USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier still in trouble. It's more than just a fire.

Fire aboard a nuclear aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) pointed out a problem that could prove far more serious than the incident itself in the laundry rooms. The latest U.S. media findings, based on a Pentagon report, show that around the world's most expensive warship, questions about its real readiness are growing again.

According to Bloomberg, the matter is no longer limited to one incident or to the crew's living problems. The journal, citing the assessment of the DOT&E office for the fiscal year 2025, points out that the wider problem of the Ford aircraft programme, namely whether the technical solutions introduced on the first unit of this series have already reached the maturity expected of them.

Fire — warning signal

We wrote about the fire on March 12, its location, scale and direct effects before on our portal. At the time, we informed that the fire broke out in the dry cleaner rooms, two sailors suffered minor injuries, and the incident itself, according to the U.S. Navy, had no connection with Operation "Epicka Furia" and did not affect the ship's further operation. In subsequent publications, we also pointed out that the event was part of a broader context of an extremely long operational deployment of the unit, which increasingly burdened both crew and ship maintenance systems.

But this is only the most visible layer. The real problem, at least from the perspective of the Pentagon, is not so much about the incident as it is that, after almost a decade of entering the service (2017) the USS Gerald R. Ford has still not closed the discussion on the reliability of its key systems. And that's why Bloomberg compiled the current events on board with the evaluation included in the DOT&E report.

Pentagon report and question marks

That's where you have to be precise. Director's office report, Operational Test & Evaluation does not state that Ford is an entity unable to act. However, he says something different and not less important: there is still insufficient data to fully assess the operational efficiency and usability of the ship, as the operational testing and evaluation process of IOT&E has not been completed.

In practice, this means that the most expensive U.S. warship is still functioning under the weight of questions that should have been closed long ago in the ideal scenario. It is not a media sensation, it is a broader problem of the program: whether the technological leap on which the Ford aircraft carrier was built proved to be a greater burden than was assumed in the design and implementation phase of the unit for service.

EMALS and AAG are back on track.

EMALS electromagnetic catapults and AAG braking rope system continue to attract the most attention. The Pentagon report shows that the reliability and maintenance of these solutions continue to influence the pace of the aircraft carrier's work cycle. This is a very important point, because these two systems are the most important solutions distinguishing the Ford type from older Nimitz carriers.

This is not about the simple thesis that systems "does not work". The problem is more complex and more uncomfortable. The thing is, Pentagon There is still no reason to consider the case definitively closed. And in the case of an aircraft carrier whose main task is to run intensive air operations, this is where the real assessment of the combat value of the ship begins.

Ammunition elevators and radar – these are not secondary matters

The issue of EMS-powered AWE ammunition elevators is similar. The DOT&E report indicates that the ship has still not demonstrated the fully assumed efficiency of the transport of weapons to the aircraft. From the reader's perspective, this may sound technical, but in practice it is one of the foundations of the aircraft carrier's operation: without a smooth circulation of weapons it is difficult to maintain the required rhythm of take-offs, arming and receiving aircraft on board.

There are also objections to DBR's two-range radar. The DOT&E report indicates that this system is expected to be replaced in the future by EASR radar, and until then its availability will depend on spare parts and contract support. It's not a detail either. On the ship, which is to be the centre of the impact group, the reliability of radar and technical facilities is as important as the efficiency of the systems deciding on aircraft carrier cycle. Since the Pentagon is still paying attention to this, it is difficult to treat this problem as a one-time episode.

Is the USS carrier problem Gerald R. Ford Is he really a problem with the whole program?

From my perspective, this is the most important thing. History USS Gerald R. Ford The problem of one unlucky unit seems to be becoming less and more difficult as a result of an ambitious attempt to implement many new technologies simultaneously. Fire in the laundry, crew's living problems and forced entry to the port are easy to show on the header. It is much harder to describe the fact that real tension increases around less spectacular things, but for the U.S. Navy much more important: the reliability of catapults, the braking rope system, ammunition elevators and DBR radar. This is the direction of interpretation imposed today by both Bloomberg and the DOT&E report itself.

In this sense, USS Gerald R. Ford remains a symbol of American maritime ambitions, but at the same time shows that even the world's most expensive warship will not defend itself with the momentum of the program and the price included in the contract. Its real value still needs to be confirmed in practice, and with this Pentagon He still has a problem.