Orka submarine program and Swedish A26. Does changing requirements close the discussion?

Orka submarine program returns in discussion not only by selecting the Swedish A26 offer, but also by abandoning the requirement to carry maneuvering missiles. Translation that after Sweden and Finland entered NATO The Baltic became a different operating water, sounds logical only at first glance. This is a decision that requires a much more serious debate.

Did NATO change the Baltic or just the justification for the choice?

In the discussion about the Orka program, another argument was made to explain the resignation of the requirement to carry missiles maneuvering by future Polish submarines. Gen. Dyw. Krzysztof Zielski, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Academy of Sciences, in an interview with Defence24 indicated that the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO changed the strategic situation in the Baltic Sea and the list of tasks foreseen for the Polish Navy.

This explanation sounds logical only at first glance. The accession of Helsinki and Stockholm to the Alliance has indeed strengthened the region's security, but at the same time it has increased NATO's commitments. The Baltic has not become a peaceful water under the full control of the Allied States. It has become an area of even greater military, political and economic importance.

This problem was accurately described byour portalkmdr Tomasz Witkiewicz, pointing out that the extension of NATO to the Fennoscandish states does not mean the conversion of the Baltic into a "security oasis", but on the contrary – increases its strategic importance and increases the weight of the strong, well-built Navy of Poland. The author also emphasized that Poland, having strong submarines and real submarine capabilities, could become not only a recipient but also a "safety donor" in the region.

This does not mean that Poland has lost the need for its own ability to deter and kill targets at long distances. On the contrary, the war in Ukraine showed the importance of long-range systems capable of influencing the enemy's facilities, logistics, military infrastructure and command post.

The argument about the "internal sea of NATO" does not eliminate the Russian threat in the Baltic. Russia continues to maintain a strong military group in the Kölewiecki Oblast, developing means of reconnaissance, conducting hybrid activities and treating the submarine infrastructure as a potential target of pressure. Under such conditions, submarines remain one of the most discreet tools for deterring, recognizing and influencing the opponent.

Was the best offer selected?

However, this is the second equally important question: did Poland really choose the most advantageous offer after changing requirements?

Swedish proposal wasn't the only one on the table. Poland had a choice of several solutions that differ not only in ship design but also in industrial facilities, export experience and the scale of potential cooperation with the national shipbuilding sector.

The German offer was based on a country with very extensive experience in the construction and export of conventional submarines. Spanish NavantiaShe offered ships.S-80Plusand extensive industrial cooperation. South Korea presented a package that could combine the purchase of ships with the modernisation of selected capabilities of the Polish shipbuilding industry. The French offer also had its advantages, although its weak side was a longer waiting time for ships.

A separate case was the Italian offer,about which I wrote on our portalAnd I won't change my mind. In my opinion this does not change the fundamental problem: Poland had a real choice, and the decision to indicate the Swedish offer still requires a factual explanation.

It is worth recalling that the Swedish government offer was indicated at the end of November 2025 and assumes the acquisition of three new ships of typeA26. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in December 2025 and the conclusion of the executive agreement was announced for the first half of 2026. According to the assumptions presented, the first new ship is to be delivered in 2030, while in 2027 Poland is to receive a bridge unit, most likely of the typeA17S. The value of the Ork program is estimated at several billion PLN.

The problem is not whether the Swedish offer will bring any industrial contracts to Poland. All indicates that the Swedish side intends to comply with these announcements, which can be illustrated by the order for the construction of a rescue ship. The question, however, is whether such orders do not cover the main problem: the risk of selecting a submarine, whose program has been facing delays of almost a decade for years. Thus, we are talking about a structure that has not yet undergone the full cycle of construction, shipbuilding and maritime trials and has not been put into service.

Therefore, the dispute over Orka does not concern only the question of whether a future submarine for our MW of the Republic of Poland is to carry maneuvering missiles. It also concerns whether Poland has chosen the best solution in terms of the capabilities of the Polish Navy, and the risks that I have described above.

This is where the argument comes back, which in the lyrics about Orka shows up regularly: when buying weapons of this class the priority should be time, maturity of construction and real combat capabilities. However, in the case of the selection of future Polish submarines it is difficult to resist the impression that this order has been disrupted. Beyond the eastern border there is war, Russia carries out hybrid actions against NATO states, and Poland in the underwater domain is today in a "deep collapse".

Modernization of "once" does not always mean modernisation of "for sure"

The General in Defence24 points out that the future ships are to retain the propensity of modernisation, which in future could allow for the integration of maneuvering missiles. That's an important argument, but he's not closing the case. The history of reinforcement programmes shows that the vulnerability of modernisation alone is not a guarantee of modernisation.

Integration of new weapons is a separate process: it requires money, political decision, manufacturer approval, certification, trials and time. Without this, the record of future possibilities remains only an option, not a real ability.

The key question remains unanswered

This is not about whether Sweden is a NATO member, nor whether Project A26 can prove to be a valuable submarine in the future. The problem is that today we are talking about a construction which must be completed first, undergo shipbuilding and sea tests and then confirm the operation of combat systems, weapons and on-board equipment.

The right question is different: whether Poland has chosen a solution providing the greatest fighting capabilities with the lowest risk of delivery, or rather the politically easiest option to carry out.

This is not a personal polemic with representatives of the HR General Staff, but a question about the logic of decisions in one of the most important ship programs of recent decades.Orka Programis to rebuild the underwater capacity of the state now, not just to close the multi-year purchasing problem. Therefore, the argument about changing the situation in the Baltic after Sweden and Finland entered NATO should not end the discussion but open it.