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Why did Sweden's proposal win on Orka's show?
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Mariusz Dasiewicz
Mariusz Dasiewicz
Today, General Michał Marciniak's interview for "Rzeczpospolita" was to dispel doubts about Sweden's choice as "the country of first choice" in Orka's programme. Instead, he exposed a mechanism where logic is increasingly difficult to see.
In the article
In official communications we are talking about the "best offer", but from the conversation itself it is clear that economic obligations, rather than parameters and capabilities of the submarine for the MW of Poland, became the basis of the decision.
"Best Offer". Only by what assumptions?
This is where General Martiniak missed the truth. It is not true that none of the "there are" ships offered in this course, although it is fair to admit that in two points it is right: Korean KSS-III operates today in the Batch I configuration, while Poland was proposed a variant Batch II, like none of the ships of the type 212 in the configuration offered to the Polish Navy is currently not in service. However, this does not justify the thesis that "no ship exists" because submarines are not bought from a shelf in an identical configuration for every navy in the world. Moreover, Spanish S-81 Isaac Peral swims and – whether the general likes it or not – is a battleship. The conclusion that the delivery deadline is "in a few years" does not add anything to the assessment because it concerns every offer; the maturity of the platform and the level of risk of the programme, rather than semantic playing with definitions, remain crucial.
General Marciniak also said that the Swedish bid received the highest score. Sounds serious until we look at what was actually scored. Producer declarations were first assessed as part of the initial market consultation of the JCC. Ten economic and industrial criteria were then added, including commitments to investment, cooperation and future purchases in Poland. Each of these areas received their own weight and scoring. As a result, the advantage It resulted not from what the ship can do at sea, but from what Sweden is willing to buy or promise Polish entities.
When the ship's combat capability ceases to be a key category and becomes one of the many boxes in the table, the logic of modernization of the naval forces completely disappears. The submarine is not a commercial product that can be exchanged under the economic system. It is a deterrent tool that must operate in a specific place and at a specific time. Meanwhile, in this procedure, it began to matter first and foremost who made more attractive industrial promises.
A submarine that doesn't exist. And an answer that doesn't explain anything
The general replies to the question of controversy over the construction itself that "no ships offered exist". Technically, it's true. Each project needs to be developed to meet the needs of the user. However, the difference between developing a proven platform and building a unit that is yet to be built is crucial. And that's the difference that was left out in the interview.
Nor was the answer to the question which should have been first: was the design chosen because it met the requirements of the Polish Navy, or because Sweden made the most extensive economic offer? The general assures that the sailors have accepted the project, but in the same interview admits that industrial criteria had a significant impact on the final outcome.
Meanwhile, in the spheres, we talk about something completely different. Less than two weeks ago, during the ceremony of burning sheets under The lifeguard., one of the Navy officers told me plainly that the consultations we are hearing so much about today, in practice "almost did not take place". If, in fact, the main basis for the assessment were forms and economic calculations rather than in-depth operational analysis, it is difficult to consider this choice as a response to the real needs of the submarine fleet. Unless someone believes that the Navy's priorities can be replaced by an industrial benefit sheet.
Offset instead of security
The most public talk is the announcement of industrial benefits. Sweden has undertaken to buy in Polish military equipment. Investments are expected to emerge, the competence to maintain ships is to be delegated. It sounds attractive until we remember that the offset does not replace the ship's combat capability, and Poland has been in a crisis of submarine potential for years.
We buy ships for several billion PLN, while the scale and value of liabilities on the Swedish side have not yet been revealed. The general does not give specific amounts, so the balance sheet of the transaction remains classified. So it is not known whether we are dealing with a real "something for something" or just declarations that sound good in messages.
However, the most worrying is that delivery time and operational readiness become part of the economic game. The combat capability, which was to come back quickly, is once again delayed.
2030 – supply of hull, not ship. Real abilities only after years
In public space, it is repeated that the first submarine will reach Poland in 2030. That's not true. The hull and systems will reach Poland. Combat readiness is a completely different stage. You'll need years of crew training, system integration, testing, backroom building.
This means that the actual operating capacity will not appear until the mid-1930s. And in an optimistic variant, without delay. In the realities of the Baltic, where Russia conducts almost daily military and hybrid activity, such a time horizon sounds like a decision disconnected from reality. The interview does not reflect whether Poland can afford such a long wait. No wonder. Who would dare say that in public?
What really decided?
The intelligence analysis shows one thing: Sweden's advantage brought economic elements, not combat parameters. If not., the offer would defend itself without having to support it with further additional criteria.
The Navy of the Republic of Poland was to receive rapid reinforcement. In the end, it will only receive the announcement of cooperation, investment promises and the possibility of technology transfer. Meanwhile, the fleet will remain without real capabilities for many years to come.
Epilogue: a contract that may not last up to two years
The whole process looks as if it was constructed in advance in such a way as to defend Sweden's choice, while at the same time leaving a wide open door for its annulment in the future. If the contract is written without hard penalties for breaking up – as was the case with the Sword Program. Any subsequent government, regardless of political colors, will be able to throw it in the basket in one move.
It's a script that can — But he doesn't have to — to become real after the election in two years. In that case, the Ork program will return to its starting point, and Navy He'll lose another year. And time is the most precious resource today — And the least accessible.
The most important question that is still left out of silence
There's a question that still nobody wants to say out loud. Can Poland really afford to postpone reconstruction of submarine capabilities for the following years? This is happening at a time when war is taking place beyond our eastern border, Russia tests the resilience of the Baltic almost daily, and maritime critical infrastructure requires permanent protection.
Meanwhile, the debate about the acquisition of submarines is going on as if there were reigning around geopolitical silence — It's like nothing happened.
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PGZ Stocznia Wojenna and JRCKT with container converter contract
PGZ Stocznia Wojenna signed an agreement with the Military Central Engineering and Technology Office of S.A. (CBKT S.A.) to design and supply container converters for frigates built under the Sword Program.
In the article
This is another concrete step in the construction of the Polish supply chain for the new ships of the Polish Navy and a real strengthening of the national defence and shipbuilding industry.
JRCKT will provide container converters for the Swordbar frigate
JRCKT will design, perform and install two 950 kW minimum output converters each, built in 40-foot containers made by sea. The scope of the work will also include medium voltage infrastructure and a wiring system that allows the unit to be connected and disconnected from a terrestrial power source.
The solution will allow to power the frigate Swordfish from the mainland during a stop in the port. This means a higher operational readiness, a lower load of on-board energy systems and a reduced consumption of ship's resources at rest. It is an element that directly translates into efficiency of operation of units and reduces the cost of their maintenance in life cycle.
JRCKT expands competence – support of the Sword and Polish defence industry program
JRCKT is a Warsaw company with over 50 years of experience in designing and manufacturing equipment for the military. The company specialises in ground handling of aircraft and remains the only entity in Poland capable of providing comprehensive equipment for military airports. Entering the marine power system segment shows the expansion of competences with new defence domains.
For years, JRCKT has been working with American partners on air and land projects, and we are now jointly opening a new chapter in naval defense programs. As a company of the PGZ Group – we show that we can meet the requirements of the Polish Navy also in the most technologically advanced projects.
Marcin Ryngwelski, President PGZ Stocznia Wojenna
Wherever possible, we focus on Polish partners. Each such contract means maintaining and developing jobs, transferring competences and increasing the participation of national companies in the implementation of strategic modernisation programmes. Construction of the frigate is not only strengthening the Polish Navy, but also a long-term investment in industrial sovereignty, security of supply and development of the Polish defence industry.
It is worth noting that Swedes offer delivery already in 2030, and competition only in 2034 and 2035. This means that in 2030, the A26 Blekinge ship delivered will have more combat value than the non-existent 212CD.
Even in October, they annexed the agreement for the Swedish MW with the delivery date of two ships at 2031-2033 and now building five OPs first delivers in 2030😂 I'm not against the Swedish offer, but not the crazy dad job.
Elected submarine Orka from Sweden, A26 did not fire up. First, the AIP flaws have because . Modern AIP ships do not have , have modern batteries fast charging with diesel engine . A26 has outdated batteries . It has no A26 firing missiles to combat on land at large distances. A26 defect that Sweden builds them with a large delay. It has no magnetic steel. And we're A17 weak, nothing worth a submarine but training. Until the A26 is built. And Poland needs submarines to fight submarines, submarines, long distances on land or in the air, not just to swim for training. The best choice was the German Norwegian submarine 212 CD has all modern battery technologies and has non-magnetic steel. France Scorpene without AIP but with rockets, torpedoes or fast battery charging. Sweden is building an obsolete submarine. Korea would also be good choice and modern. At A26 the sailors will have little opportunities and only problems in them.A Sweden resigns from the A26 for its navy, possibly they will build on modern batteries and rockets and non-magnetic steel. A 26 wrong political choice.
In point. Incidentally, I was almost sure of the Korean offer. Well, political economic rudders have won.
But did you read what "delivery"? Apart from everything, we are talking about a completely new construction, there is not a single piece running, and 90% of Swedish will not have any. Before we even develop our own knowledge, it will be years.
Przecież Korea oferowała nam o wiele bardziej nowoczesny okręt dostępny od razu, bez czekania. Co więcej, poprzedni Rząd, wyslał na szkolenie grupę marynarzy. Fakty są takie – kupiliśmy okręt o 3 lata młodszy od naszego Orła, czyli A17 + rysunki. W zamian za to, Szwedzi, kupili od nas trochę „Piorunów” i zadeklarowali, że być może, w przyszłości dadzą się skusić na zbudowanie u nas czegoś podobnego do „Ratownika”. Autor bardzo przytomnie napisał, że zamiast szkolić się na Koreańskim okręcie w strzelaniu w Murmańsk rakietami balistycznymi, my będziemy czekać kolejne 10 lat na cokolwiek nowoczesnego. Jeśli Putler da nam tyle czasu. Prawda jest taka – ta decyzja to skandal. Ryzykujemy życiem Polaków, żeby uratować martwy Szwedzki projekt, z upadającej, Szwedzkiej stoczni. Zrobili nas w bambuko za koraliki i lusterka.
It's not really about the fact that Poland does not have the money to buy this equipment!! First of all, in 5 years' time it is not known who will be in power and whether or not we will be arguing with Russians as America has already sold Ukraine. Secondly, before it is built and armed with electronics, etc., another 2 years will pass before the crew gets acquainted with the year, or perhaps 2035 will be the year when something comes out of Poland to the Baltic! and another option is that quietly we will buy another equipment on loan from Korea and it will turn out that the ship is too big for the Baltic without the arms of service and production in the country but cheaply and on loan like PiS bought aircraft.
Unfortunately, the 212CD type is not acceptable for political reasons. Tusk would shoot himself in the knee with a DE offer. The PiS and the President and Confa would have spent a month on it...
And from France, there's news that there's no power to build for Argentina.
And if you assume that HMS Södermanland of A17 is useless, it would mean that op in PMW has not existed since >10 years 🙂
It is true that A26 loses a mouse, but if it is cheaper and operates on well-made proven technologies (and it is probably because it is based on what was implemented in A19 and A17) then in connection with an equal partner in terms of threats, political and economic strength, it seems a very rational choice.
Type 212 ships built for Germany and Norway were a reasonable choice. The German shipyards are built in a timely manner. However, such a choice is an opportunity for opposition to the total spitting of the government that sells us to Germans.And so the Swedish shipyard which has trouble with the work dates will build the ships the devil knows when. .Politics have unfortunately won.
Buying anything from Germany when our neighbors are already changing their legs to go back to business with Russia would be political suicide and total stupidity. In turn, the Korean version with ballistic missile launchers (their design! Not Tomahawks who do not know how we could use) should be as a reserve
It is the Americans who seek to resume business with Russia.
How come the Swedes won... Rudy got caught on the last visit of Prime Minister GB... the handle washes...
Every expert knows that the best offers with ships were already Spanish and Korean. All military portals wrote equally. From the beginning, I bet a red liar would put it on German, as usual, but this time I was surprised by the septic baby.
And this professional is you?
Germany builds on time, almost. Conservative (doesn't want to write that obsolete) nice ships. But we buy three ships. Besides, in exchange for what? We have almost nothing. Why don't you buy it before it comes from Germany and then three in time? Yes, I know two types are costs but a German ship is of course relative "economic" money. How about this? There is not one perfect solution even with the GF.
German with 212 accidents because they are not credible, they have too many errands and their OP is much more expensive. The second thing is the quality of offset. We have very bad experience with cooperation with leopards and how The Germans worked together and what time travel they generated. I am only puzzled by the lack of consideration of the Italian offer which along with miniature submarines with modular weapons was an interesting solution. But here, too, problems in cooperation with Italian arms companies and very bad experiences, even with delivery and service you know to hitfist wolvengers... thirdly, not only economic and military, but more specifically the combat capabilities of OPs, were involved. Remember the construction of the Baltic block excluding Germany, Sweden Finland Baltics and Poland, i.e. all those who are deeply interested in the marginalization of Russian capabilities in the Baltic Sea...
The selection of submarines lasts from 2007 to 2008. At first, the French "Scorpene" had a clear advantage. When the requirement to carry missiles maneuvering from torpedo launchers was introduced, the French offer became a silent favorite of the proceedings. The problem was the AIP and ... exotic users of this ship (serio, even a racial requirement). Germany with Type 212CD strongly backed by financial lobbying, political, whispered propaganda were ignored?, rejected? Hard to say. Polish sailors had the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the German submarine, where they gained recognition from a proven AIP drive, was criticized by limited weapons (too few weapons carried). A26 from Sweden was even 5-6 years ago rejected as a high-risk project by the lack of a floating, proven prototype during service. The Spanish and Italians were considered a second choice, but it was the Italians who recently declared a fast delivery of a new ship (one?). There has been a requirement for a bridge solution.