Not just Ormuz. Iran targets infrastructure to save oil exports

The Ormuz Strait was supposed to be Iran's main pressure tool, but today it is clear that Tehran can play wider. Not only tankers and the sea trail itself are threatened, but also pipelines, terminals and spare export routes built by the Gulf States for a time of great crisis.

Iran reaches for the Habshan–Fujajra pipeline bypassing the Strait of Ormuz

The starting point for this analysis is an entry published on the X platform by Shanaka Anslem Perera. He pointed out that Iranian strikes could be read more than just as an attempt to paralyze shipping by Ormuz. In this interpretation, Tehran seeks to undermine the credibility of alternative export routes and energy terminalscedCommon throughout the region.

This is best seen in the example of the Habshan–Fujajra pipeline. It was launched in 2012 so that the United Arab Emirates could direct some of Abu Dhabi's oil exports directly to the Oman Gulf, with the omission of the Ormuz Strait. It was intended to provide security for the time of the crisis and allow exports to be maintained even when the main route would be blocked.

However, this entry shows that the latest satellite images are to confirm fires at two pump stations along this pipeline. If these reports are confirmed, this will mean an impact not on the shipping route itself, but on an installation that was intended to allow it to be bypassed.

The list of targets is longer than the strait itself

This shot is not about a single incident. The author of the entry points to a sequence of strikes aimed at the energy and logistical infrastructure of the Gulf States. Among these facilities were the oil terminal in Fujiar, the transhipment zone in the same area, Dubai airport fuel tank, the Shah gas field, the Salala port in Omana, the desalination installation in Kuwait and Ras Laffan in Qatar, one of the most important LNG export points in the world.

The meaning of this list is obvious. The target was not only the sources of supply, but also the elements of the system that would allow the region to function despite the crisis in Ormuz. This is where the most interesting, but also the most disturbing, dimension of the current situation is revealed.

The Persian Gulf countries have diversified routes over the years, built pipelines, developed alternative ports and expanded raw material storage. However, they assumed that in case of escalation, the opponent would try to close the main gate. Meanwhile, Iran shows that it can also at the same time damage the infrastructure that would allow maintain exports In spite of the crisis.

Alternative to the Strait Ormuz ceases to give certainty

From a strategic perspective, this is a very important signal. Tehran does not have to win the war in the air or rebuild the destroyed fleet to achieve a political and economic effect. It is enough to show one thing to the markets, shipowners and insurers: whether oil flows through Ormuz or is guided by an alternative route, and so it remains within the reach of Iranian means of destruction or weapons used by Tehran's allies.

In practice, this means a change in risk calculation. If not only the strait itself is threatened, but also the infrastructure built to bypass this narrow throat, part of the advantage given by the infrastructure allowing to bypass this narrow throat disappears. In other words, the collateral ceases to be fully credible as it itself becomes a potential target.

Against this background, the Saudi East–West pipeline leading to Yanbu on the Red Sea is particularly important. In the above mentioned entry it was indicated as the last great alternative to exports bypassing Ormuz. The problem is However, on the fact that it is an infrastructure extended on a long desert stretch, with many sensitive pump stations. If Bab al-Mandab had been further threatened, the region could face a situation where this option would no longer be a secure option.

The strongest conclusion from this analysis is simple. Preparing for the closure of the Ormuz Strait and the real survival of such a crisis is not the same. The Gulf States built alternatives, but apparently assumed that the opponent would not attempt to systematically damage or deactivate them. Iran today shows that this is what can become its most important bargaining leverage.