A26 submarines for Poland with problems? Orka submarine program has entered a difficult stage

Poland continues to negotiate with Sweden the purchase of new submarines under the Orka programme, but today the choice of partner is no longer at stake. The real dispute concerns whether the MON will sign a ship contract without maneuvering missiles and whether it will accept a schedule burdened with the problems of the Swedish A26 programme.

According to Deputy Minister of Defence Stanisław Wzątek on the Sejm's defense committee, if the final offer proves unsatisfactory, Poland will speak with other bidders. That doesn't sound like a routine formula anymore. Rather than a signal that after months of political declarations, someone finally started asking the most important questions: the delivery deadline, the bridge solution, the range of weapons and how the state should be protected if the contractor fails to deliver the program in accordance with the agreement. By Orka program It's not enough to talk about parameters today. What matters is whether this offer will withstand the collision with the schedule, costs and realities of transferring new circles of our MW RP.

The dispute is not only about the ship itself, but also about the weapons.

At the session of the Parliamentary Defence Commission, the theme of maneuvering missiles sounded most strongly. The members of the Law and Justice Service argued that the purchase of submarines without such weapons would weaken the potential for deterrence and in practice undermine the whole program. Navy corresponds to the mouth of the Viceadm. Jarosław Earthy, that there is no conventional submarine with maneuvering missiles on the market today, which could simply be bought "from the shelf", without a complex integration process. Except that argument doesn't close the case. The problem lies not only in the difficulty of integration, but also in the fact that Poland indicated as the preferred offer a solution which already at the start did not give such potential, while competitive proposals were much closer to the original expectations.

This is where the political problem begins, but also the military problem. It is no longer just about the technical risks associated with the integration of new weapons into the future ship, but about something much more serious: about entering into negotiations on terms that mean moving away from one of Orka's loudest ambitions. Since for years the message was being built that new submarines are also meant to provide Poland with the ability to destroy land targets, it is difficult to consider it a minor situation in which the chosen path leads today to individuals deprived of this asset. In this perspective, the question is no longer just about what may be added later, but whether the state is agreeing to a very expensive compromise on the capacity previously presented as one of the foundations of the entire programme.

Therefore, the question of whether Poland is heading towards the purchase of a ship, which will be modern but limited in political and operational terms, is increasingly coming back. On this scale, it would not be as much a compromise as a conscious reduction in our own ambitions. And such a luxury the front state simply should not afford.

The greatest shadow falls on the schedule today

The second problem is the calendar. According to FMV information, following contract update, Swedish HMS ships Blekinge and HMS Skåne are to be delivered in 2031 and 2033 respectively. This is very important, because this is the construction which is based on the offer for Poland. So, if the program for its own navy has such a big slip, the question of how reliable are the declarations of delivery of the first unit for Poland around 2030.

It's not about crossing out the A26 project in advance. The problem is not the ship itself, which today is only on paper, not in service. The problem is that after years of delay Poland should no longer buy the promise itself. In this case, a good presentation and the belief that "it will be" is not enough. The ship must be built, tested in the sea and delivered within the time limit. In fact, Saab has the biggest problem today.

MON leaves a door open, but time is running out.

Therefore, the words of the Deputy Minister take on the possibility of moving to other offers must be read seriously. The Ministry of Defence shows that it does not want to be held hostage by one partner, even if it is Sweden was previously indicated as the preferred direction. It is also a form of emphasis on the final stage of talks. The closer we get to the end of June, the less room for political courtesy and more for hard contract terms.

From a political perspective, the matter becomes uncomfortable. If conversations with the Swedes start to drag or fail, the question will come back if the choice of partner was announced too early. On the other hand, if the MON signs a contract for ships without maneuvering missiles and with a timetable of doubt, the opposition will get a ready argument for the attack when the pre-election battle begins.

This is no longer the stage of the declaration

In practice Orka submarine program He just entered the most difficult phase. Not the media one, but the real one, in which political choices need to be turned into a feasible agreement. Today, it is no longer important who won the stage of the declaration, but who can deliver Poland's submarines on time, with appropriate weapons and without excessive risk. Polish Navy Poland There is no longer time for further slips and problems, especially those that could have been avoided more by choosing an offer based on a more mature program. If Saab doesn't show this, the subject of returning to the competition offers will cease to be just a negotiating scare.