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Ćwiczenia „Strażnik Bałtyku-25”. Marynarka Wojenna – reakcja na zagrożenia
W obliczu rosnącego napięcia na Bałtyku, 3 lutego Marynarka Wojenna RP przeprowadziła ćwiczenia „Strażnik Bałtyku-25”. Ich celem było doskonalenie procedur reagowania na potencjalne zagrożenia. Szczególny nacisk położono na wykrywanie, identyfikację i kontrolę niezidentyfikowanych jednostek operujących w pobliżu polskich wód terytorialnych i infrastruktury krytycznej.
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Scenariusz ćwiczeń „Strażnik Bałtyku-25” – „statek widmo” na horyzoncie
Głównym założeniem ćwiczeń było przechwycenie i zabezpieczenie jednostki morskiej, która nie odpowiada na wezwania i podejrzanie zbliża się do polskich instalacji wydobywczych na Bałtyku. W tym przypadku chodziło o tzw. statek floty cieni – jednostkę, której transpondery systemu AIS są wyłączone, a załoga nie reaguje na próby nawiązania kontaktu.
Tego typu sytuacje stanowią realne zagrożenie, zwłaszcza w kontekście możliwych działań dywersyjnych, takich jak podkładanie ładunków wybuchowych czy niszczenie podmorskiej infrastruktury telekomunikacyjnej i energetycznej.
Dynamiczna reakcja polskich sił podczas ćwiczeń „Strażnik Bałtyku-25”
W odpowiedzi na zagrożenie do akcji wkroczyły jednostki Morskiego Oddziału Straży Granicznej, które jako pierwsze miały przeprowadzić inspekcję podejrzanego statku. W tym przypadku rolę „statku floty cieni” odegrała jednostka Zodiak II, należąca do Urzędu Morskiego w Gdyni. Ciekawostką jest, że jednostka została zbudowana w Stoczni Remontowej Shipbuilding, gdy jej prezesem był Marcin Ryngwelski, obecnie stojący na czele PGZ Stoczni Wojennej. Oddana do służby w 2021 roku, została uznana za najlepszą jednostkę tego typu na świecie według renomowanego czasopisma branżowego.
W momencie, gdy jednostki straży granicznej zbliżyły się do statku, z jego pokładu zrzucono niezidentyfikowany obiekt – mogący być zarówno dronem podwodnym, jak i ładunkiem wybuchowym. Sytuacja eskalowała, co wymusiło poderwanie do akcji samolotu patrolowego Bryza oraz fregaty rakietowej ORP Kościuszko.
Ćwiczenia te pokazały, jak skomplikowaną operacją jest przejęcie jednostki mogącej stwarzać zagrożenie. Samo dostanie się na pokład dużego statku, który nie współpracuje, może być niezwykle trudne i wiązać się z wysokim ryzykiem dla żołnierzy.
Skoordynowane działania na wielu poziomach
Operacja wymagała perfekcyjnej koordynacji sił marynarki wojennej, lotnictwa, wojsk specjalnych oraz straży granicznej. W ramach symulacji podjęto próbę zmuszenia jednostki do zatrzymania się poprzez demonstrację siły – w tym strzały ostrzegawcze przed dziób statku. Gdy to nie przyniosło efektu, abordaż przeprowadziła Formoza, wykorzystując swoje łodzie półsztywne. Następnie na pokład wszedł Boarding Team fregaty, który dokonał kontroli jednostki.
Podczas operacji wsparcie z powietrza zapewniały śmigłowce Black Hawk z JW GROM, jednak ich rolą było jedynie zabezpieczenie sytuacji z powietrza – nie przeprowadzano desantu. Na pokładzie śmigłowców znajdowali się snajperzy Formozy.
Marynarka Wojenna na straży bezpieczeństwa Bałtyku
Zagrożenia, na które odpowiadają ćwiczenia „Strażnik Bałtyku-25”, to nie fikcja, lecz realne wyzwania, z jakimi mierzą się państwa regionu. W ostatnich latach na Bałtyku dochodziło do incydentów, takich jak uszkodzenie gazociągu Nord Stream czy przecięcia podmorskich kabli energetycznych i telekomunikacyjnych, co pokazuje, jak wrażliwa jest infrastruktura krytyczna na tym akwenie.
Marynarka Wojenna RP, mimo ograniczonych zasobów i oczekiwania na nowe jednostki w ramach programów Miecznik i Orka, stale doskonali swoje zdolności operacyjne. W najbliższych latach flota ma zostać wzmocniona trzema fregatami Miecznik, co najmniej dwoma okrętami podwodnymi w ramach programu Orka, trzema niszczycielami min Kormoran II oraz okrętem ratowniczym w ramach programu Ratownik. Kluczowym wyzwaniem pozostaje skuteczna ochrona infrastruktury krytycznej – rurociągów, terminalu LNG i portów naftowych – w sytuacji, gdy przeciwnik stosuje nieregularne metody działania.
Ćwiczenia „Strażnik Bałtyku-25” dowodzą, że polskie siły morskie są gotowe na wyzwania przyszłości, choć jednocześnie podkreślają potrzebę dalszego wzmacniania potencjału MW RP. W obliczu dynamicznie zmieniającej się sytuacji bezpieczeństwa w regionie Bałtyku, tego typu manewry mają kluczowe znaczenie dla utrzymania stabilności i odstraszania potencjalnych przeciwników.
Autor: Mariusz Dasiewicz
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Why European Frigate Programmes Struggle – and What Distinguishes the Few That Don’t
As European navies modernise their surface fleets, frigate programmes have become a litmus test for industrial governance, risk management and institutional maturity. Recent experience across the continent suggests that outcomes are shaped less by ambition or technology than by when and how complexity is confronted.
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Frigate Programmes Under Pressure: Structural Patterns Rather Than National Exceptions
Across major naval procurement programmes, frigate construction has increasingly been associated with schedule slippage, cost escalation and declining delivery confidence. This pattern is visible across several Western navies and reflects persistent structural pressures in how modern surface combatants are designed, contracted and brought into service.
In recent years, parliamentary oversight and official assessments have made these dynamics unusually transparent. In some cases, programmes advance physically-modules assembled, steel cut, keels laid—while formal delivery confidence ratings indicate that successful completion remains uncertain without corrective action.
Rather than focusing on individual programmes as isolated successes or failures, a more illuminating approach is to analyse the structural conditions under which delivery confidence deteriorates—or is preserved: when risk is deferred, how integration is sequenced, and how national industrial governance shapes programme behaviour over time.
Delivery Confidence, Design Maturity and the Cost of Concurrency
One increasingly visible indicator of stress within naval procurement is the divergence between construction status and delivery confidence assessments. Situations have emerged where ships are already under construction, or even launched, while formal delivery confidence is categorised as red-indicating that, under current conditions, successful delivery appears unachievable without significant intervention.
This pattern is commonly associated with high degrees of concurrency: ship construction, workforce ramp-up, combat system integration and industrial modernisation advancing in parallel rather than sequentially. While such concurrency may appear to compress timelines, it also concentrates unresolved risk into the build and integration phases-precisely when options to adjust scope, sequencing or architecture are most constrained.
Public acknowledgements of inflationary pressure and integration risk, alongside assertions that programmes remain “in line with plans and forecasts”, illustrate a recurring tension: investment in facilities and integration capacity can mitigate risk, but also confirms that risk has not been eliminated-only displaced.
Reference Models and Diverging Outcomes
International experience suggests that the most persistent problems arise where three conditions coincide:
- incomplete design maturity at contract award,
- dispersed or evolving production arrangements,
- accelerated schedules that assume later integration will absorb early uncertainty.
In such cases, delivery confidence tends to erode even as visible progress continues.
By contrast, programmes that prioritise architectural stability, incremental capability introduction and firm control of scope before construction begins tend to display greater predictability over time. This does not imply technological conservatism, but a governance choice to constrain variance rather than optimise capability early.
Within Europe, several frigate programmes are now referenced as illustrations of different risk-management logics rather than as national exemplars.
Programme Maturity as a Structural Variable
In comparative analyses of recent European frigate programmes, differences in delivery outcomes increasingly appear to correlate less with national ambition than with accumulated programme maturity and institutional learning.
While individual programmes are often discussed in isolation, international experience suggests that delivery outcomes are rarely explained by single design decisions or isolated industrial measures. More often, they reflect accumulated programme behaviour: a sequence of architectural choices, governance practices and institutional learning built up over time.
Programmes that appear stable in execution tend to share a common characteristic: they are not abrupt departures from earlier work, but the result of iterative development across multiple generations of ships, organisations and supply chains. Their relative execution predictability is therefore less a function of novelty than of continuity.
Incremental introduction of new technologies, firm control of design baselines prior to construction, and avoidance of radical mid-build modifications consistently emerge as decisive factors. Where such practices are embedded over long periods, they become organisational habits rather than ad‑hoc risk mitigations.
Certain European programmes are increasingly referenced in this context-not as outliers, but as illustrations of how sustained investment in digital design, systems engineering and integration discipline can translate into comparatively predictable execution, albeit within tightly governed frameworks that leave limited room for late-stage deviation.
British Type 31: Progress Without Corresponding Confidence
The United Kingdom’s Type 31 frigate illustrates the tension between physical progress and delivery confidence. Despite visible milestones-launch events, modular construction and expanded shipyard capacity-official assessments in late 2025 assigned the programme a red delivery-confidence rating, indicating that successful delivery could not be assumed without corrective action.
Fot. Babcock Internationale A substantial investment in shipyard modernisation and shore-based integration facilities has been presented as a mitigating measure. However, the juxtaposition of a red confidence rating with ongoing construction reflects a familiar structural pattern: concurrency sustains momentum while increasing the internal concentration of risk.
The French FDI Programme: Discipline With Structural Constraints
The French FDI frigate programme is often cited as evidence that schedule and cost discipline remain achievable in modern frigate construction. This assessment is broadly accurate but requires nuance.
The relative predictability of FDI is based on a highly centralised governance model, strong design authority and strict scope control. These characteristics have limited design churn and supported execution stability. At the same time, they limit elasticity: configuration divergence and sovereign modification are feasible but procedurally demanding.
Thus, FDI represents a model of low variance but low elasticity: predictable and coherent, but less accommodating of rapidly evolving requirements.
Spanish F110 frigate: Importance of the industrial system
Spanish F110 frigate: Importance of the industrial system
The Spanish F110 frigate is one of the cases frequently cited in recent comparative analyses. Its development did not begin with the current hulls but is based on a long sequence of surface‑combat programmes that progressively reduced uncertainty rather than accumulating it.
This suggests that programme maturity must be understood not only at the level of an individual ship, but also at the level of the industrial system that produces it. Where that system has already absorbed the learning curves associated with complex integration, subsequent programmes begin from a fundamentally different risk position.
Seen from this perspective, contracting decisions are less about selecting a platform than about selecting an industrial trajectory-one in which predictability is the cumulative result of methodical, long-term effort rather than accelerated optimisation.
The Polish Miecznik Programme: Deferred Decisions, Rising Costs
Poland’s Miecznik frigate illustrates a less forgiving variant of the same structural dynamic. Although based on an existing design line, the programme has been characterised by repeated revisions to cost assumptions, shifts in delivery timelines and an extended pre‑contract phase that has significantly shaped its risk profile.
Open-source reporting and official disclosures indicate that the total programme value has increased substantially compared with initial estimates, with successive contract modifications reflecting evolving scope, system choices and industrial arrangements. Delivery milestones have likewise shifted to the right as design completion and industrial mobilisation advance.
These developments do not indicate programme failure. Rather, they suggest that risk has not been eliminated but redistributed. In Miecznik’s case, a significant portion of that risk appears to have emerged early through renegotiations and baseline revisions, rather than later through formal delivery‑confidence warnings. As a result, the programme enters its construction and integration phases with less schedule margin and greater sensitivity to sunk cost than originally envisaged.
The German Case: Modular Ambition Under Fragmented Governance
Recent German frigate programmes add another dimension to the European landscape. Despite access to one of Europe’s most capable naval industrial bases, outcomes have been repeatedly shaped less by technology than by governance structure.
The F125 frigate entered service only after considerable delays and extensive post‑delivery remediation. Its successor, the F126, has so far shown familiar symptoms: cost increases, schedule delays and prolonged decision chains, despite the involvement of the experienced Damen Shipyards Group as prime contractor.
Fot. Bundeswehr / Carsten Vennemann The German case is instructive because it removes simple explanations: even where design philosophies emphasise reuse and modularity, outcomes remain highly sensitive to clarity of design authority and sequencing discipline. Without these, complexity is not removed-it is merely displaced.
Implications for Decision-Making
Taken together, recent European experience suggests that the decisive variable in frigate programmes is not ambition, but when risk is absorbed.
- Risk deferred to construction and integration phases is the least reversible.
- Risk addressed earlier limits options but preserves delivery credibility.
However, from a Central and Baltic European perspective, the challenge increasingly concerns time. The strategic environment in the Baltic Sea region continues to evolve faster than naval modernisation cycles allow, giving priority to early operational availability over theoretical final capability.
For neighbouring allies approaching major surface‑combatant decisions, including Sweden and Denmark, recapitalisation delays are therefore not a purely national concern. They affect the entire region, shaping deterrence, interoperability and collective resilience.
