Force scale – how many really small combat units Iran has

In media space, there is often an image of individual incidents involving several small individuals. In fact, the scale of small combat units that Iran's naval forces have in the Persian Gulf is much higher. It is in this context that we should look at the potential of Iran in the Gulf region.

Iranian naval forces in the Persian Gulf. Hundreds of IRGCN boats and boats

Today's text on the United States impact on Iranian ships and rocket boats operating off the coast of the Strait of Ormuz, where information about the destruction of 16 units appeared, inspired me to look at this issue more widely and to show what the structure and scale of Iranian naval forces in the region really look like.

Because contrary to what can often be seen in media relations, we are not talking about a few fast boats appearing accidentally on U.S. Navy's radars. Iran has much more potential in the Gulf region. According to Western analysis Iran may have up to 300–500 small IRGCN impact units operating in the Persian Gulf and the Ormuz Strait area.

It is worth remembering that Iran has in practice two separate Navys. Along with the Classic Navy (IRIN), which operates larger ships in the Arab Sea and Indian Ocean, there are just naval forces of the Guard Guards of the Islamic Revolution. They are responsible for actions in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Ormuz and develop a doctrine based on the use of a large number of small, fast craft.

In practice, Iran's naval forces operating in the Persian Gulf are largely based on IRGCN units.

Among them are both armed assault boats and larger rocket boats capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and miners. In conjunction with patrolmen and smaller ships at the disposal of Iran's regular Navy, small numbers combat units operating in the Gulf region may exceed 600 platforms.

Such a large number of units makes even if a single boat or boat has limited firepower and little resistance to damage, throughout the formation they become part of a much more complex maritime system.

Saturation tactics instead of classic clashes

Iranian maritime doctrine assumes the use of numbers and mobility instead of direct technological rivalry with ocean fleets. In Western analyses, this strategy is often referred to as swarm attack.

In this scenario, small groups of high-speed craft approach the target from several directions simultaneously. First wave to force the enemy to react and disperse his defense systems. Subsequent platforms can at this time approach closer and use weapons – from unguided rockets and heavy machine guns to anti-ship missiles launched from larger boats.

The purpose of such actions is not a classic clash with the enemy's ships, but an overload of its defense systems and the creation of a situation where some units may be in effective range of fire.

Geography as part of the strategy

This tactic is closely linked to the geographical conditions of the region. Ormuz Strait in the narrowest place is about 54 km wide, while the actual shipping tracks used by ships are much narrower. Under such conditions even relatively small forces can cause serious disturbances in maritime traffic.

Small high-speed IRGCN naval forces are deployed in numerous bases along the Iranian coast and on islands scattered in the Persian Gulf. This allows you to carry out activities from many directions at the same time and to use natural terrain shields – narrow crossings between islands, bays and shoreline.

This allows such units to quickly appear in the area of action, carry out a short attack and retreat under cover of their own coast.

Part of a larger maritime system

Small impact units, however, do not function alone. In the Iranian concept, they are only a fragment of a much larger puzzle, the task of which is to impede the operation of a stronger opponent near the Iranian coast.

In this arrangement are coastal missile launchers, seamines, small submarines operating in coastal waters, and unmanned aircraft conducting reconnaissance over the water. Each of these elements separately does not constitute a breakthrough on the battlefield. Only together do they create an environment in which even a much stronger fleet must operate from a distance, more cautiously and engage more forces to protect its own ships.

Therefore, small boats and assault boats are not an end in themselves for Iran. Rather, they are tools to make it difficult for the opponent to operate freely in the Gulf and Strait of Ormuz – one of the most important energy routes in the world.

The destruction of 16 Iranian units certainly impresses Publications online. In a broader perspective, however, it is difficult to recognise them as an event that fundamentally alters Iran's potential in the Gulf region.

History shows that the first reports from the battlefield often build a very simplified picture of the situation. At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the media reported almost daily about the destroyed equipment, sunk ships, or subsequent "breakdowns" on the front. Meanwhile, four years later, the conflict continues and is still not seen to end it.

Therefore, it is also worth looking coolly at the first accounts in the Gulf region. At sea, as well as on land, the picture of the situation often fades after time – when the dust of the first messages settles and more reliable information begins to appear.

Finally, it is worth remembering that the exact number of such individuals remains difficult to determine. In many cases these are small civilian boats processed for armed action.