Not a battle of fleets, but a fight of freedom of action. Iranian naval forces vs US Navy

For more than a week now, the US Navy has been leading strikes at sea against Iranian naval forces, and Tehran has suffered severe losses in these clashes. However, these clashes are only a fragment of much wider competition for control over one of the world's most important shipping routes.

However, it is worth looking at why Iran has not built naval forces capable of fighting a classic battle against the American fleet over the years. Instead, he developed measures to make it difficult for a stronger opponent in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Ormuz.

When the enemy's advantage at sea is too high

In its confrontation with the U.S. fleet, Iran was at a disadvantage from the very beginning. The U.S. Navy's potential, based on aircraft groups, modern recognition systems, and extended anti-aircraft shields, has repeatedly surpassed the capabilities of Iranian naval forces. Instead of trying to compete with your opponent in a direct clash at sea, Iran builds capabilities to make it difficult to operate a stronger fleet. There is no doubt that the conventional fleet of Iran is unable to compete with the fire force of the US Navy in direct clash.

In practice, this means developing asymmetric actions – based on numerous small units, anti-ship missiles, marine mines and reconnaissance systems. The aim of such a strategy is not to destroy the American fleet, but to limit its freedom of action and raise the cost of operating in one of the world's most important waters.

Small Units – a fragment of a wider puzzle

In the public discussion, there is often a picture of Iranian activities at sea brought to one element – small, fast boats operating in the Persian Gulf. In fact, this is only a fragment of a much broader system of action that Iran has been developing for many years. Boats alone cannot be stopped by a large ocean fleet, but they are one of the tools that hinders the opponent from operating near the Iranian coast.

It is much more important that these individuals act in conjunction with other means of combat. This system includes, inter alia, coastal anti-shipping missile launchers, seamines, submarines intended to operate in coastal waters and an extensive reconnaissance system. Unmanned aircraft and submarines also play an increasingly important role, which can conduct water observation, indicate targets for anti-ship rockets, or impact on enemy units.

Only such a combination of different tools – from reconnaissance drones to rockets and sea mines – allows to create an environment in which even a much stronger opponent must operate more carefully and engage more forces to protect his own ships.

Aircraft carrier and ship team

The debate on action at sea often presents a simplified picture of the duel "small units versus aircraft carrier". In fact, such a scheme has little to do with the realities of the modern maritime war. The aircraft carrier is not operating alone. It is the centre of a much larger group, which is an aircraft strike group. It consists of escort ships providing anti-aircraft defense of the team, capabilities to combat submarines (ZOPs) and protection against water threats, as well as on-board aviation and an expanded reconnaissance system.

For this reason, the enemy of Iran's forces at sea is not a single ship, but a whole combat team capable of conducting operations in a large area of the water. In this arrangement, Iran's goal is not to destroy an aircraft carrier in a spectacular clash. A much more realistic assumption is to bind US forces, force them to be more careful, and engage additional resources to shield the team of ships operating in the Gulf and Strait of Ormuz.

Strait of Ormuz – pressure on the world and paradox of Iran

In the case of the Gulf, action at sea is much broader than military action. The Ormuz Strait remains one of the most important bottlenecks of world shipping. It is estimated that around one fifth of the world's oil trade goes through this water, as well as a significant part of liquefied natural gas transport. Therefore, any destabilisation of the situation in this area immediately affects energy markets and maritime trade. As we have written many times on our portal, for over a week the oil tankers' movement in the Strait of Ormuz has been in practice almost completely limited.

And that's what the Iranian maritime strategy is all about. To Tehran, sinking an American aircraft carrier is not a key target. The Iranians know exactly who they're dealing with at sea. Just create an impression of a threat to shipping in the Ormuz Strait area. Several incidents at sea, the increase in ship insurance costs or the decision of shipowners to bypass the region can translate very quickly into oil prices, transport costs and the stability of many economies.

However, it is worth noting another element of the current operation against Iran. In recent days, impacts have focused not only on military targets but also on oil storage and processing installations. Thus, for the US, the aim is not to destroy the mining infrastructure itself, but to reduce the storage and refining capacity of the raw material. This may lead to Iran having to rely more on maritime exports and energy cooperation with the countries of the region. This creates a strategic paradox – Tehran has been treating the Strait of Ormuz for years as a tool of pressure on global energy markets, at the same time it can become increasingly dependent on the road path.

Iran doesn't have to win the battle to achieve the intended effect

In the realities of the modern maritime war, Iran is unable to defeat the United States in a classical confrontation at sea. The difference in potential between US Navy and Iranian naval forces is too large to take such a scenario seriously. Tehran is well aware of this, which is why his strategy is not to try to settle a war in one battle.

In asymmetric actions, however, there is no need to win a military clash to achieve a real political and economic effect. Just raise the level of threat in the Gulf and the Strait of Ormuz to feel it Energy markets and shipping. Distortions of navigation in this water can affect not only the activities of the US Navy for weeks but also the economy of many countries dependent on the supply of raw materials transported through this road. In this sense, Iran does not need to win the war at sea to produce effects felt far outside the Gulf region.

In the media, there are increasingly scenarios that assume that tensions in the Middle East region can persist even until autumn. Whether this will happen, we will see in the coming weeks – and the first effects of this crisis are already felt in our wallets.