Submarine ships under Orka and Italian understatements

Orka submarine program This is not only the rivalry of shipyards and arms companies, but also the field of lobbying – both in political offices and inside the Polish Navy. For years, there have been voices that part of the military community has been leaning towards concrete solutions before all offers are presented and properly assessed.

In the article

At first I must point out that this text is not intended to indicate the Italian proposal as the best or the worst. It is something else – that the Ministers and those responsible inMinistry of Defencefor the selection of the tenderer under the scheme Orka could see how individual companies answered and what questions they did not want to address. In this case, Fincantieri and the Polish submarine offeredU212 NFS.

A month ago I published the first text on the subject and announced that I would address the issues that were left unanswered. It all started with an e-mail message – basically answers to questions that I sent to the shipbuilding company in connection with Orka's program. I received it from a media company operating Fincantieri in Poland.

Sorry it took us so long. At the same time, I would like to point out that we cannot provide an answeron the recordquestions on delivery time and bridge solution and on training. We could only provide such answers informally, with a contribution to the source of the case.

It was this answer – avoiding clear declarations and removing the most important issues from the official circulation – that led me to prepare that text in such a form. Does this raise serious questions about a program worth nearly PLN 20 billion? Why does the manufacturer of modern submarines decide to limit transparency and propose to provide information only in unofficial mode? Is this simply a precaution, an element of a negotiation game, or a consequence of a license and export consent? These are doubts that should be put out loud and that are worth getting MON bent on.

Responses to the X platform with Italian offer

After publishing my text aboutsubmarines of typeU212 NFSThe discussion quickly moved to platform X. There has been a particular activity of people who have long sought to promote the Italian offer. Can such a debate be considered natural or rather part of a wider game?

In my article, I made it clear that I did not receive answers to all the questions. Why would I do that to a billion-dollar corporation? This is not my editorial role. The most interesting fact remains, however, that the entry of the Reserve Commander Wiesław Goździewicz – for a long time the opening of a critical one towards my person – was further given by the Naval officer in active service, Commander Witkiewicz.

This officer is well known to me; for several years he has co-written some of the more valuable texts published on my portal, for which I am very grateful to him. But it does not relieve me of my role as a psychic whose duty is to point out potential collisions of roles and communication nuances. If kmdr Witkiewicz actually sits on the team responsible for selecting new submarines forin the Polish Navy, the question arises about the standard of public activity of members of such a body in social media.

The following example illustrates well how thin the boundary between private opinion and the public signal is. The whole situation was no surprise to me – from the beginning it was clear that this reaction would appear on the X platform sooner or later.

Does MON have clear guidelines governing the activity of members of such teams on social media? Is there a private opinion in such situations, or is there a message sent by the person involved in the decision-making process? The boundary between one and the other should, in my opinion, be clearly defined – only by whom. I do not prejudge the facts, but I ask questions that, in my opinion, require answers.

Instead of answers, the "mini-orcs" theme

As I announced in my earlier text, I will not forget one of the threads that appeared in the answers – although in my opinion it had nothing to do with what I asked. Instead of giving factual answers, the Italian side sent me additional information among the answers:

The ability to interact with miniature submarines is a valuable complement to the capabilities of larger vessels to be procured under the Orca programme, especially in the case of missions carried out in shallow coastal waters which are not available to classic submarines.

The problem is that in the current context such a thread seems unnecessary. It does not answer questions about the delivery schedule, training or bridge solution as reported by all candidates in this race. Instead of getting a specific message that wasn't connected with my questions, it raises further questions: who thought such a message was right? Who advises the company in building such a narrative and whether this is really the way to convince the Polish side to a billion-dollar contract. These questions, dear reader, you will have to answer yourself.

Questions Unanswered and German License

But when it comes to the lack of answers from the Italian company, their position has left significant gaps. Fincantieri did not provide official information on delivery dates, possible bridge solution or details of crew training. Of course, on other portals such information sounded. My editorial board is not going to speculate about what the Italians themselves did not want to reveal and why. The mere fact that such important data did not come up, however, must raise questions – both among the public, who will spend huge money on these individuals and in the MON.

There were also no answers to questions about basic parameters: dimensions, buoyancy, maximum speed, maximum depth of immersion and number of crew. The silence also concerned the declared time of being in immersion on the AIP and the types of missile planned for Polish units.

And you can't forget thatU212 NFSis a structure developed on the basis of a German license. Any attempt to sell these units must therefore take place in the shadow of Berlin's consent or opposition. It is worth asking yourself: how will Germany react to this if the contract worth nearly PLN 20 billion falls into the hands of an Italian partner? There is an opinion in the Kulouara that for Berlin, which is itself involved in this proceeding, this would not be in his interest.

History shows that Germany can uncompromisingly defend its interests. Just remind a dispute about A26 submarines:after the acquisition of Kockums by Saab, The Swedes had to rebuild their capabilities from almost zero, which translated into years of program delays. In the background, there were licensing and organisational disputes and nervous movements of both parties, including the loud FMV intervention at the Malmö plant. Can a similar scenario happen again this time? Will Berlin accept that a billion-dollar contract will pass him by his nose? And most importantly, can Poland afford even a shadow of confusion in the program of this weight?

End

Whatever happens during the selection of the offer, I am not saying that U212 NFS units should not be in the Navy of Poland. These are modern and valuable ships. The problem, however, is the envelope – the lack of answers to the key issues, the avoidance of clear declarations and the fact that I was not the first editorial board to which the Italian company addressed a similar proposal. It is these issues that should be of particular interest to the public and the Ministry of National Defence.

As the only portal I try to conduct this topic honestly – above all in the interests of the Polish taxpayer, although it does not always translate into the good of my own interest. In the coming days, I am still waiting for answers from the other bidders: the French Naval Group, whose stand I visited during the MSPO fair in Kielce, the German TKMS, which still did not take the position, andKorean Hanwha Ocean. Finally, I am going to write about Spanish Navanthia as well. If the answers don't go down, I'll write it straight – in my style, without looking at politeness. Because the Polish taxpayer who will finance this program has the right to know who answers without problems and who prefers to remain silent on some questions. The transparency of the tenderers depends not only on assessing their credibility, but also on the future security of our country in these undoubtedly difficult times.

Written by Mariusz Dasiewicz