Black Sea: Why is NATO helpless?

NATO faces a serious challenge in accessing the Black Sea due to legal restrictions imposed by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which prevent its members from intervening in defence of Ukrainian seaports, key to grain and steel exports. The maritime blockade by Russia, controlling most of the Black Sea coasts, threatens not only Ukraine, but affects the global food market, asking NATO the question of the effectiveness of possible actions in this region.

Ukrainian ports under pressure – economic importance and threats in the context of war

Ports above The Black Sea and the Azov Sea account for about 85 percent of Ukrainian grain exports. Ukraine provides 13% of the world's corn and a similar amount of wheat, which means that trade disruptions on the Ukrainian coast can have a major impact on the food market of the whole world. Ukraine's seaports are also responsible for around 80% of steel exports.

The main port cities such as Mariupol on the Azov Sea and Odessa on the Black Sea have not yet been occupied by Russian troops. Unfortunately for the first of them, there are currently fierce fighting going on, at the same time there is drama of its inhabitants on an unimaginable scale. Odessa, although preparing for defence, may soon share Mariupola's fate. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the blockade of Ukrainian ports by the Russian Navy began before the last land and air operations.

The attack on Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea should be understood as an economic war waged by the Russians. Discontinuation of normal trade will not only deprive Ukraine of the means needed to carry out war, but will also directly or indirectly impose additional costs on almost every country in the world.

Can NATO do anything to allow Ukraine to access the Black Sea?

Probably not. The first possible solution would be to create land roads bypassing the naval blockade. Ukraine does not have sufficient means of land transport to replace maritime transport, and even if they were, realistically, they could transport goods only to Europe.

Unfortunately, the Marine Force NATO for purely legal reasons, also cannot provide transport security to Ukrainian ports, due to the 1936 Montreux Convention. Under this treaty, countries on the Black Sea receive special maritime privileges and other countries are strictly limited as to what ships can affect the sea (e.g. aircraft carriers or submarines cannot influence the sea).

Turkey, which controls the straits connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea, decides on how to enforce these rules, and Ankara has so far not been determined whether it wants or can use its privileges under the treaty to disrupt Russian operations.

The United States is not a signatory to the Montreux Treaty, so technically these rules do not apply to the US Navy. However, American warships traditionally follow them – for example, because of the ten signatory states eight being US allies: France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Japan.

Furthermore, an investigation of the right to exercise this technical legal option would mean Istanbul's passage of an American warship.

If using the U.S. Navy to break the blockade is out of the question, what do we do about NATO allies? Well, those who have more modern naval forces are not black sea states, so their access is limited. And black sea states don't have Large enough fleets, even though they have access to them. Unfortunately, the situation is critical.

Harpoon, partisan of the sea and the price of the blockade – reflections on the maritime strategy of Ukraine

One possible solution would be to hand over the U.S. Harpoon missile to Ukraine. This weapon, originally developed by the American Navy in the 1970s, which is currently used by more than 30 countries. If the sinking of several Russian cruisers would not be enough to complete the blockade, it would at least raise the cost of the Russian Navy.

Of course, it is much easier to deploy, train and test a new (at least for Ukrainians) weapon system when there is no war yet. This means that the best time to hand over Ukraine's Harpunks would be the period between 2014 and last month of that year. The same applies to Stinger and Javelin missiles, which are now feverishly transported through the Polish-Ukrainian border.

There are also other, even less attractive options: attacks by small boats on warships, putting mines threatening their blocking ships, attacking the Russian Navy from the air, or other actions of the partisan sea. But that would probably beSuicide, regardless of intent and purpose.

The hope of maintaining open Ukrainian ports is probably unrealistic at this point. The only way to win a war at sea is to win on land.

Written by MD