Portal partners
Portal partners
Will Swedish A26 prove to be another Gawron?
- Author
Mariusz Dasiewicz
Mariusz Dasiewicz
The decision to choose Sweden as a partner of the Orka programme was presented by Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz as "the most important step for the security of the Polish state in years".
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In the Minister's statement, the words "new security architecture", "the most advanced offset declarations" and "objective analysis". However, a thorough hearing of the statements of Minister Kosiniak-Kamish leads to several fundamental conclusions which require a cold, industrial analysis.
Ship from offer, not front line
The Minister emphasises that 3000 pages of documents and six state offers have been reviewed in the analysis process. It points out that the Swedish proposal "met all the expectations of the Navy". However, there is not a single sentence in the whole statement that confirms that the ship offered to Poland is already in operation and is used by any Navy. The speech shows the opposite – the work is only to begin, while the actual entry of individuals into the service separates us more indeterminately "a few years".
The situation does not improve the fact that the Swedes themselves have postponed the delivery times for their own Navy. Today we are talking about the early 1930s. In such a situation, it is difficult to speak of a fully reliable partner who has significant problems in keeping the schedule even in programmes implemented for his own fleet.
In the realities of modern ship programs, this means a choice of design, whose sea ripening will take place only for the second half of the 1930s. This is a time when the security situation in the Baltic already requires complete, operational capabilities to combat submarines, not plans and promises for the future. For this reason, the marine environment has been repeating one simple postulate for years: Poland should buy submarines tested in service, not constructions that are mostly in the documentation and are to be created.
"Gap filler" without real filling the gap
The Minister points to a submarine. Västergötland types (A-17), which is to enter the Polish service in 2027 as a training vessel. The government message presents this ship as a transitional solution to fill the gap between signing the contract and supplying new submarines. However, this does not change the fundamental issue: the training vessel will not replace the full-value naval combat capabilities.
Even if the Swedish ship enters the line at the announced time, the target combat units will only appear after many years. In practice this means that our Navy for much of this decade and the beginning of the next one will remain without a complete, modern underwater component. However, it was an urgent closure of this gap that was the crowning argument of supporters of the purchase of ships that are already floating in the colors of other fleets.
The Minister's words that "mares cannot wait a moment longer" remain in clear tension with the timetable presented by him. The announced gap filler will improve the training situation, but will not solve the fundamental problem of lack of full-value underwater combat capabilities.
Supply: Government talks about time, but does not talk about specifics
The Minister has repeatedly stated that delivery time was one of the key criteria for assessing offers. Yet, there is no hard date for the construction of new submarines throughout the recording. Not known, when the first unit is established or in which year it could be transferred to service in the Navy of Poland. The Minister is confined to stating that "a few years later" does not give any point of reference.
There is also no information on the risks associated with the construction process. In the programmes of this scale, the timetable shifts are almost certain, and their omission in the Communication raises reasonable doubts. Not presented either comparison of time limits offered by other participants. It is therefore difficult to speak of the advantage of the Swedish temporary solution, since no data were given to verify this advantage.
In the Navy, predictability is as important as the technical parameters of the individual. The delivery schedule determines the real operational capacity of the fleet, therefore the lack of specific deadlines in such a fundamental programme as Orka remains one of the most problematic elements of the announced decision.
Offset and investments: declarations, not contracts
In the speech of the Minister there is a wide list of benefits that cooperation with Sweden would bring. We talk about the potential purchase of a rescue ship built in Poland, about investments in the domestic shipbuilding industry, about technology transfer and about service and repair in Polish shipyards. These announcements are promising, but at this stage they are purely declarative.
The Minister uses terms such as "declaration", "commitment", "investment". In the language of arms programs, such phrases do not have the power to prosecute. Real offsets and sustainable economic benefits are only due to precisely recorded contracts, including schedules, scope of work, intellectual property rights and liability of the contractor. The ship programmes use tough clearing mechanisms that allow you to enforce your partner’s obligations. There are no such elements in the government's announcement.
Until the final documents are presented, it is impossible to assess whether the announcements will translate into measurable, measurable benefits for the Polish shipbuilding industry. Only the agreement will show whether these declarations have operational value or will remain only part of the narrative accompanying the announcement of the selection of the tender.
Why were ships left out in the service?
The Minister points out that their offers have been submitted by Germany, Norway, South Korea, Spain, France and Italy. Some of these countries has ships that are already used by their naval forces, tested in operation where they have extensive logistics and training facilities. The proposed units have known use costs, a clearly defined modernisation cycle and function in the structures of NATO states or are close partners of the Alliance.
Nevertheless, the government has decided to build a structure that is not yet in the service of any Navy. In practice, this means choosing a solution that has not yet been tested under real operating conditions, so that its actual combat value can only be assessed after years.
In the navy, there is a simple rule: the ship must first swim and be tested in action, only then can you talk about its superiorities or operational reliability. The announced decision failed to explain why proposals that met this basic condition were omitted.
Conclusion: selection politically effective, operationally risky
Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz presents the decision as "historical" and "breakthrough", but his own statement reveals the key problem: Poland has chosen an offer based on unverified construction in operation, with a distant delivery date and offset based on declarations.
In practice, this means that instead of immediately rebuilding the capabilities of the Polish Navy, Poland enters into a few years of waiting – with the hope that the project, which is today a political broadcast, will become a real operational capacity.
However, experienced sailors have for years pointed out that we should buy a ship already in service. This is the only real test of the value of the submarine.
Do we really not have the right to ask ourselves questions that have been appearing in many people’s conversations for several days? Will Swedish A26 prove another Gawron — a project promising, costly and in practice repeatedly moved and for years not in service?
That question is not emotional. This is a cool reflection on the decision that determines the future of Polish submarine capabilities for decades. I'll do it again. — in a situation where a ship has been selected, which is not yet in service of any Navy, and the partner responsible for building it alone has been struggling with delays for years — This question is not only acceptable. It's necessary.
Written by Mariusz Dasiewicz
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PGZ Stocznia Wojenna and JRCKT with container converter contract
PGZ Stocznia Wojenna signed an agreement with the Military Central Engineering and Technology Office of S.A. (CBKT S.A.) to design and supply container converters for frigates built under the Sword Program.
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This is another concrete step in the construction of the Polish supply chain for the new ships of the Polish Navy and a real strengthening of the national defence and shipbuilding industry.
JRCKT will provide container converters for the Swordbar frigate
JRCKT will design, perform and install two 950 kW minimum output converters each, built in 40-foot containers made by sea. The scope of the work will also include medium voltage infrastructure and a wiring system that allows the unit to be connected and disconnected from a terrestrial power source.
The solution will allow to power the frigate Swordfish from the mainland during a stop in the port. This means a higher operational readiness, a lower load of on-board energy systems and a reduced consumption of ship's resources at rest. It is an element that directly translates into efficiency of operation of units and reduces the cost of their maintenance in life cycle.
JRCKT expands competence – support of the Sword and Polish defence industry program
JRCKT is a Warsaw company with over 50 years of experience in designing and manufacturing equipment for the military. The company specialises in ground handling of aircraft and remains the only entity in Poland capable of providing comprehensive equipment for military airports. Entering the marine power system segment shows the expansion of competences with new defence domains.
For years, JRCKT has been working with American partners on air and land projects, and we are now jointly opening a new chapter in naval defense programs. As a company of the PGZ Group – we show that we can meet the requirements of the Polish Navy also in the most technologically advanced projects.
Marcin Ryngwelski, President PGZ Stocznia Wojenna
Wherever possible, we focus on Polish partners. Each such contract means maintaining and developing jobs, transferring competences and increasing the participation of national companies in the implementation of strategic modernisation programmes. Construction of the frigate is not only strengthening the Polish Navy, but also a long-term investment in industrial sovereignty, security of supply and development of the Polish defence industry.
They can't do anything!
Another example of stink!
Poland is suffering!
Italians and Korea gave ships better and faster.
Ofset at high level.
But lans good and fools happy!!!
,, Bravo ore and tiger"!
Shit, the experts are here. Maybe we were supposed to build ships in Poland? If I don't know anything, I'm quiet. The flatman built and didn't build for years. Go to the Russians and buy fools
These "Yours" – Klich and Siemoniak built before 8 years ago and now the new Kosiniak-Kamish pretends to be a big breakthrough. Rather, he will finish his tenure and there will be nothing specific – because you swallow like Russian pelicans and declarations and announcements you treat as facts. It's been enough for you for a long time. There is no breakthrough – there is propaganda like putler. We're powerful because we're going to! Someday...
After all, the Italians offered inferior ships with longer delivery dates.
Unfortunately, this choice is a mere thing done to Poland and Polish sailors. The worst ship of all has been selected, the worst because the non-existent, and also struggling with growing problems. Kosiniak Kamysz rose to the heights of hypocrisy and had to babble unkindly in justifying this unexpected choice of nonexistent nothing. Then Polish submariners will surf for another decade on an old Swedish boat to switch to a technically uncertain ship, which next decade will have to be checked in the expedition and spend years in shipyards because something will still have to be verified and improved. The Koreans Mr. Kosiniak gave specific delivery dates for ships tested in the expedition and the battleship for a transitional period. They gave full knowhow and license and the right to build their own production capacity as if we wanted to build such ships in the future. And, of course, the Koreans are financing the project as a whole, and we wouldn't have to waste funds from European funds. This decision shows that what you have described as a matter of honor has become a matter of political commerce of security of Poland and Poles. You're the last scumbag and a fraud. If you can prove publicly that the Navy has placed a Swedish offer, then I return the honor. If you didn't, you'd better pack up an evacuation backpack because what you did wouldn't scare off Russia. We're screwed.
I think it's a premeditated decision. We bought a ship that doesn't exist because the government isn't sure about the next election and is stalling the problem. As the ship is gone and we don't know when it's going to be and we need ships "for yesterday" it's completely incomprehensible if we approach it rationally. If another option wins in the future election, he will probably do an audit and fail the proceedings, in a way rightly, because I doubt that at least one A26 will enter service in Sweden by 2027 and the costs of the program will be piled up. Then the opposition will say that they were very successful, and the disgusting writings destroyed everything. If he wins this option we have now, they have some time to come up with a beautiful excuse like, "These ships are the future, modern units, and they need time to show their power."
In the end, we will be left without any submarine, because the Eagle is not even able to leave the port, but maybe we are just waiting for it to end as with the Migs-29 that the ship will sink and someone will die because our rulers like to ask for tragedy. We've been through this all these years and we've been through it all the time.
Just to remind you that Scorpene Evolved, 212CD, 212NFS and HDS-2300 do not exist either. In turn S80 Plus and KSS-III are oceanic ships too large for the Baltic.
After all, the best ship was chosen because it was the only one who met all the requirements. The Koreans offered an oceanic ship too big for the Baltic and delivery only in 2035.
Well, that was obvious. Protracting, talking, record in history- only unsavory. What kind of country doesn't have submarines anymore chooses this. You can see this is a delay and a time that will not bring any benefits, effects. The title of the article refers to the ship Gawron 🤣 so far, it's swimming as a blow job. So it's no wonder they didn't really want to buy these ships just so they wouldn't be whistled at in the Navy World.🤣 It was a shame to hope and bet on the Koreans who were fulfilling their contracts and for them it would be a shame if something went wrong with them.
I remember there was a series of articles that said that this offer might not be the best, but the conclusion was that everyone would be better than French...
The Koreans offered an oceanic ship too big for the Baltic and delivery only in 2035.
I understand disappointment with other favorites, but criticism in this article is amateur rather than journalistic reporting. Somehow, however, we could learn from the minister's high level political statement.
As usual, political considerations and rationality prevail.
I agree with the opinions that the choice of Sweden's Orka offer is the most unthought-out and risky decision and irresponsible, arguments that were translated in earlier comments as accurately as possible.
I kept my fingers crossed for the Korean Orca, unfortunately politics and not pragmatism and responsibility took hold again.
I myself have been involved with MW and I know that our MW will not be happy with this decision regarding this choice for understandable reasons which have already been written in previous opinions and comments.
I wouldn't be surprised that in a little while, for all the reasons, there's a deal coming up if it comes to being broken up and we're waiting for new ships forever again, hmm, and maybe that was the idea of a sting, but it's just a thought that came to me.
In summing up Bunchus' announcements and the reality and the offer that was chosen very risky and incomprehensible to me.
Time will show if it will defend itself, although the word time is in our case not very fitting for our MW situation because it has long ended with submarines.
After all, the MW chose A26 Blekinge.
After all, the MW chose A26 Blekinge
What's this information about a non-existent ship called Gädden? If the editorial board has information about the bridge ship, then request the name of the existing vessel.
And you're right. I'm sorry. I already did. It was supposed to be the Gotland type. 🙂
The comment section of this portal is a lol-content mine. Almost the experts and patriots themselves, who discuss submarines and international agreements better than the native language of a country they declare to be supposed patriots. Pretty funny.
A’proposing the arguments against buying prototypes – exactly the same arguments came out when contracts were signed on Rosomak...
You should have taken this, or that, checked in combat and all...
Today, most of these proposals are medium-quality second-hand sent to Ukraine, because it is cheaper than disposal.
And it's just an APC, not a ship.
I am not saying that the choice of the Swedish offer is the best, because unfortunately, unlike commentators, I do not have access to the real proposals of individual states, but ships that already have one basic flaw – they have been designed for a war that has not already taken place and they are difficult to adapt to a war that can come, for example, the battlefield of all the ointments of submarines and submarines. I do not question the need to have ships of this class, but an example of action in the Black Sea shows that not a single vessel was needed to neutralise the Russian fleet under new conditions.
And what kind of drone ointment does a submarine colleague mean that makes the submarines in service obsolete?
Where would a "hard contract" dot offset come from at this stage? That's bullshit. Regardless of which offers would be selected, the situation would be exactly the same. Signing the contracts before us.
In Mon I usually a bunch of losers with a minister doctor ... hands drop as you can buy something from paper. This boat doesn't even have Swedes laughing in the gym. But well, the writing bought Korean equipment so you couldn't buy it now because it looked like it was in the eyes of the fanatics of the Poparancov coalition.
The Koreans offered an oceanic ship too big for the Baltic and delivery only in 2035.
The offered gap-filler is not a Gotland (A-19) class ship but a Västergötland (older A-17).
It is clear that this choice is highly politically motivated. But Sweden and I should be working together as closely as possible, the last few years have shown that we have much more common interests with them in regional security than (unfortunately) with Germany.
All criticism ignores the very important issue of this choice – in the recommending selection of a specific offer the Task Force was experts from MW, not only interested in the contract of ministries. MW claims (so far unofficially) that she is satisfied with the choice. Industry (MW, PGZ) is also reportedly satisfied. Swedes announce the purchase of "Rattownika" and large orders at PPO.
Why isn't there a word about this? First of all, is this a recommended selection by MW?
Is this a choice with more risk than the others? Maybe. But why not believe that it is still optimal? Isn't it appropriate to wait for specific agreements by condemning in a pulpit?