Ork without rudder. Where are the guarantees for billions of PLN?

About PLN 20 billion – that could be the cost of acquiring submarines as part of the Ork program for the Navy. But the MON is silent: it does not reveal the criteria, it does not show the schedule, it does not indicate responsibility. Has the decision been made yet? The editorial of the Shipyard Portal asked about the transparency of Ork's program, which disappeared under the surface of political declarations.

What did we want to know from the MON about buying new submarines?

1.On what legal basis or on what government decisions and documents is the procedure for acquiring new submarines in the G2G formula?

2.Is this a formal task force or a working team responsible for assessing offers and preparing recommendations?

• If so, when and on what basis was he called?
• What is its personal composition (positions, functions – without revealing sensitive data)?
• Who serves as Team Leader?

3.What are the criteria for assessing tenders adopted?

• Are these criteria exclusively cover technical and cost aspects, or strategic factors such as security of supply, service support, technology transfer, industrial cooperation or long-term partnership?

4.Which body or person inMinistry of Defenceis responsible for the preparation and presentation of recommendations regarding the selection of a specific government partner and a ship-based solution?

5.Is it planned to provide the public or the Sejm with a detailed timetable for the implementation of the Orka programme, including an indicative deadline for the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement?

Response from the Ministry of Defence

The Defence Ministry is currently in talks with various actors to define potential cooperation in the context of the acquisition of a submarine (OP) in the Orka programme. Key decisions in the programme have not yet been made, and the process of acquisition is being conducted by the Armed Forces Agency.

An important issue for the Polish side is the potential purchase of OPs based on the intergovernmental formula (G2G). From the perspective of Poland, this form of cooperation allows not only to guarantee the highest quality of the product, but also to strengthen the strategic partnership with the target country, contributing to closer relations and ensuringincreased interoperability of armed forces. As part of the cooperation in the G2G formula, attention is paid to priority criteria, i.e. acceleration of supply; attractive financial conditions, including favourable government loans and guarantees; transfer of technology to the Polish defence industry; provision of training and technical support for new systems, as well as provision of bridge capacity so-called.gap filler.

At the same time, we expect the partnership to be bilateral and therefore we expect significant involvement in the Polish defence industry, not only in areas directly related to the purchase of OPs. The Polish defence industry has extensive technological and production capabilities which can successfully support the needs of both the Polish Armed Forces and our target partner. Therefore, we are committed to the commitment of the potential supplier of OPs to purchase arms in Polish armament plants. In addition, we also want to actively integrate Polish industry into the supply chain, which would include not only G2G cooperation partner, but also third countries.

What does MON say – or rather what it does not say?

Although the Ministry of Defence's reply contains some important declarations – especially regarding the general priorities of intergovernmental cooperation – it does not answer any of the specific questions we have asked.

We did not know the legal basis of the procedure currently under way. We do not know if a formal evaluation team has been established. No deadlines or names of the authorities responsible for preparing the recommendations have been indicated.Neither did the Resort providedetailed criteria for the selection of the G2G partner, nor has he declared whether the Orka programme schedule will be made public.

In accordance with Articles 1 and 6(1)(5) of the Public Information Act, any information on the expenditure of public funds, including the planning of purchases of military equipment, must be made public. The Public Finance Act (Article 33(1)) also states that the management of public funds is public.

Defence expenditure is not covered by the "secret" clause in Poland. The legislator allows the detailed tactical and technical parameters and configuration of submarine weapons and operational information to be classified, but not the decision-making framework, the timing of proceedings or the tender assessment mechanisms adopted. Under these circumstances, the silence of the MON does not arise from restrictions of law; it is carefully directed silence of the Ministry.

MON has knowledge – only does not want to pass it on

What is particularly surprising is that most of the information we have asked for has been available to the public for months. In July 2023, a communication is published on the Agency's website on the launch of initial market consultations for OPNT (New Type Submarine). This document contains both detailed technical and operational requirements and information on the formal establishment of the Task Force responsible for the analysis of tenders.

However, in correspondence with our editorials, the Ministry of Defence did not confirm or deny the existence of the same facts that were previously published in the official source. It's hard to consider an oversight. Rather, it is a signal that the ministry deliberately covers the contours of the process, which by definition should be transparent.

Among the written requirements were:

• ability to act in immersion for at least 30 days,
• the possibility of combating water, underwater, land and air targets,
• integration with unmanned systems, including autonomous vehicles,
• the possibility of landing of Special Forces operators,
• packages: training, logistics and rescue,
• and capacity to act as a bridge capacity (gap filler).

If this information is available in public space, why did MON refuse to confirm it in official correspondence? It is difficult to consider this as an omission – it is rather an attempt to maintain maximum information control over the process, which should be transparent for the Polish taxpayer.

Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamish declared publicly several times that the decision to select a supplier of submarines would be made by the end of 2025. That means it's time for real,open dialogue with industryAnd public opinion practically ends.

Where are the technology transfer guarantees?

Although in the response of the MON there are declarations of the "expected" participation of Polish industry, there are no specific commitments or mechanisms to guarantee this participation. Moreover, both the Ministry and the Armed Forces Agency's communications almost completely ignore the issues of technology transfer, shipbuilding and the participation of national plants in international supply chains.

However, real technology transfer is measured not by declarations, but by licenses, patents, trainings and real orders addressed to Polish companies. In the programMiecznik programmeThe offset proved to be much lower than suggested at the announcement stage. Despite the declaration of broad participation of the national industry, in practice no licenses or services were transferred to PGZ War Shipyard. So far no service centres have been created as part of technology transfer.

Can Poland really afford to spend such resourceswithout hard guarantees regarding technology transfer and the involvement of national industry? MON mentions the "expected" involvement of Polish entities and the "notice" on transfer of competences – but does not give any specifics.

And just as importantwhether the government intends to duplicate the programme's mistakesMiecznik programme, where was initially said about PLN 8 billion for three frigates and after the selection of the bidder – due to changes in the configuration of the weapon – the cost of building 3 frigates reached nearly 16 billion? Only that such differences should be foreseen and presented already in the selection of the tenderer rather than after the fact.That's why it's hard not to ask.Questions:EagleWill he follow the same path? After all, we are talking about a strategic program for the Polish Navy, about huge money and a decision that will bind us for decades. This cannot be a process based on probable amounts. This must be a decision based on knowledge, specific conditions and real commitments. Because it's a serious lesson we should learn from.

Poland without schedule, EU countries transparent

Meanwhile, in Norway, the purchase of new 212CD submarines was conducted openly – the contract was signed in July 2021, the construction of four units jointly with the Federal Republic of Germany began in September 2023, and the implementation schedule (first delivery in 2029) was communicated publicly as early as during the negotiations.

The same was true of the Netherlands (the Walrus Replacement programme) where the process was also transparent from the beginning – the defence minister provided detailed criteria for the evaluation of tenders and the Court of Auditors (Court of Audit) assessed that the decision was taken in accordance with the principles and duly presented to Parliament.

Poland, being a member of both NATO and the European Union, clearly deviates from the standard of transparency. Unlike the major neighbors,no schedule has yet been publishedthe detailed selection criteria have not been disclosed and the formal appointment of the team responsible for preparing the recommendations has not been confirmed.

It is the detailed technology transfer commitments that decide whether, after the end of the Orka program, Poland will be able to service the acquired ships, integrate new weapons systems, train crews or even produce selected components in the country. Without such guarantees, we depend for decades on a foreign supplier – technologically, operationally and financially.

Price of silence: 500 PLN from each taxpayer for OP

We are talking about an investment of around PLN 20 billion. The lack of public records here is not a coincidence, but an informed political, technological and financial decision, which will be borne by the Polish taxpayer in the future. For comparison, it is about 500 PLN from the taxes of every working citizen. As far as the largest ship contract in the history of the Polish Armed Forces is concerned, it is all the more worrying that the public still does not know even the indicative schedule, scope of offset or specific commitments from potential partners.

Why isn't 20 billion PLN of respect exaggerated?Someone will ask: where did Dasiewicz get this amount? I'll explain. Although such an amount may appear to be a figure from the ceiling, it is in fact a rational reference point, especially when it is combined with the data and analyses that come from those following the subject from close proximity. One of the friends of our editorial team, a specialist in defence issues, prepared a comprehensive calculation of total costsOrka program– taking into account both ship construction and training, armaments, operating component and possible "gap filler".

Hard numbers, hard logic

The estimated total cost of purchasing 3-4 new submarines by Poland – along with the full accompanying package – could be between €5.5 and 8.5 billion, or about PLN 25-39 billion. The final value of the contract will be influenced by details of the technical configuration, the scope of technology transfer, the training component, the method of financing and the level of involvement of the Polish shipbuilding industry.

The largest part of the package is the cost of ships themselves – a new generation of units with air-independent drive (AIP or LODC), such as KSS-III, type 212CD, Scorpène NG or S-80 Plus. The cost of building three or four such units can range from EUR 3.5 to EUR 6 billion, depending on the range of equipment and the level of local production.

This includes the cost of a training package including crew and technical personnel preparation, as well as the delivery of operational and engineering simulators, estimated at a total of EUR 350-700 million.Another few hundred million euroswill include a supply of combat resources, i.e. modern torpedoes, mines and – perhaps – maneuvering missiles if offered and selected.

A key element will also be the long-term supply of spare parts and components, the value of which may exceed EUR 250-500 million. If Poland expects the construction of full service capacity (MRO – Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) in national shipyards, it will be necessary to take into account the costs of technology transfer, yard equipment and staff training – at the level of another EUR 300-600 million.

In the case of a temporary solution (gap filler), i.e. the rental of the ship used, together with the training component until the delivery of new units, an additional cost of EUR 100-300 million should be established depending on the lease conditions and the scope of operation.

In summary, if Poland decides to take a comprehensive "total package" approach, with full technology transfer and bridge component, the cost of the programme could be close to EUR 8 billion. A limited version – without technology transfer, without a filler gap and with a minimum offset – may close in the range of EUR 4.5–5 billion, but will be significantly poorer in terms of combat benefits.

Clock ticks: a schedule that does not exist

As of 2014, further governments have promised new submarines. There was a re-start of the proceedings, then the OPNT consultation, now the declaration: a decision by the end of 2025. Except we still don't know what the rules are. We do not know the criteria, we do not know what obligations the partners are to take, and for the taxpayer it is still one big unknown.It looks like paper.to jak postęp, lecz w praktyce wszystko tonie w braku odpowiedzi. A zegar tyka. Im dłużej trwa cisza, tym mniej zostaje czasu na realne działania: budowę jednostek, szkolenie załóg, przygotowanie infrastruktury. Bez jasnych kryteriów, harmonogramu i decyzji MON coraz bliżej moment, w którym z planowanej współpracy zostanie tylko awaryjna opcja – leasing zagranicznych jednostek, bez transferu wiedzy i bez korzyści dla przemysłu.

Answers first, then choice

Więc czy naprawdę warto dziś „krzyczeć” na platformie X, że „czekamy na Orkę, Orka potrzebna natychmiast”, skoro nikt tak naprawdę nie wie, co się pod tym programem kryje? Napiszę to kolejny raz. Nie znamy szczegółów, nie mamy listy wymagań, nie wiemy, jak zostanie wybrany partner.Może zamiast domagać sięszybkiej decyzji, lepiej najpierw wymagać konkretnych odpowiedzi od tych, którzy mają ją podjąć. Dopiero potem rozmawiajmy o wyborze, a na końcu – jeśli trzeba – róbmy ferment w sieci, kiedy będzie wiadomo, na czym stoimy.

Bo póki co, wygląda to trochę jak dziecko, które wbiega do sklepu i krzyczy, że chce lizaka, nie wiedząc nawet, jak on smakuje. To taka mała dygresja do kolegów z branży, którzy czasem – mam wrażenie – właśnie tak się zachowują.

Dlatego czas, by Sejmowa Komisja Obrony Narodowej wezwała przedstawicieli MON do ujawnienia szczegółowych założeń programu Orka. To parlament, nie resort, sprawuje kontrolę nad budżetem państwa. Brak jawności uderza nie tylko w obywatela, lecz także w konstytucyjną rolę Sejmu jako strażnika kontroli nad polityką obronną.

Written by Mariusz Dasiewicz