Vietnam artificial islands in the Spratly Archipelago

Even a few years ago, Beijing was a symbol of expansion in the South China Sea. He built artificial islands, runways, and military bases on reefs that had previously barely propped over water. Today, Vietnam has taken over the role of a quiet "builder" who has significantly accelerated the rehabilitation of the Spratly Archipelago in recent months.

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Vietnamese Remediation vs Chinese

The Spratly Islands are small pieces of land scattered in the South China Sea, but their importance is incomparably larger than the size. Thanks to their strategic position on the shipping routes, they became an inflammatory point of regional competition. Six countries have been resenting them for years, and every new investment in reefs has aroused geopolitical emotions.

The symbol of this expansion over the years has been the actions of Beijing – the construction of artificial islands, runways and military bases on reefs that had previously barely been exposed above water. Today, however, Vietnam takes over the role of a quiet "builder" who has significantly accelerated the rehabilitation in recent months Spratly Archipelago.

Since mid-2022 Vietnam has gained over 300 hectares of new land, which means that the scale of work has already reached about 70% of what China had done before. Experts point out that if the pace is maintained, Hanoi may even top Beijing in terms of the total surface area of artificial islands in the region.

This revolutionary change – so far Beijing has been considered the only actor capable of conducting such large and costly megaprojects at sea. But now Vietnam shows that it can not only catch up with distance, but even challenge Chinese dominance in the Spratly Islands.

It is worth noting that Hanoi's work rate is faster than in Chinese investment a decade ago – China needed several years to turn Fiery Cross or Subi Reef into bastions with runways. Vietnam accelerated this process, using the experience and technology that Beijing had previously tested.

For the region this means that the game is no longer just about symbolism. The resulting bases are real resistance points – fortifications, ports and logistics facilities, which increase the sustained military presence. It is not only a matter of area in hectares, but also a practical ability to project force in the South China Sea.

Spratly Islands in the shadow of competition

The Spratly Archipelago is a collection of over a hundred reefs, islets and rocks that six countries compete for: Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and China. Biggest player There is no doubt Beijing, which claims the right to almost all the water, without retreating from the use of force and diplomatic pressure. And yet, alongside this power, Vietnam step by step, patiently and without publicity, builds its own presence. There are no giant parades or great messages – but there is a laborious work of excavators, concrete mixers and engineers who transform subsequent reefs into resistance points.

This strategy shows that even a smaller state can systematically increase its defence and administrative capacity. Hanoi acts like a player in a long game of chess: each new magazine, port or radar is another figure set on the board. And although at first sight it remains in the shadow of China, in time it may turn out that this patience will give it an advantage in the region.

New infrastructure – ports, radars and strip on the horizon

According to the latest AMTI report, Vietnam by the spring of 2025 increased the artificial land on all 21 occupied positions on the Spratly islands. Objects such as Alison, Collins, East Reef, Landsdowne and Petley have been converted from simple bunkers to more elaborate platforms; constructions resembling ammunition storage have emerged. Further analysis of CSIS adds that these newly created bases provide real space for coastal artillery, missile systems, radars and other detection devices.

According to industry sources, in 2021 only four Vietnamese facilities on Achpelag Spratly had ports. Today there are twelve of them – it is a leap that radically improves logistics and allows to keep its warships in the area much longer than before. It is a key element to maintain a permanent presence on islands and support patrol vessels, fishing boats – also in crisis situations. Port infrastructure is supported not only by local companies, but also by international cooperation: American companies (e.g. Boeing, L3Harris) offer maritime surveillance and satellite communications systems, and European (Thales, Leonardo) provide radars and navigation systems with AI and real-time data analysis.

Barque Canada Reef became a showcase of Hanoi's new ambitions – in 2024, a 2.4 km long runway appeared there. AMTI emphasizes that this is the only full-size airport in the entire program, because on other reefs the building leaves no room for similar projects. The area is already equipped with functional structures, including capes, breakwaters, as well as islands with bridges ("Thuyen Chai" A–E), which creates the potential to build a runway of up to 3,000 m long. This shows that Vietnam is not just building today – it plans future development and more operational opportunities.

The silent offensive of Vietnamese diplomacy

Vietnam has consistently avoided ostentatious declarations for years that could cause international tensions. Unlike Beijing, which each new investment in the South China Sea surrounds with loud propaganda about "historic rights" and "defence of territorial integrity", Hanoi chooses a different path.

Vietnam's strategy lies in quiet, gradual expansion – first reefs and shoals appear heavy remediation equipment, then another hectare of artificial land are created. After a few months, the new island gains reinforcements, warehouses, or a small landing ground. Then it turns on. it for routine naval activities, patrolled by Coast Guard units and supported by local military garrisons.

Such actions resemble a silent policy of facts done. When the infrastructure is built, it quickly enters the daily rhythm of the service: patrols, equipment, logistics appear. Over time, new islands become a daily sight and... it's harder to question them.

From Hanoi's point of view, it is logical – a country that continues to balance between cooperation with China and close ties with the US and ASEAN, does not want to provoke open confrontation. As a result, Vietnam achieves similar goals as Beijing, but other methods: instead of media shows and harsh statements, it focuses on patient, methodical expansion of its own sphere of influence on the Spratly islands.

Written by Mariusz Dasiewicz