Europe strengthens the protection of LNG terminals against sabotage

Europe is increasingly seeing LNG terminals, ports and maritime critical infrastructure as part of the State security system. After a series of incidents in the Baltic, the sabotage scenarios ceased to be solely the subject of exercises. They have become one of the basic options to which services, port operators and maritime forces are preparing.

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LNG as strategic infrastructure for European countries

The importance of LNG terminals has increased after the reduction of gas supply from Russia. According to ACER, the share of LNG in EU gas supply increased from 23% in 2020 to around 40% in 2024 and the European Union remained the largest LNG importer in the world, bringing in 112 billion cubic metres of gas in this form.

This means that ports serving methanes have become not only an element of energy logistics, but also a potential target for hybrid activities. Disruption of the LNG terminal does not necessarily mean destruction of the installation. All you have to do is block the approach track, an incident involving a civilian unit, breach of the security zone by a drone or cyber attack aimed at port handling systems.

The Baltic forces a change of approach

NATO launched Baltic Sentry activity in January 2025 to increase its military presence in the Baltic Sea and improve its response to destabilising activities Marine critical infrastructure.

It's not just about pipelines and offshore cables. The same hazard directory applies to LNG terminals, transhipment wharfs, port communication systems, waterways and port access units. In practice, defence of maritime critical infrastructure becomes a multi-domain task: maritime, land, air and cyber.

Świnoujście checks procedures in practice

Poland also strengthens preparations to protect energy infrastructure at sea. In September 2025, exercises were conducted in the area of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście involving police officers, Border Guards and soldiers of the Military Gendarmerie. The script included actions towards a vessel blocking the access of methane ships to the gasport, including boarding a boat unit and using a helicopter. In parallel, the recovery of control of part of terminal infrastructure was practiced.

GAZ-SYSTEM also develops cooperation with state security services. The operator emphasizes that the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, Baltic Pipe, pumping stations and other transmission infrastructure elements are the foundation of the energy security of Poland.

European Union strengthens infrastructure resilience

At EU level, the CER Directive on the resilience of critical actors is crucial. The European Commission recalls that it covers natural risks, terrorist attacks, internal threats, sabotage and public health crises. Member States had time to implement national rules by 17 October 2024.

In 2025, the Commission adopted additional guidance on identification of critical entities and risk assessment. These include energy, transport, digital infrastructure and water.

The port as a destination, not just the facilities

The main change is that the port ceases to be viewed exclusively as transport facilities. LNG terminal, breakwater, VTS system, tugboats, port services and ICT infrastructure form one organism. Hitting one element may reduce the efficiency of the entire supply chain.

Ports are a strategic basis for trade, energy and security in European countries. As key entry and exit points, they are exposed to various threats: from organised crime, cyber attacks, to actions inspired by third countries. This is why European ports are increasingly practicing scenarios covering the control of civilian units, the protection of quays, the response to drones, the prevention of cyber threats and the maintenance of terminal continuity.

In this sense, the protection of LNG is no longer the responsibility of the operator itself. It's a test of the collaboration of the maritime administration, the police, Border Guard, troops, infrastructure operators and the private sector.

Conclusion for Poland

For Poland this is not a distant or theoretical problem. The Świnoujście LNG terminal is already one of the most important elements of the state's energy security, while the planned FSRU In the Gulf of Gdańsk, the national transmission system with the sea will be further bound. In practice, ports, terminals, approaches, communication systems and gas supply units become key entry and exit points for the Polish economy.

So it's not just about protecting one object. Disorder LNG terminal, blocking the approach to port or attacking ICT systems can hit the continuity of supply of raw material, maritime transport and the functioning of industrial facilities. This risk includes both sabotage and cyberattack activities and the use of civilian units to test security procedures.

Therefore, the protection of critical infrastructure at sea must not be limited to fences, cameras and patrols. Constant exercises are needed, rapid exchange of information, recognition of movement of individuals, resistance of port systems to cyber threats and readiness to operate on water. Europe is increasingly recognising ports as a strategic basis for trade and security. Poland, building its own maritime energy gate, must draw the conclusion from this early: critical infrastructure at sea does not He'll defend himself..