacity of the fleet and the degree of modernity were at an incomparably higher level than today.

Therefore, from the perspective of today, it is worth trying to find an answer to the question why, one hundred years after the decree of Józef Piłsudski was issued, it is so difficult to obtain a political declaration determining what we need a marine type of armed forces and what tools should be available to carry out the tasks imposed.

Since the definition and description, by Mahan and Corbet, the basics of the doctrinal use of naval forces, defensive tasks and economic interest tasks permeate one another, and depending on the current level of tensions in the safety environment, one of them alternately gains priority.

In 2016, the largest China was the trading partner of the Federal Republic of Germany, with a total value of PLN 169 billion in freight, and the second place was the United States with a value of USD 164 billion2.

A careful observer of the German Navy's activities could easily see how, with the development of trade with China, areas of operational interest in the naval forces were changing. Today, ships under the German flag in the Baltic are met, and only in the North Sea appear during transit to the more remote waters located in the Mediterranean, the Arab Gulf, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

In the case of Poland, in mass terms, maritime transport is responsible for about 30% of the trade in goods, and the attempt to convince political and military leaders of the need to participate in the management of freedom of navigation in the world, including participation of the Polish ship in the anti-piracy operation, usually met with the reply "But we have no business there". Unfortunately, it has rarely been pointed out that, in value terms, maritime transport represents as much as 70% of our freight exchange. Secondly, maritime transport plays an increasingly important role in the transport of strategic raw materials and in the diversification of supply sources. And in the span of a decade, it may even play a dominant role.

Since, in the general opinion of decision-makers, we, as a State, have no interest in maintaining safety in key shipping waters, it can be assumed that similar arguments will be made in the case of water essential to the transport of strategic raw materials.

If only a military function remains the sole objective of the Navy, then The effort to acquire new vessels should remain focused on acquiring tools to ensure that defence tasks are carried out.

OPERATIONAL USE OF WAR MARINARIA AND HER NON

Until 1989, tasks for the Navy were defined by the Soviet comrades within the Warsaw Pact and were reduced strictly to aggressive warfare. Moreover, both the Soviet Union and Russia have never been maritime states in the "western" sense, therefore the role of the naval forces was only seen as a military function and a secondary function.

It would seem that dropping the burden of supervision from the Soviet Union would push naval operational art on its own tracks, unfortunatelySince 1989 Poland has suffered from chronic inability to define the interests of the maritime state, Navy function in the security system and its concept operational use.

The only experience of conducting activities at sea, gained during World War II, was completely lost, either through physical elimination and degradation of human resources or through depreciation (which takes place today) of the role of MW in the September Campaign and further fight against Kriegsmarine, throughout the war.

The post-war period is the re-subordination of all tactics and operational arts to the East-West axis, giving the Navy a subordinate role to the Baltic Fleet of the Soviet Union

The total lack of experience of conducting naval operations, the loss of military thought and the legacy of the position of the Navy in the former Warsaw Agreement have led to the fact that in political and military circles decisions about the acquisition of security ships are easily made, while complete decision-making paralysis arises when ships are acquired. Moreover, in many public statements and publications, in relation to the Marine Rocket Unit (MJR), it has been stated for several years that it is intended to cover (sic!) naval forces and shore objects, as if MJR ever had the ability to combat rockets or aircraft.

And while it is possible to ignore the silent expression of such opinions by civilians, they are unforgivably harmful in the mouth of persons in uniform, as they have led to the elimination of ship platforms from WISŁA and NAREW programs, creating a huge gap in the target air defense and missile defence system of the state.

The fact of successful construction of a mine destroyer, which in itself constitutes a unique project on a global scale, cannot obscure the fact that we first invest in individuals without independent survival on the modern battlefield.

Watching the ladle dance around the NavyIt's time to end the philosophy of replacing old ships with new ones of the same type.

Polish Navy requires serious discussion of itself, redefinition of its role in the state defence system and development of the Technical Modernisation Programme from scratch.

Knowing that Polish Navy will not be a priority type of armed forces, at least in the perspective of a generation, and taking into account the limited financial effort it appears that the key to success will be to define only one operational task around which the maritime component should be built. The choice, in fact, is limited to "Fighting" or "Airspace Defense".

RESTRUCTURING

A few years ago, with the start of the process of defining a program to acquire new submarines, the idea of equipping these ships with maneuvering rockets emerged.

Soon thereafter, the idea of a "stunning triad" or a combination of the capabilities of the Air Force equipped with JASM missiles, the Land Forces equipped with long-range missile artillery, and the Navy with these submarines appeared.

However, one can get the impression that, in the case of MW, the political side adopted the idea of submarines with maneuvering rockets without any reflection on the conditions of their use, because a brief look on the attached map is sufficient to realise the extent of the limitations they will have to face in the case of operational operations.

The widespread enthusiasm that accompanies the theoretical secrecy of submarines in the waters of the Baltic Sea, resulting from specific hydrology, is a message of the fact that available aquenas represent a small part of the Baltic Sea, of which almost half are in areas which are not operationally suitable for MW.

I don't know if anyone has tried to determine how many areas of submarine activity can be "split" in this limited area, but with great probability, it is possible to assume that in deep water, there will be such a tight fight between submarines before any rocket launches.

However, if, despite any adversities, the rockets can be launched for the target, it should be remembered that the actions will be carried out during the war, and the enemy's ZOP's air force will be in the highest combat readiness. This means that a maximum of 30-40 minutes after the launch of the rocket will begin intensive hunting of submarines and in unfavourable circumstances it may turn out that within an hour of the missile impact on the bottom of the Baltic Sea the property worth several billion zlotys will rest, and the effects of the use of maneuvering missiles will be disproportionately poor.

Source: Naval Academy

If politicians really think that the Polish State should have an element of a deterrent system in the form of submarines with maneuvering missiles, a new concept of their operational use must be developed from scratch.

If they are to respond to the planned combat effect, they must first be given greater flexibility in maneuvering and, secondly, a better chance of secretly developing into operational areas, which means that they must operate outside the Baltic.

Unfortunately, this involves building an expensive system of support for submarines on waters away from home base and supplying them with exploratory information.

Secondly, if account is taken of the number of rockets necessary to overpower the operational level command post, early warning radio-location stations or any other similar object, it appears that it will be necessary to acquire 6-8 ships with appropriate capabilities for the effective execution of the missile impact.

Airspace Defense

One of the most prominent theorists of maritime operational art, Professor Milan Vego, in his deliberations on the role of naval forces carrying out tasks in closed or semi-closed seas, i.e. such as the Baltic Sea basins present, points out that for centuries, the task of naval forces has been to support the flank of major forces active on land.

Importantly, it shows that wherever in practice the principle of combined action was applied (although for centuries a different terminology was used to describe them), the final result, in the vast majority of cases, was beneficial not only for the course of a given operation but even for the course of the final outcome of the war.

Meanwhile, taking into account the historical safety conditions, the established theory of operational art, the geographical location of Poland, potential threats and the relatively long and difficult to defend shoreline, the weight of cover and defense of troops operating in the coastal belt, may and should assume on themselves Polish Navy carrying out the following key tasks:

• preventing the secretive intrusion of air raid measures in Poland from the sea direction;
• implementation of the early missile fire warning function from the Kaliningrad Oblast;
• providing cover and anti-missile and air defense, from the sea direction, to the coastal wing of the main forces, conducting a strategic defense operation on land.

Action at sea must not be separated from what is happening on land and vice versa. For years the term "combined activities" has been changed by all cases, only that until we start applying the principle of common (uniform) operating space, until action in the land-sea relationship will remain activities connected only in the theoretical sphere.

In the reality around us Military, the Baltic Fleet alone is able to launch 140 to 160 missiles in one volley. If you add to this rocket troops that have already been deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast and their possible reinforcement, the number of rockets is at least doubled. Their target will be not only ships but also, perhaps above all, troops operating on land.

Moreover, the potential threat will be posed not only by aircraft stationed in the Kaliningrad Oblast, but also by aviation stationed in the St. Petersburg area, which will be able to take advantage of the maneuverability resulting from the possibility of an approach in the airspace by the sea instead of overland.

The focus of the operational attention towards the East-West, the operational development of troops along this axis and the disregard of the role of the MW in the potential armed conflict may result in the formation of a "soft underbelly" from the sea direction, where the attacking opponent encounters almost zero countermeasures (if we continue to modernise the Navy so far) and will gain a zone of full operational freedom, or rather a "zone of impunity" by the sea and in the coastal belt.

Taking this into account, in order to protect airspace from the sea direction, a second group of ships on which it can and should place its bets Polish Navy there are air defense (anti-missile) ships.

Only a combination of the capabilities of the existing Marine Rocket Unit MJR/High Coast Rocket Squadrons/ with the capabilities of air defense ships will provide an effective barrier to defence of access to the coast while at the same time providing cover for the coastal wing of forces fighting on land. At the same time, the ships will shield the MJR from air strikes and provide reconnaissance information on the submarine situation at maximum ranges of MJR missile weapons.

Moreover, the adoption by MW of the function of "space defence" and the acquisition of appropriate tools in the form of ships equipped with a minimum of two complexes (2 x 32) of vertical launch rocket launchers will simultaneously provide the ability to be deterred by purchasing an appropriate fire unit and will solve the problem of fulfilling the commitment to participate in NATO's permanent teams.

Agreeing with the claim, that the most important task of the Navy is to defend the territory of Poland from the sea direction and support the coastal wing of the land troops on the strategic perimeter of the defence, it is completely incomprehensible not to include ship's anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence systems as components of the WISŁA and NAREW programs.

These systems are technologically advanced, operationally tested, have no problems covering the area of 360o. Due to the ship's platform, they are constantly mobile and, most importantly, in the marine environment they are much more efficient than when used on land.

Of course, I am aware that immediately there will be an argument that a ship of this type will be an easy target in the Baltic. Where, then, will it not be the subject of the attack? In the middle of the ocean? We won't be fighting a defensive war there.

This type of argument is interesting enough, that a contract for the construction of a rescue vessel with a displacement of 5,500 tonnes has been signed, proceedings for planned logistics support vessel with a displacement of 6,500 tons of buoyancy have been suspended, and there is an absurd discussion in public space whether the core of the naval forces, i.e. the submarine battleships can have 2,500 tons or it will be too much because they will not swim far.

The political side cannot define the role and tasks of the Navy, Polish Navy he acts as a great mute and absentee, willing to accept any solution as long as it floats, and meanwhile the ship industry waged a fraticidal war over a "strategic" order for 6 tugs.

One would like to believe that this is only a coincidence but the order of the orders to be launched, first on the mine destroyer and then on the tugboats and the lifeguard ship suggest that the worst scenario is fulfilled and the top takes the "magic small numbers" that is, the launch of projects that do not represent a significant burden on the MON budget.

Indeed, such orders will fulfil the role of a specific drip for selected companies but do not bring any added value in the form of new technologies or new generation capacity.

Worse still, such a philosophy will take its revenge in the event of an armed conflict. Cheap today means worthless when it comes to defending the state. Instead of investing in strike ships, we invest in battleships and support that will not be useful for anything out of lack of main forces, and will also not be able to survive on their own in the battlefield.

We need to be clear that Polish Navy There's no chance of a simple exchange of old ships for new ones.

Without defining yourself again, without finding a new idea for the Navy and narrowing the operational competences by choosing one of the two presented options, which can be read as "finding an operational niche" in the State's defense system, instead of raising the flag on new battleships, we will see the drop of the MW flag as an organizational unit. Soon.

May I prove to be a bad prophet this time.

P.S. The statements contained in the text contain only private opinions of the author.

Author: kmdr dir. Mirosław Ogrodniczuk