Drones over Poland. Incident analysis and system applications

On the night of 9th on 10th September, there was an unprecedented series of violations of Polish airspace by unmanned people taking part in the Russian massive attack on Ukraine. The Prime Minister confirmed a total of 19 violations, indicating that a large proportion of the facilities were coming directly from the Belarusian direction. Three facilities were reported shot down and an allied consultation was launched.

Interestingly, the X portal featured an entry by the Military Gendarmerie, which informed: "Soldiers from the Military Gendarmerie in Zamość, together with police officers from the KPP in Tomaszów Lubelski, secured the location of the drone found in Majdan-Silec. Preliminary findings indicate that it is an unarmed smuggling drone."The message after some time disappeared from the formation profile, leaving more questions than answers.

But that's in the past. The following text is not a manifestation of panic spreading, but a test of a cool and pragmatic analysis of events that show how fragile our sense of security is in the face of the growing dangers of unmanned systems.

What happened tonight

The defense operation was allied. In the area of operations, the Polish Saab 340 AEW was on duty, responsible for early detection of low-flying facilities. Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35s were picked up for interception, which are on duty in Poland. It also indicates the participation of German Patriot batteries, as well as the presence of an allied tanker A330 MRTT and an Italian aircraft early warning. Details of which forces neutralized specific targets have not been disclosed, but it is known that three facilities have been disabled.

Meanwhile, Minsk informed that he was to provide data on the Polish and Lithuanian sides about the approaching drone borders. The Operations Command did not confirm these reports and should therefore only be considered as a declaration by the Belarusian party.

Simulation versus reality – compliance almost 1:1

In recent weeks, I have prepared a detailed simulation of the scenario of breach of Polish airspace by a drone type Geran. The results were clear – with the current sensor system, the object is only detected at the end of the flight. Today's events have almost accurately confirmed these predictions.

As part of the simulation, I recreated a full sequence of actions: from the first information about the coming OWA measures, through the entry of stations into high alert condition, the start of Saaba 340 AEW and its work in the border area, to the first radio-location contact with a low flying goal. Then – guidance the F-16 on the intercept vector and finally shoot down after reaching a safe shooting situation.

The whole illustrates the limitations of ground-based radars, for which a low-flying target often remains invisible, and the key role of an early-warning aircraft that "raises" the situation beyond the field obstacles and the curve of the Earth. Today's incident recreated this pattern almost one to one.

What does this night teach us?

The conclusions of this night are clear. Single, even effective elements do not yet form a defense system. Without a coherent architecture of recognition, Poland will react with delay, instead of warning the threat. It is therefore crucial to maintain constant supervision of the most sensitive sectors – both in the royal and Baltic direction, where the strategic energy infrastructure of the state is concentrated.

Today's events strongly confirmed that Poland needs not only ad hoc reactions, but above all a coherent and multilayered radio-location surveillance system. It is crucial to combine continuous surveillance with rapid response. In this context, the Barbara programme deserves special attention, which can become one of the foundations of such architecture.

"Barbara" — JLENS aerostats as permanent surveillance over the Baltic

The "Barbara" programme assumes the use of JLENS aerostats as permanent sentries of the Polish sky and sea. Simulations have shown that radar up to about 1,500 metres [1,500 m] can detect an object moving only 5 metres [5 m] above the sea surface from a distance of up to 175 km. Such a broad radiolocation horizon allows for continuous surveillance of the planned Energy infrastructure in the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone and over the Gulf of Gdańsk.

Aerostat remains on standby continuously for 30 days. Appropriately planned rotation guarantees continuity of observation, and its transfer in transport mode takes only a few days. At the 1500 metres ceiling, an optimal compromise is achieved between range and weather resistance, without costly and complex logistics characteristic of classic aircraft.

The biggest advantage, however, is the ability to operate on the network. With Link-16 and Link-22 links, data from aerostats can immediately supply national and allied operating images. American tests have shown that the system cooperates with Patriot kits, supports ships armed with SM-6 missiles, and even transmits data to aircraft armed with air-to-air missiles. In Polish realities, this means not only prior warning, but also real support for the process of indicating goals.

The conclusion is that the current order for aerostates under the Barbara is too modest. In particular, there is a lack of a permanent surveillance point for the northern flank of the Baltic, towards the Rabbit. Only the deployment of several radio-location domes will close the gaps that came out that night again.

The need for a coherent recognition architecture

Saab 340 AEW performs well as a bridge role, but cannot be treated as a target solution. Poland needs full-value early warning and command aircraft, interoperable with NATO systems, with at least four machines – only then on-calls and rotation will ensure resilience to long-term crises. In parallel, gaps should be filled in the national radio-location network of mobile field radars that, as demonstrated by Ukrainian experience, effectively close the low-flying drones and maneuvering missiles. Only a combination of JLENS aerostats, AWACS targets and distributed field radar network will create a coherent layered reconnaissance architecture. Today's incident has proved that we can react, but the advantage comes solely from constant situational awareness, and this one is built by a system, not a shopping catalogue.

Today she showed something else – for the first time since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine decisions about the defence of the Polish airspace fell quickly and were made without looking at political risks. Shooting down Russian drones over the territory of Poland is a signal that Poland and NATO crossed the psychological barrier, moving from passive reaction to active defence. This is a milestone – from now on, the opponent must count on the fact that any further attempt to breach the border may result in immediate neutralisation. Importantly, the events of that night also show that despite internal political disputes, the state can act effectively in the face of threats affecting the security of the entire nation.