Iranian-Russian maneuvers in the Caspian Sea and a scratch in the alliance

Iran and Russia have completed short maneuvers in the Caspian Sea, which, albeit modest in scale, are of clear political importance. For both countries it is an attempt to demonstrate influence in a region where they lose allies. In the case of Iran, this is also a sign of disappointment.

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CASAREX 2025 maneuvers: more propaganda than forces

CASAREX 2025 exercises began on 21 July and lasted three days under the motto "Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea". The maneuverrami was commanded by Rear Admiral Mohsen Razzaghi. According to official communications, they were attended by units of the Islamic Republic of Iran (NEDAJA), the Navy. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGCN), Iranian order formations and, according to IRNA, Russian Polish Navy. Observers were to arrive from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

However, the confirmed Russian participation was limited only to the presence of a civilian rescue tug SB-738 from the Caspian Fleet, adopted by the forces of the northern fleet of Iran as part of the rescue scenario. Unlike media declarations, no other Russian vessels participating in the exercise were identified.

On the Iranian side, a defilada of Sina missiles was visible: Paykan (P224), Joshan, Derfash and Separ. The presence of an IRGC Shahid Basir auxiliary unit (a.k.a. Martyr Basir, no. 117), equipped with Zafar/C704 anti-ship missiles and operating from an Iranian base in Babolsar, was also noted in Azerbaijani media relations

Uncovered declarations

The lack of confirmation of the participation of observers from the supra-Caspian states undermines the credibility of Iran's communications. Tehran does not declare the participation of third countries in its maneuvers for the first time without official confirmation. Azerbaijani "The Caspian Post" described the course of the exercise, but did not mention the presence of Baku representatives.

The relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been strained since the Israeli raids on targets in Iran during the 12-day war, in which Tehran see the participation of Azerbaijani services. The atmosphere between Moscow and Baku is equally difficult today – a wave of arrests of Azerbaijani citizens in Russia and a disaster of December 25, 2024, when 38 Azerbaijan Airlines passengers were killed as a result of the fire at Grozny.

New dynamics in the Caspian Sea

It is not only Azerbaijan that distances itself from Kremel protectionism. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan also make Moscow realize that the age of "older brother" has come to an end. The breakthrough took place during the Economic Forum in Petersburg (June 2024), when Kazakh president Kasym-Żomart Tokayev – sitting right next to Vladimir Putin – openly refused to recognise Russian claims to occupied parts of Donbass and to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He also announced that Astana did not intend to circumvent Western sanctions or send his soldiers to war in Ukraine.

In the background, however, there is a much more important battle: about energy sovereignty. Although most Kazakh oil reaches Europe through Russia – the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) ending in Noworosyjsk – Nur-Sultan is increasingly investing in an alternative. It is the so-called Caspian Southern Corridor: from the port of Aktau through the Caspian Sea to Baku, from where the raw material flows further through the BTC pipeline to Turkish Ceyhan. The project gained support from Abu Dhabi Ports Group, which builds specialized, shallow tankers – adapted for use in shallow waters.

Strategic uncertainty

The Geography of the Caspian Sea favours Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which, although not yet working together, gain a common interest. By controlling the central part of these waters, they could potentially disrupt maritime transport between Russia and Iran. Although this scenario is not realistic today, in the context of the war in Ukraine and the delivery of arms from Iran to Russia, it is gaining importance.

Access to the Black Sea Russia provides itself thanks to the Volga-Don channel, connecting the Caspian Sea with the Don's water system and further to the Azov Sea. Despite the damage to two Project frigate 11661K (type of Giepard) as a result of the Ukrainian attack in November 2024, the Russian Caspian Flotilla remains the most powerful tactical union in the region – it has a total of 28 units, including corvettes, trawlers and patrol vessels.

Iranian forces, grouped within the so-called 4th Naval Marine District, base their potential on the IRINS frigate Deylaman (F78) Mowj type and four Sina type rocket boats – armed with 76 mm cannons and C-802 guided anti-ship missiles.

Although the military advantage of Russia and Iran in the Caspian Sea is undeniable, Azerbaijan does not intend to limit itself to the role of observer. Thanks to cooperation with Israel and Turkey, Polish Navy This country has undergone substantial modernisation. The naval forces included, among others, new generation patrol ships and Triton-type submarines – the only such platforms operating on this watershed.

Diplomatic dissonance and false anthem

Risa in Iranian-Russian relations was visible even in the symbolic sphere. An unofficial and distorted version of the anthem was played on a recording published by Iranian media showing the entrance of the SB-738 to port. Russian Federation. This event, according to the correspondent of The Maritime Executive, overshadowed the protocolar awkwardness of Vladimir Putin's visits to Egypt (2015) and Saudi Arabia (2019) when the orchestras there also failed to cope with the proper performance of the Russian anthem.

Source: The Maritime Executive/MD