Sharp and Corvette Program for the Polish Navy. The Baltic needs ships for daily service

Organisation Crude It triggered an old mechanism. The longer the discussion takes, the bigger the future ship gets. Corvette starts to resemble a light frigate, a light frigate – a smaller Swordfisher, and at the end the question of whether Poland is building a fleet for real tasks in the Baltic Sea, or under the catalogues of large shipbuilding companies returns.

Crude and old illness of Polish ship programs

Today on platform X, a heated discussion about program Crude, future Corvettes of the Navy of Poland and the border between the Corvette, the light frigate and the "small Sword". It was quick to see that it wasn't just the name of the ship's class.

Some pointed out that with the current dimensions Crude It starts to rub on a light frigate. Others asked why, on such a ship, more anti-ship missiles were needed, since the greater problem could be the ZOP, the anti-aircraft self-defense and the ability to act in the area of danger. There were also voices about submarines and underwater drones, catamarans, larger taskspaces, and that the hull itself would not solve fleet problems without a well-thought-out destiny.

However, with respect to the participants of this exchange, it is worth to get off the level of launchers, radars and weapons tables themselves. We need to ask more simply: does Poland need another increasingly expensive multitasking ship or more cheaper ships capable of daily service in the Baltic?

Programme Crude is intended to cover four multipurpose corvettes for the Polish Navy. After Defence24 Days, it was reported that the new program replaces earlier thinking of the Wall as successors to small Orkan-type rocket ships. It's an important change. Instead of simpler carriers of anti-ship missiles, larger multi-tasking ships appeared in the debate.

That's where the problem begins.

In Polish realities, the ship program rarely becomes what it was supposed to be at the beginning. First, there is a need: more ships in the sea, regular patrol, surveillance of areas, protection of pipelines, cables, terminals and wind farms. Then there are further requirements: a stronger anti-aircraft defense, a ZOP, anti-ship missiles, a helicopter, unmanned aircraft, a larger supply of modernization and an expanded combat system.

This is where you see the greatest risk of the program. Crude. Each next function looks separately reasonable: a little more OPL, a better ZOP, a larger supply of modernization, helicopter, unmanned, additional launchers. The problem is that the sum of these reasonable additives quickly makes the corvette a larger, more expensive and more difficult to build.

And then we go back to our starting point: instead of the number of hulls, we get an ambitious design that starts to resemble a frigate.

Poland cannot be a test ground

In this discussion, there is one more very practical question: can Poland afford to choose a ship today, which exists mainly in presentations, visualizations and marketing materials?

Are we to choose a hull that has not undergone sea trials, has not been tested in any navy, and it is only here that we have to go from design to real service?

The construction of a prototype ship is not a technical detail that can be added in small print for presentation. It is a risk of delays, structural changes, problems with the integration of the combat system, stability, power, cooling, logistics and costs of subsequent operation.

Every project looks mature at the conference. It is only sea trials that show whether the ship is ready to serve or whether it is just a long list of problems to solve.

Poland does not operate in a peaceful environment of security today. There is a war going on beyond the eastern border, Russia is rebuilding its capabilities, and the Baltic is becoming one of the most important tension areas in Europe. Under such conditions Polish Navy The Republic of Poland should not order ships like a development experiment, whose mistakes will only come out after the contract is signed.

That's why on the show Crude You have to ask simple questions: is the ship offered already floating? Was he inducted into service in any navy? Did he pass the sea trials? Are his childhood problems known? Is there a real supply chain, documentation, service facilities and operating experience?

If the answer is no, the State should be very careful about such an offer. Poland does not need another program, in which the first years of proving that the chosen concept works at all.

Programme Crude should not become a contest for the prettiest visualization. He should be the choice of a ship that will actually increase presence. in the Polish Navy In the Baltic Sea, it will not pass on technical, financial and organisational risks to Poland, which other users have not yet verified.

Corvette cannot be a small Sword

Polish Navy The RP needs corvettes. But not those that will attempt to build a smaller frigate for money similar to a higher class program. If Crude it makes sense, it should be a ship possible to build in the assumed number, cheaper to maintain and available for daily service.

In the Baltic, not every task requires the participation of a frigate class vessel. Not every way out to sea, a patrol at sea critical infrastructure, an identification of the situation or cooperation with allies must involve the most expensive ship in the fleet. The frigate can be patrolled around wind farms. Just like a field can be plowed by a tank. But why and why are we able to afford it?

The same is true of a helicopter. Almost everything can be put on visualization. In practice, not only the landing ground, but also the hangar, service, fuel, weapons, spare parts and the real availability of machinery are important. The very drawing of the helicopter on the stern does not yet give us the ability.

The Black Sea War showed something else. Russia is losing ships not because Ukraine built its own large fleet, but because it was able to use rockets and unmanned systems in a way that forced the Black Sea Fleet to retreat from part of the water.

This is an important lesson for our region. Not only the class of the ship and the number of launchers, but also the recognition, reaction, availability and ability to operate with many cheaper means.

The Baltic requires quality, but also requires number and rhythm to go out into the sea. Without this, even the best ships will be too few to guard gas pipelines, cables, ports and offshore wind farms daily.

We're missing ships for patrol and surveillance.

In this discussion we need to return to the simple question: what Polish Navy Poland Should she patrol the Baltic every day?

It's not about the patrolman pretending to be a corvette. That would be a mistake. The patrol vessel will not replace the warship, will not take over the role of frigate and will not provide air defense to the fleet. But it can do something else: relieve more expensive ships from tasks that do not require a full combat package.

A well designed patrolman can do what is most needed in the Baltic: lead surveillance, control suspicious units, support divers, cooperate with unmanned workers, cover critical infrastructure and quickly enter the area of the incident.

It's not very effective. They don't look as good as launching an anti-ship missile. But it is they that build the real presence of every country at sea.

In this sense, Mark Tails' entry about simpler patrol ships and units with space for task modules is not an escape from the Navy, but an attempt to bring discussion to earth.

The drones are important, but they can't stop anyone alone.

The growing role of unmanned workers changes the way you think about patrolmen. The ship of this class does not need to be used solely for displaying the flag. Could move water drones, underwater and air, observe the waters, check the bottom, support the adversaries and transmit data to the command system.

But you have to keep the proportions.

The drone may detect a suspicious ship. He can check the perimeter of the cable or the gas pipeline. It can give you an image of the situation. However, it will not replace people when it is necessary to approach the unit, call for detention, send a control group, or perform boarding.

You need a ship for that. Not a presentation. Not a concept. Not another visualization. Ship with crew, RHIB boat, communications, fuel supply, sensible weapons and the possibility of staying in the area for more than a few hours.

Therefore, the future fleet should not be built exclusively around large multi-purpose ships. It should combine frigates, corvettes, submarines, patrol ships, unmanned systems and logistics facilities into one coherent system.

Concers will always be happy to build a larger ship

From an industrial point of view, the issue is simple. A larger hull, a more expensive combat system, stronger radars, more launchers, and greater integration mean a larger contract. It's natural. Companies want to sell bigger and more expensive ships.

The problem begins when you cannot clearly tell what you really need.

Poland should not build a fleet under the pressure of sales folders, but under its own tasks in the Baltic. And these needs do not always require a ship, on which in time they try to fit everything: from antiship missiles, through the ZOP, to a helicopter and a full set of unmanned vehicles.

Sometimes a simpler, cheaper ship is needed and ready to go to sea when the frigate should remain ready for higher-class tasks.

This isn't a prestige dispute. This is a dispute over whether Polish Navy The RP will have a real impact on the Baltic every day.

Programme Crude should remain "reasonable"

The Sharp program may be needed. Four corvettes can actually strengthen the Polish Navy if they are designed for specific tasks rather than under ambition added along the way.

Worst-case scenario is well known: with Corvettes makes the road ship, overloaded with requirements and thus difficult to build in the assumed number. Poland has been suffering too long from adding more functions to ships, which were to be simpler, cheaper and more numerous.

Therefore, next to the question of future corvettes Crude We need to make things bigger.

One of our Readers rightly pointed out to FB Robert Wąs: before we start comparing launchers, radars and subsequent visualizations, we need to ask a simpler question – what fleet does Poland want, in fact what fleet should it have? Should it be a fleet of several very expensive ships, or a fleet capable of daily action, patrolling the Baltic, guarding critical infrastructure and rapid response to events?

In practice, this is what the force of the fleet should be measured: not only the number of rocket launchers, but how many ships can actually go out into the sea, how long they are able to maintain presence in the area and whether the state has anything to react when the situation begins to get out of control.

Without this even the best project will remain only a promise of ability, not a real presence of the Polish Navy at sea – especially today, when there is a war going on beyond the eastern border, and the Baltic requires constant supervision.