Orka submarine program. No response from the Armed Forces Agency

Poland ordered three A26 submarines in Sweden and agreed to retrieve a used A17 vessel. The Shipyard Portal asked the Armed Forces Agency how contracts worth nearly 49 billion Swedish crowns were secured. For 28 questions we received two sentences of answers.

Our editorial team addressed 28 questions to the Armed Forces Agency concerning contractual penalties, schedule, financial guarantees and rules for the transfer of a bridge ship. We didn't ask for sonar parameters, communications systems, details of weapons use.

We wanted to figure out how. state secured the execution of two contracts with a total value of nearly 49 billion Swedish krona. The reply was limited to two sentences, a link to the press release and information that the other data of the parties to the agreement were considered sensitive.

In response, we received two sentences, a link to the press release and a formula for "sensitive information".

We asked about money, deadlines and responsibility.

Two sentences instead of 28 answers

The response from the Armed Forces Agency was brief:

All available data regarding the contract for the procurement of ORKA submarines are available on our website. To the other extent, the information shall be considered sensitive by the parties to the agreement and shall not be made available.

The most important issues raised in our question remain unanswered.

According to the above summary, the Armed Forces Agency has omitted all key issues concerning contract security. Instead of referring to penalties, schedule, guarantees, audits and bridge ship, she sent the editorial board back to a message published after signing the contracts.

Such treatment of the case is difficult to regard as anything other than a slap on the face of every taxpayer. They're the ones who fund Orka submarine program, and nevertheless cannot know which safeguards protect the State against delays, increases in costs or failure to perform the contract.

A press release may be used to announce decisions and present the main objectives of the programme. However, it will not replace information on contractual penalties, financial guarantees, the right to review the contractor or the conditions for withdrawal.

Orka submarine program. There are numbers, still no answers.

The Agency’s material gives the value of both contracts. Contract with Saab on three submarines A26, arms, training and logistics package is worth nearly 47 billion Swedish krona. Leasing A17 It's supposed to cost about 1.9 billion crowns.

According to the original declarations the first Polish A26 was to be transferred in 2030. This has caused the experts to be surprised because the first ship of this type built for Svenska marinan is not expected to enter service until 2031. This raises the basic question: how will Poland receive its A26 sooner than the state whose ships are already being built.

We didn't know that before. However, the most important information is still lacking in terms of contract supervision.

We do not know the price split into ships, weapons, training and logistics facilities. We do not know what part of the remuneration will be paid before the ship is picked up or whether Poland can suspend payments if the contractor fails to comply with the schedule.

The Agency shall only ensure that the contract regulates penalties, guarantees, time limits and price valorisation. However, it does not reveal exactly what is recorded.

The very existence of contractual penalties does not prejudge that they will be effective. They may be high and charged from the first day of delay. They may also be symbolic, limited by a small limit or subject to conditions that hinder their enforcement.

Without these data, it is impossible to assess whether Poland's interest has actually been secured.

"Sensitive information" means a comfortable curtain

AU considered the other information to be "sensitive". However, she did not indicate whether it was classified information, business secrets or any other secret protected by the law.

In our letter, we have made it clear that we do not demand the disclosure of classified data. We have asked for a public part, an indication of the legal basis for any restriction and a decision to be taken in the event that information is refused.

We have not received a partial answer or such a decision.

All it took was one general term. Thus, the amount of penalties, payment rules, definition of delivery, terms of guarantee, the right to work control and the possibility to terminate the contract can be considered "sensitive".

The taxpayer has to pay, but he shouldn't ask.

Except the Armed Forces Agency doesn't fund Orka program With my own money. It's funded by citizens.

These questions don't concern military secrets.

We wanted to know whether the contractor would bear the financial consequences of the delay and whether the penalties applied to each ship separately. We asked about the right to control the work at the shipyard, report on progress and the possibility of seeking additional compensation.

We also asked whether Polish ships have guaranteed seats in the yard's production plan and whether the units were delayed Blekinge and Skåne may move deliveries to the Navy of the Republic of Poland.

None of these questions concern the combat capabilities of future submarines A26. Nor does it facilitate the action of a potential opponent.

These are simple questions about the implementation of a contract financed by the state budget.

If the office does not want to answer them in general, safety is not the problem. The problem is the lack of transparency and accountability to the public.

The conference takes an hour, a program of several years

Signing a contract does not end the program. He's just starting it..

The press conference lasts an hour. The construction of submarines will take many years. During this time, production problems, shortages of staff, delays of subcontractors, increases in costs and disputes over the delivery range may arise.

This is why effective penalties, financial guarantees, the right to control work and clear rules for receiving ships are needed.

These are not technical additions to the contract. It's state security in case the program starts to delay.

HMS Södermanland not only for crew training

Poland issues from Sweden HMS Södermanland A17S project with equipment, weapons, training and technical support. Renovated and efficient ship is to be transferred in 2027 and then serve under the Polish flag until the first vessel takes over A26.

The only good news we haven't been in charge of from AU is that HMS Södermanland can give the Navy much more than simply supporting crew training. As Maximilian Dura points out, Defence portal24, A17S will enable seamen to be trained to operate an air-independent propulsion system, sonar systems and a ship-based combat system. It will also be used to train submarine combat forces.

The issue of weapons is also important. It is not yet certain that Poland will receive a full supply of battle torpedoes with the ship. However, the lack of ammunition at the time of the transfer does not mean that Södermanland will only be a school unit.

The ship will retain six 533 mm torpedo launchers and three 400 mm torpedo launchers. There will also be software in the combat system to plan torpedo attack as it is necessary for crew training. After loading the corresponding A17S torpedoes, it will be able to perform combat tasks and use weapons.

As Maximilian Dura points out, the very presence of an efficient submarine forces the opponent to take into account its possible position and weaponry. After immersion, it is not known where the unit is located or what task it performs.

The problem therefore does not concern the usefulness of the bridge ship. We still don't know the detailed lease terms. The Armed Forces Agency did not explain what kind of weapons will be transferred to Poland, how responsibility for repairs and spare parts were divided, or whether leasing would be automatically extended if the first A26 arrived later.

It is also unknown whether the agreement contains restrictions on the use of the ship and its armaments by the Polish crew. That's what we were asking the Armed Forces about. They do not question the point of acquiring A17S, but would allow to assess whether the bridge solution will be fully operationally useful.

It's not a coincidence. It's the M.O.

The diagram is simple.

First politicians announce historic success. The AU then publishes its own communication and considers the case closed. When the media asks for details, they hear about information "sensitive".

If delays or additional costs occur in a few years, everyone will pretend to be surprised.

Politicians will be able to announce success. The contractor will have a contract. Officials will cover documentsThe public can't see. The risk will remain on the side of the Polish Navy and the taxpayer.

This is what you look like in a cardboard box. It doesn't have to be unable to sign a contract. All she has to do is solemnly announce it, but she won't tell me who's responsible for the execution.

Why do we ask that?

Who knows me knows that I've seen from the inside the mechanisms whereby one bidder promotes and removes others from the game. I also saw the responsibility for the decisions that were made later blur. Therefore, I am not convinced by conferences or assurances of historic success. What matters is what is written in the contract and what tools you have when the schedule begins to fall apart.

I'm not an opponent. Orka program. It's exactly the opposite. Poland needs 0 submarines delivered on time, with weapons, logistics facilities and trained crews. That is why we must look at the hands of those who have signed contracts and will supervise their execution.

I want to know how Poland's interests have been secured: who will bear the costs of delays, what will be the consequences of failure to meet deadlines and what will happen if the contractor does not deliver ships according to the agreement.

If in a few years Orka submarine program It will be a success mainly on paper, no one can say that these questions have not been asked.

Mariusz Dasiewicz – publisher of the Shipyard Portal. He deals with the issues of the Polish Navy and shipbuilding industry. In his texts he focuses on modernisation programs of the navy and issues related to the development of the maritime security of Poland. It focuses on a factual analysis and transparency of the decision-making process.