Safety of Marine Expeditions: Analysis of Titan Baiskaf

The disaster of the Titan Bathyskaf, a shocking world of shipping, prompts a global debate on maritime safety. In response, American Coast Guard And the Canadian Transport Safety Council is entering an investigation. Maritime expert Robert Dmochowski brings his unique perspective to the discussion.

June 23, American Coast Guard confirmed the initiation of a formal investigation into the loss of Titan’s batiskaf – events that shocked the marine world. This information came after the Canadian Transport Security Council (TSB) announced Friday that it had initiated its own investigation.

To bring up the facts: The Titan submersible, the property of the American company OceanGate Expeditions, was torn by the enormous implosion force caused by hydrostatic pressure exerted by water column a height of 3780 m. This tragedy had The site while attempting to descend into the wreck of the legendary Titanic liner. After approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes after the expedition began, the crew of the mother ship Polar Prince, flying the Canadian flag, lost contact with Titan, resulting in the launch of an international search and rescue operation.

A remote-controlled drone (ROV) found a debris field that confirmed the presence of remnants of Titan. Preliminary results indicate submersible suffered a catastrophic loss of pressure, known as implosion, resulting in the death of all five people on board.

The role of the U.S. Coast Guard in the investigation of this incident was initially uncertain, due to the fact that the incident involved a U.S.-flagged unit but outside the territorial waters of the USA. However, as the law firm Holland & Knight notes, Coast Guard decide to investigate maritime accidents, based on maritime safety information, available resources and risks in the port concerned.

The purpose of an investigation conducted by the Coast Guard is not only to determine the causes of the accident but also to assess whether there has been malpractice, negligence or violation of the law. This may result in the imposition of civil or criminal sanctions, as well as in the application for new legislation. The tragedy of the Titan Bathyskaf poses questions about the future of maritime safety, but it is also a reminder of the continuing need for research and investment in methods of improving safety on our seas.

As I emphasized in earlier ArticleThis incident may have long lasting consequences for the future of marine exploration. There may be changes in safety standards that may result from this tragic event.

This is not only a time to reflect on tragic events, but also a time when we must take action to improve maritime safety in the future. This incident shows how important it is to continuously improve our methods and processes to prevent similar tragedies in the future.

Based on my experience, there is a high probability that Titan's flag law of batiskafu did not require it to pass a full classification procedure to obtain a registration certificate. This may be due to the length criterion of the unit. Polish law, in the context of registration and admission to navigation, makes a clear distinction between recreational and commercial voyages. For the latter, the formal requirements are significantly tightened.

Flag law under which he sailed submersible, likely contains some gaps, or has been bypassed by classifying batiscafu as an object not subject to it. If compliance with maritime safety law, which also includes underwater facilities, Could not have happened for such gross negligence in the construction of the key structural element, which is the manned compartment.

If the Polish shipbuilding industry had been commissioned to build this type of batiskaf, then already at the stage of construction and fatigue simulation there would have been certain systems of wall thickness of all components with an appropriate safety margin and the permissible operating intensity (e.g. 2 descents per month for 2 years) and the inspection and diagnostic procedure (what to study every time). It is clear that the marine experience of Polish shipyards would not allow the control of the implementation systems to be turned down only by electronic controllers and without doubling critical systems such as e.g. two-plane hulls, drives, power supplies, work circuits and critical state sensors.

In summary – if Titan were made by Polish industry there would be no mention of this tragedy.