Will the Swedish A26 prove another Gawron? – Part 2

Is it wrong to choose a Swedish offer? There's a lot of evidence. But – and this is worth noting – there are also arguments that show that this decision does not have to be as dramatic as it looks at first glance. And since a discussion broke out at the first part of my text, I will try to refer to a few comments – without a cap, in friendly and in human language.

With background delays – David Kamizela with some strong arguments

But before I go to the comments, we should start with an extensive entry on David Kamizeli's X platform. Because he should be the beginning of the whole discussion on why this choice raises so much doubt. In short, his argument is this:

"A26 is a project that drags 9 years of delays, four changes in the dates of transfer of units and more than twice the cost increase."

And in fact, this chronology resembles the scenario of the episode of the documentary program "The Catastrophe in the Skys" – each subsequent step reveals the previous underestimation and structural problems of the entire program:

• 2015 – contract for two A26The first was to enter service in 2022.
• 2019 – it is known that the deadline will not last → new date 2024-2025.
• 2021 – annex, next shift → 2027–2028.
• 2025 – next correction → 2031, or 16 years of construction of the first ship, and we are still not sure that the program with this date will be delivered.
• Increase in construction costs of two units from SEK 8.6 billion to SEK 25 billion.

And here it is difficult to disagree with it – these numbers just look bad. In addition, the Swedes have not launched a single submarine in 35 years. Yeah, it sounds like "science from scratch," and science continues, costs and hurts. Because we ourselves have to answer the more important question: is the Swedish SAAB able to deliver this program by 2035? For the time being, no one can answer this question clearly except, of course, the Swedish side, which, as a seller, promises everything.

But... it's still SAAB. A SAAB in the armory "delivers"

In many comments, however, there was a counter-argument which, in my opinion, should not be overlooked, and which I did not develop in earlier texts.

SAAB is not a bush company. It is one of the most predictable and structured companies in Europe.

Whoever watches their programs knows one thing: they do what they sign.

These are not French contract volts, this is not Italian "will be tomorrow". SAAB has an iron reputation – mainly because it does not play PR promises, but does in its own way, in Swedish: slowly, methodically, expensively... but effectively.

Therefore – paradoxically – this powerful media emphasis (called even our own public debate) is now working against their possible failures.

SAAB simply can't afford to see that, with a project that's on the lips of all Europe, they're starting to crack again, or they're running out of control.

And here is another element – we have a war behind our eastern border. Every company that enters the project for Poland today knows that every fault will be watched "under a microscope". A26 it is not a battleship in the sense of classical thinking about offensive platforms – it is a tool for deterrence, control and hidden presence. Designed more for "before" war than "in" war.

In such a project late is harder to explain.

France? Here the argument is simple and hard

In comments under the first parts of the opinion, there was also an interesting allegation: that supposedly "I hit the French more than the Swedes". And here I have to make this clear: those texts were different. I focused primarily on the offers that the industry actually pointed to as real – German, Korean And French. This is why the French proposal required comment because Scorpène Evolved does not exist in the service and there is no user, and Poland cannot afford a prototype after years of capacity gaps. That was and remains the main reason for my caution with this offer.

On the other hand, Sweden was not left out of sympathy or resentment, just because at that point its choice seemed extremely unlikely. Whole industry — from experts to former MW officers — was compatible, that program A26 is burdened with the greatest risk: many years of delays, four changes in deadlines, rising costs and the fact that Swedes have not launched a submarine in 35 years. In short: I did not analyse this offer further, because I did not assume that someone could actually bet on a project that only returns to the track after a few decades of break.

Only after the Minister's statements and after your comments on which the subject A26 He came back like a boomerang, I thought it was time to look at this proposal with the same severity as the others.

Then what? Bad choice or not?

I look at it this way:

• Yes, the story of A26 looks terrible – and it is difficult to defend it.
• Yes, the Swedes rebuild their industry and capabilities in the construction of submarines after 35 years of break.
• Yes, Blekinge will be their test, and we can be the first foreign recipient.

But at the same time:

• SAAB is a company that has a reputation for shipping.
• Politically – closeness to Sweden, entry to NATO, Baltic cooperation – are real advantages.
• And really – we need ships as soon as possible, because time works against the MW of Poland and the security of our country.

And here we go back to the question of: Will Swedish A26 prove to be another Gawron?

I'm not going to answer clearly today whether this decision is good or bad. That's not for a few years. I know one thing: it's a risky decision. The A26 program is delayed, its costs are rising, and the Swedes themselves have limited their order and in parallel are already working on another version of the ship.

Yes. — They could have promised us a lot of sweeteners. Meanwhile, we had on the table companies that offered ships already in service, tested by allies, with a ready-made package for our industry and a foreseeable risk. And we — for different reasons — We went off the highway on a narrow, winding road and most unpredictable of all available.

But one thing I can say without hesitation: if this program is not to repeat the fate of Gawron, it is not Swedes, but we must ensure that the agreement is favourable to the Polish state — to make the schedules hard, the annexes checked, rather than "on paper".

Otherwise even the best design will prove too expensive, delayed and too weak — and this lesson the Polish Navy has already done more times than it should.